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PREFACE
The material contained herein constitutes a supplement to
the report entitled Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarma-
ment--The DecadeUnder Khrushchev, 1954-19617prepared under
contract (ACDA IR-15) with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency.
The report proper concentrates its focus on three periods--
1954-1956, 1957-1962, and 1962-1964. For each period the analysis
in the report is introduced by a brief factual summary of the
manifest Soviet negotiating posture and the propaganda line that
accompanied it.
This annex volume contains the same general material in
considerably more detailed form. While it does not purport to
tell the whole historical story, it may be of interest to those
wishing to explore the material in greater detail. In addition
to Messrs. Clemens and Griffiths, contributions were made by
Peter Kenez , Paul Marantz, and Joseph L. Nogee.
Lincoln P. Bloomfield
Director, Arms Control Project
Chapter I
THE SPIRIT OF GENEVA: A NEW ROUND AFTER STALIN
1954-1956
A. The Negotiations: Style and Substance
1. September 1954 to May 1955: Oscillation. The shift
in manifest Soviet policies toward arms control can be dated
from September 1954.
Table I.1
DATES OF MAJOR MEETINGS OF U.N.
DISARMAMENT ORGANS, 1952-1957
U.N. Disarmament Commission
U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee
1952 March 14-August 29
1954 May 13-June 22
1954 July 20-29
1955 February 25-May18
1955 August 29-October 7
1956 March 19-May4
1956 July 3-16
1957 March 18-September 6
This table shows the periods of meetings of the two
principal disarmament negotiating bodies referred to in the
text, apart from meetings of a purely formal or procedural
nature. The basic forum for negotiations from 1954 till 1957
was the Subcommittee, where the United States, Soviet, British,
French, and Canadian governments negotiated behind closed doors,
though with the understanding that their verbatim record would
eventually become public.
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It took the form of a statement by Andrei Vyshinsky to the U.1. U
General Assembly on September 30 during debate on the disarmament
item. In this statement the Soviet Union dropped the demand for
unconditional prohibition of all nuclear weapons regardless of
conventional arms reductions or control measures--a demand that
had characterized Soviet policy for many years. Specifically,
the Soviets declared themselves willing to negotiate on the basis
of the principles laid out in the so-called Anglo-French proposals
of June 11, 1954 on the phasing of nuclear and conventional disarma-
ment. Inherent in this proposal was the willingness to proceed in
stages, instead of the immediate and sweeping measures contained
in previous Soviet proposals.
Oscillation in the Soviet position even at that point was
not long in coming. TASS on February 18, 1955 carried a statement
proposing the immediate destruction of all nuclear stocks; the
freezing of conventional forces and military budgets as of January 1,
1955; and the convening of a world disarmament conference forthwith;
in other words, restating the old Soviet position with virtually
no change. Thus when the Disarmament Commission Subcommittee (DCSC)
reconvened on February 25, 1955, Soviet representative Andrei
Gromyko, by insisting on priority for the position stated by TASS,
appeared to renege on the position originally presented to the
Assembly.
On March 11, 1955, however, Moscow again appeared to return
to its previously stated willingness to negotiate on the basis of
the Anglo-French memorandum. The details were spelled out in a
Soviet proposal of March 18, 1955 that was in many ways similar to
the French elaboration of the plan originally introduced by the
Western nations on March 8. The Soviet and Western plans appeared
to be in agreement on the following points:
1. The disarmament program should begin with a
freeze on military forces and spending. (In dispute was
the base period for the freeze and whether, as Moscow
proposed, armaments should be included.)
2. Reductions of military manpower and conventional
armaments should take place in two stages.
3. Production of nuclear weapons should halt at
the end of the first stage (Western proposal) or at the
beginning of the second stage (Soviet proposal).
4. Following the latter two stages there might be
a reduction of forces to the minimum levels needed for
internal security and fulfillment of U.N. obligations.
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5. "Existing" stocks of nuclear materials would be
used exclusively for peaceful purposes. (Later in 1955
Moscow announced it would take part in the United States-
proposed International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEAJ. Nothing
was said in the DCSC about an end to production of fission-
able materials.)
This set of proposals seemed to constitute a wide framework
of consensus potentially broader than any East-West agreement since
1945. Nonetheless there were important differences, which Western
proposals in mid-April of the same year helped to bridge. But the
Soviet d6marche of May 10, 1955, seemed to go still further toward
narrowing the gap between East and West.
2. May through December 1955: Soviet Demarche and U.S.
"Reservation." The Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955 were particularly
significant in three respects. First, they acknowledged that, as
the West had been insisting for years, hidden nuclear stockpiles
were an undeniable possibility in the contemporary world; this
effectively put an end to Soviet demands for a simple uninspected
ban on nuclear weapons. Second, although they constituted a com-
prehensive "package," the May 10 proposals' emphasis on a nuclear
test ban and ground control posts marked the beginnings of Soviet
interest in a partial measures approach which became explicit in
March 1956.1 And third, they represented a movement toward Western
positions on some of the details of disarmament, particularly in terms
of the interrelationship between disarmament and security, that was
nothing short of dramatic by contrast to the glacial pace of negotia-
tions until then.
Specifically, the Soviet May 10 proposal adopted the Western
position on force levels, the timing of nuclear disarmament, and the
principle of a single control organ (the first three items listed in
Table 1.2). It also accepted the Western view that the base period
for the initial freeze should be 1954 rather than 1955. At the same
time the three East-West differences on inspection and control remained
as indicated on items 4-5 in Table 1.2. Questions of control were
Moscow's first serious interest in partial measures dated
from 1955. It was confirmed by Premier Khrushchev himself in his
September 18, 1959 address to the U.N. General Assembly. "The Soviet
Government," he said, "considers it appropriate to recall its dis-
armament proposals of May 10, 1955, which outlined a specific scheme
for partial measures in the field of disarmament." U.S. Department
of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959 (2 vols.; Washington,
1960), Vol. II, p. 1460. Hereafter cited as Documents on Disarmament.
1945-1959.
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central then--as they still are. They were in fact discussed in a
separate section of the May 10, 1955 document, which argued that
international distrust did not presently permit states to allow
international inspection of industrial and other facilities basic
to their security. An agreement that purported to authorize such
inspection "would create a false sense of security" because "there
are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for
evading this control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture
of atomic and hydrogen weapons. . . ."1 Premier Bulganin made the
same point in a speech to the Warsaw Pact conference on May 11. In
defending the new Soviet position on disarmament inspection he ex-
plained, "It is possible to have controllers, but not to exert
control. "2
Clearly an inner contradiction pervaded the Soviets' May 10
d6marche, growing out of their acknowledgment of the clandestine-
weapon problem coupled with a call at the same time for complete
nuclear disarmament under what might or might not be adequate inter-
national control. Moscow offered two approaches in an apparent effort
to overcome this dilemma. First, the May 10 dsmarche began with a
"political declaration" listing the major cold war issues andCD Icalling for their early resolution in order to "create the requisite
conditions for the execution of a broad disarmament program" with
"international control over its implementation." Second, the
May 10 statement on control proposed the establishment, during the
first stage of conventional reductions, of static control posts to
guard against surprise attack. These would be established "at
large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways, and in
aerodromes" in the territory of the states concerned. These posts
would be supplemented by the single control organ with expanding
powers and unlimited access to the objects subject to its jurisdic-
tion.
Without wholly facing up to the many political and technical
difficulties raised by its new proposals, Moscow implied that con-
fidence-building measures--including measures to guard against
certain types of surprise attack--would create a climate in which
unrestricted inspection might either be allowed (though this was
never specified by Moscow) or--more likely in the light of increased
good will between states--become superfluous.
lIbid., Vol. I, p. 465.
2Ibid., p. 470.
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The seeds of the partial-measures approach that Moscow
pursued increasingly in the next two years existed in the compre-
hensive program espoused on May 10, 1955--not only in the surprise
attack posts but in another measure proposed for the first time by
a great power: a nuclear test ban, to be implemented in the first
stage. The May 10 proposal posited that the test ban would be
supervised by an international commission reporting to the General
Assembly. (However, Moscow's position evolved in 1955 and 1956 to
deny the need for special machinery to inspect a test ban.)
The May 10 initiative involved other unresolved problems.
One was its timetable, calling for only one year per stage. Another
was its proposed liquidation of all overseas bases in 1956 and 1957.
A Also, it postponed many vital details for a world disarmament confer-
ence to be called early in 1956. Finally, all measures of "pre-
vention" and "suppression" regarding violations of the agreement were
entrusted to the veto-ridden Security Council.
Despite the difficulties, the Soviet demarche of May 10, 1955
appeared an oasis in a desert after the barren record of ten years'
disarmament negotiations. The response of the Western negotiators
indicates the degree of at least verbal consensus that seemed suddenly
to have been achieved. The French representative, Jules Moch, imme-
diately termed the Soviet move "historic" because "it repeats earlier
proposals by the Western powers," adding "that the whole thing looks
too good to be true." 2 The United States delegate, James Wadsworth,
on May 12 said he was "gratified to find that the concepts which we have
put forward over a considerable lengbh of Lime . . . .have been accepted
in a large measure by ghe Soviet Union."3 Mr. Johnson of Canada spoke
of "a marked advance," and Anthony Nutting, representing the United
Kingdom, described the Soviet initiative as "an encouraging develop-
ment and a significant advance." 5
In retrospect it may be significant that the May 10 proposals
were made on the same day that the West invited Moscow to attend a
Heads of Governments Conference--a meeting at the Summit. It can
be suggested that the Soviet initiative may have been intended to
condition the atmosphere in which an East-West rapprochement was to
take place. The West, in any case, moved to adjourn the DCSC,
&A
1 See, e.g., Bulganin's September 11, 1956 letter to
Eisenhower in Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. I, p. 692.
2 United Nations Document DC/SC.1/PV.47, pp. 56-57, May 10, 1955.
3United Nations Document DC/SC.1/PV48, p. 43.
Ibid., p. 21.
5Ibid., p. 12.
Table L.2
MAJOR DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION SUBCOMMITTEE, MARCH 8 TO MAY, 10, 1955
Western Position1 Soviet Position2
1. Force Levels
Manpower reductions in two stages to specified
levels for the Big Five (1 to 1.5 million for the
United States, Soviet Union, and C.P.R.;
650,000 for Great Britain and France).
Blanket cut of one third in Big Five manpower.
2. Nuclear Weapons
Complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear
weapons at the erd of the two-stage process of
conventional disarmament. (Modified on April 19,
1955 by the Anglo-French 75 per cent "compromise,"
which proposed splitting the difference between
the Western- and Soviet-proposed phasing. The
United States and Canada did not approve this com-
promise proposal pending Moscow's response-- a
point stressed in Soviet historical writing.)
Complete nuclear disarmament at the beginning
of the second stage of conventional arms
reductions.
0-N
3. Control Organ
One control organ with expanding powers to super-
vise first conventional and then nuclear disarma-
ment.
Temporary organ to supervise conventional dis-
armament followed by a permament organ to
supervise nuclear disarmament.
4. Transition Between Stages
International control organ to be in position
to supervise each stage of disarmament before
it begins.
International control positioned "simultan-
eously" with the beginning of each disarmament
stage.
m - --- ----- m - - m m -
Transition from one stage to next dependent
on report of control organ. Only tentative
deadlines. ("Residual elements of Baruch
Plan" in Soviet terminology.)
I
Transition from one stage to another according
to predetermined schedule of 6 to 12 months per
stage. ("Total automism" in Western terminology.)
5.1 Right of Access
Inspectors to have "unrestricted access to
installations and facilities as required by
them . . . to perform their duties." (Empi
added.)
1March 8 plan, United Nations Document
DC/SC.l.15/Rev.l; April 19 compromise, ibi
DC/SC.1/24; April 21 control plan, ibid.,
DC/SC./25; for historical comment on point
above, see V. Zorin, ed., Bor'ba Sovetskovc
Soiuza za razoruzhenie, 1946-1960 (IMoscow,
1961), pp. 182-184; also, pp. 196-199, whei
subsequent conflicts among the Western alli
in September 1955 are discussed.
all
as is
Inspectors to have "unrestricted access, within
the limits of the supervisory functions they
exercise, to all establishments these objects
to be specified subject to control."
(Emphasis added.)
2March 18 plan, United Nations Document
DC/SC.1/19/Rev.1; no substantive changes until
May 10, 1955.
2
e
es
A
I
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apparently because the Heads of Governments Conference might
drastically alter the terms of discussion. The Soviet delega-
tion, in contrast, protested that negotiations should continue
in the DCSC in order to lay the basis for a disarmament agreement
at the Summit. The Western majority prevailed, and the DCSC
adjourned on May 18, 1955 until after the Heads of Governments
Conference.
The chiefs of state met in Geneva in July of 1955. From
July 18 to 22 they discussed disarmament, European security and
Germany, and cultural and economic exchange programs. On the
first topic, Premier Bulganin introduced a modified version of
the Soviets' May 10 proposal, dropping its "political declaration,"
its statement concerning clandestine weapons, and some of its less
feasible features, such as the two-year timetable and the proposed
liquidation of foreign bases. But some troublesome changes were
also made. The most egregious of these was an additional speci-
fication that non-great-power armed forces be limited to 150,000
to 200,000 men--a provision obviously directed against the recently
developed NATO plans to build a 500,000-man Bundeswehr. (The May 10
proposal had said that limits on the forces of smaller powers would
be fixed early in 1956 by a "World Disarmament Conference.")
At the Summit meeting there was actually no real negotiation
on disarmament. In fact, in Geneva the Western heads of govern-
ment made no reference to the positions they had advanced and
debated earlier that spring in the DCSC. Nor did they reply to
Bulganin's amended version of the Soviets' May 10 proposal except
to assert that static control posts were insufficient to guard
against surprise attack. Instead the Western leaders spoke in
terms of control measures, each advocating an approach that would,
they said, lead later to disarmament. President Eisenhower thus
made his surprise "Open Skies" proposal for aerial inspection of
the Soviet Union and the United States. British Prime Minister
Anthony Eden pushed for an experimental zone of arms limitations
and inspection in Central Europe; French Premier Faure espoused
budgetary controls of armaments.
The various issues and proposals dealing with control of
armaments were soon overshadowed by the chief item of contention
at the Summit: European security and Germany. Moscow proposed
that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact be replaced by an all-European
security pact within the framework of which the presumably neutral-
ized Germany might be reunited. The West, however, refused to
disband NATO and insisted that Germany should be reunited only on
the basis of free elections and a free hand in foreign and military
policy--conditions that Moscow quickly rejected.
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Disarmament negotiations continued when the DCSC reconvened
in New York late in August of 1955. Each delegation continued to
press the basic line taken by its government at Geneva. On Sep-
tember 6 Harold Stassen representing the United States announced that
his government was placing a "reservation" on all American "pre-
Summit" disarmament positions. He and the other Western delegates
still espoused the control measures advocated by their governments
at Geneva but called for additional research to overcome the
difficulties of control alluded to in Moscow's statement of May 10.
In anticipation of the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly session
and also the Foreign Ministers conference following up the Summit
meeting, the DCSC halted its deliberations on October 7, 1955.
From October 27 through November 16, 1955 the Foreign Minis-
ters meeting in Geneva wrestled with the same issues discussed at
the Summit conference in July. They finally admitted what the
heads of government had not: that such new "spirit" as existed in
East-West relations was not adequate to resolve divergent positions
on European security and Germany, on economic and cultural exchange
--and on disarmament and its control.
The disarmament issue was next debated in December 1955 at
the Tenth General Assembly Session in New York. The resolution
on disarmament that was finally passed--over Soviet bloc opposition
--resembled the final statement issued by the Western foreign
ministers at Geneva. It called on the DCSC to continue its efforts
toward comprehensive disarmament, giving priority to (1) such con-
fidence building measures as Precident Eisenhower's plan for
exchanging military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection and
Premier Bulganin's plan for establishing control posts at strategic
centers, and (2) to all such measures of adequately safeguarded
disarmament as were feasible. The Faure and Eden proposals at the
Summit Conference were also to be studied, along with India's nuclear
test ban suggestion.
UNGA Resolution 914 (X) proposed by the four Western members
of the DCSC. Passed on December 16, 1955 by 56-7-0, the negative
votes coming from the Warsaw Pact nations. Moscow had proposed
amendments to the resolution stressing the East-West "rapprochement"
that had been achieved on (1) force levels, (2) the phasing of nuclear
disarmament, and (3) the "need to set up effective international con-
trol." The Soviet amendments would also have given a dominant role
to Moscow's proposals of May 10 and July 21, 1955, which the Western-
sponsored resolution passed over in silence. (Documents on Disarma-
ment, 1945-1959, Vol. I, pp. 583-584.)
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3- 1956: Detente and Partial Measures. The Summit
meeting of 1955 was followed up by a series of letters exchanged
between President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin, which was kept
up throughout 1956, actually intensifying during the Suez crisis.
Even considering the lack of real rapport and the amount of propa-
ganda involved, these exchanges can be viewed as reflecting a
growing sense in both capitals that personal exchanges might play
an important role in controlling tension between the parties. In
the sense that they were inspired by mutually perceived fears about
intentions, above all the fear of surprise attack, such high-level
communications came to have vital significance in the Cuban crisis
of 1962 and the subsequent installation of the "Hot Line."
Premier Bulganin's letters were particularly interesting in
historic context for their circumspect and "reasonable" tone and
their emphasis on agreements already reached and on the common
interests of the two superpowers. There appeared to be a connec-
tion between Moscow's apparent desire to perpetuate some semblance
of the "Geneva spirit" and the preparations for the Twentieth
Soviet Party Congress in February 1956. On January 23 Premier
Bulganin proposed a United States-Soviet treaty of friendship and
cooperation. In his reply of January 28, .President Eisenhower
scouted this offer, calling for deeds, not words, and reminded
Moscow that the obligations it proposed were already in the U.N.
Charter. On February 1 Bulganin's reply dilated on the benefits
to be gained from a United States-Soviet or all-European security
pact, pointing to Moscow's "deeds" in reducing its military per-
sonnel and budgets and in closing such foreign bases as Porkkala-Udd,
and the Soviet "initiative" in concluding the Austrian State Treaty.
While letters continued to pass at intervals between Moscow
and Washington, London, and Paris, negotiations resumed in the DCSC
between March 19 and May 4, 1956 and in the Disarmament Commission
itself between July 3 and 16. In the 1956 negotiations the West
continued to emphasize "Open Skies" as well as other inspection
plans but also elaborated programs for comprehensive disarmament
--conventional and nuclear. Britain and France--as in 1954 and
1956--attempted "syntheses" and compromises to bridge the gulf
between Washington's and Moscow's proposals.1
1See U.S. proposals of March 21 and 22, 1956 in ibid., Vol. I,
pp. 599-603; Anglo-French proposals of March 19 and May 3, 1956 in
ibid., Vol. I, pp. 595-598 and 615-622; and U.S., British, and
French proposals for force ceilings in ibid., Vol. I, pp. 601-603
and 608-613.
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On March 27, 1956 the Soviet Union introduced its only resolu-
tion at the DCSC in that year. The first part of the Soviet proposal
provided for limiting and reducing conventional armaments and armed
forces to the levels specified in the May 10 document but in two
rather than the three years proposed earlier. As at the Summit and
the Foreign Ministers Conferences in 1955, Moscow again provided
that China's obligations could be determined only with the parti-
cipation of the Peking regime.
The control provisions were somewhat more specific and far-
reaching than Moscow had proposed in 1955. Ground control posts
were again suggested, but with the clarification that they would
be enumerated in a special agreement that would also extend to the
signatories' foreign bases. The control organ again was to have
unlimited access to all objects of control, now spelled out as
"military units, stores of military equipment and ammunition; land,
naval, and air bases; factories manufacturing conventional armaments
and ammunition." Since no ban on nuclear production was contained
in the Soviet proposal, the problem of dealing with clandestine
nuclear production did not arise. However, Moscow had apparently
agreed to inspection--not just over "disarmament" but over all con-
ventional armaments.
The May 10, 1955 plan had provided that "unlimited access to
all objects of control" would commence only during the second stage
of conventional force reductions, allowing solely for fixed control
posts during the first stage. No such qualification existed in
the March 26, 1956 Soviet proposal, which simply said that subse-
uient agreem~enit would bt needed: to determine the size of conventional
reductions for each year. The 1956 draft even seemed to take a step
toward the "prior positioning" of control by specifying that the
control organ would be established within two months of the conven-
tion's entry into force and one month before the first reductions
began. It is evident that Moscow's March 27, 1956 proposal offered
even greater opportunities for exploring the control issue than
had the plan of May 10, 1955 (a fact overlooked by most commentators
of the period).
The March 1956 proposal outlined a scheme for a zone of arms
limitation and inspection in Central Europe that was similar to the
1954-1955 Eden Plan and the Rapacki Plans of 1957 and 1958. "Both
parts of Germany and of states adjacent to them" would be included.
(It should be noted that it did not say "both Germanies.") First,
ceilings would be placed on foreign forces in the zone. Second, the
stationing of atomic formations and weapons in the zone would be
prohibited--a move obviously designed to thwart U.S. plans for NATO.
Third, "joint inspection of the armed forces and armaments" in the
zone would be instituted.
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The Soviet draft reflected Moscow's growing interest in partial
measures. It declared:
Independently of the attainment of agreement on
the problems of disarmament, it is considered
desirable that states should agree to carry out
partial measures in this field, as follows:
1. To discontinue forthwith tests of thermonuclear
s .c weapons.
2. To ensure that no atomic weapons are included
in the armaments of troops in German territory.
The states concerned shall take the necessary
measures to carry out this provision within three
months.
3. To reduce the military budgets of states by up
to 15 per cent as against their military budgets
for the previous year. 1
The preamble of the Soviet document stated the hope that
the proposed reduction of conventional weapons would "facilitate
. . . agreement on the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons
and their elimination. . . ." But no renunciation of nuclear
weapons was advocated either with or without a "self-defense"
escape clause. The only limitations suggested on atomic and
hydrogen weapons were the two measures that according to the
proposal could be agreed on independently of progress toward con-
ventional disarmament: a ban on thermonuclear weapons tests and
a ban on stationing atomic weapons in Germany.
In presenting the Soviet plan Andrei Gromyko declared that
the aim of the proposal was to single out those measures on which
agreement was most feasible. Replying to the protests by Western
representatives concerning the absence of any provisions to reduce
nuclear weapons, Gromyko pointed out that the continued proposals
by Britain and France of comprehensive (that is, conventional and
nuclear) disarmament contradicted the support for partial measures
by the heads of government at the 1955 Summit Conference.
1lIbid., Vol. I, pp. 603-607. (Italics added.)
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As for 1956, Gromyko took the line that the Soviet Union was
proposing a "different approach" to the disarmament problem
since the linking of conventional and atomic disarmament "has been
a serious obstacle on the way to agreement." However he expressly
reaffirmed the comprehensive package of May 10, 1955 and stated
that his "sole motive" in separatinT conventional and nuclear
disarmament was to reach agreement.
This generally conciliatory Soviet public posture on dis-
armament questions continued when Gromyko on July 12, 1956 appeared
to accept the ceilings proposed by the Western powers in March 1956
of 2,500,000 men for Soviet, Chinese, and United States forces and
750,000 men each for Britain and for France. Moscow said it was
prepared to agree to these levels "as a first step," provided the
West agreed to follow this in a second stage with reductions to the
lower levels that Moscow had endorsed at the 1955 Summit Conference.
The Soviet delegate noted that the levels now proposed were
considerably higher than those the West had proposed in the spring
of 1955 to follow the second 50 per cent conventional reduction.
Gromyko also observed that the West had upped its ceiling for
the smaller powers from 150,000-200,000 to 500,000 men. Noting
once more Bonn's plan to establish a 500,000 man Bundeswehr,
Gromyko said, "It is not hard to guess where this new figure came
from."2 It was thus not surprising--but unpromising for serious
negotiations--that Soviet acceptance of the Western-proposed force
levels for the great powers was conditioned on a limit of 150,000
to 200,000 men for other states. Furthermore, the "acceptance"
was within the context of a larger program that included a ban
on the testing and use of "atomic" and "hydrogen" weapons, a ban
on the production of nuclear weapons, and the destruction of all
nuclear stocks.
It should also be noted, however, that according to Gromyko
if the other powers preferred it, Moscow was willing to negot ate
conventional disarmament separately from nuclear disarmament. In
addition, Moscow affirmed its willingness to make further unilateral
reductions if the United States, Britain, and France carried out a
"corresponding reduction in their own armed forces and armaments."
1Doc. DC/SC.1/PV.73, p. 11, March 27, 1956. Documents on
Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. I, p. 614.
2Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. I, pp. 670-671.
3Ibid., pp. 682-683.
4Ibid., p. 639.
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After the Disarmament Commission adjourned on July 16, 1956
President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin resumed their correspon-
dence and continued it at an intensive pace for the rest of the
year. Most of the letters concerned nuclear testing; the Soviet
Union wanted an immediate test ban without inspection, which it
held to be superfluous. The United States held that a test ban
would be meaningful only in the context of a larger disarmament
agreement and asserted that science had yet to devise adequate
inspection methods.
On November 17, 1956 Premier Bulganin sent the President a
declaration entitled "Concerning the2Question of Disarmament and
Reduction of International Tension." Its main thrust was to assail
Western involvement in the "counterrevolutionary military plot
against People's Hungary" and also to characterize the war against
Egypt as an integral part of a general imperialist plot against
peace. Recounting Moscow's deeds in behalf of peace, the declaration
closed by presenting a modified version of the May 10, 1955 Soviet
proposal for comprehensive nuclear and conventional disarmament
to be executed in two years.
This November 17 Soviet proposal contained two items of
technical interest. First, it defined for the first time the
territorial limits within which Moscow would permit aerial photo-
graphy. This took the form of a zone extending 800 kilometers to
the east and to the west of the line where NATO confronted Warsaw
Pact forces in Europe. Since much of NATO's defenses would be
covered but little Soviet territory, the proposed zone had little
appeal for the West.3 The Soviet proposal, moreover, did not
indicate at what tage even this variant of "Open Skies" would
come into effect.
1lbid., Documents Nos. 175, 176, 177, 178, 182, and 184.
2 bid., pp. 721-729.
31n April 1957 the United States made a counterproposal that
shifted the axis farther east in Europe and specified a second
inspection zone in the Far East. On April 30, 1957 Moscow agreed
in principle to both U.S. suggestions but modified them to take in
more territory that included U.S. bases. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 784-785.
At the 1955 Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers, Soviet
Foreign Minister Molotov had said that aerial photography could
be considered during the final stage of a comprehensive disarma-
ment program.
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A second interesting feature of the Soviet November 17, 1956
declaration was that it served as the basis for the comprehensive
proposals Moscow put forward at the DCSC early in 1957. Moreover,
in language slightly stronger than the May 10, 1955 initiative
it forecast the line on general and complete disarmament that
Premier Khrushchev was to put forward in 1959. The November
declaration stated that after completion of the measures
envisaged for the next two years it would be "necessary to raise
the question about the complete liquidation of armed forces and
armaments of all types with retention by states of only such
contingents of militia (police) which are necessary for assuring
internal security and the security of frontiers." It was a small
step from this concept to Moscow's 1960 proposal that such national
militias would form the contingents by which the Security Council
would maintain the peace.
In 1956, however, neither side addressed itself directly to
the other. Dual and even quadruple monologues were the result.
"Interim sparring" is Bechhoefer's apt term for the disarmament
proceedings in the latter half of 1955 and throughout 1956, while
both sides groped toward the ositions adopted during the "inten-
sified effort" begun in 1957. Certainly until the United States
completed its announced reappraisal of policy in mid-November 1956
the many exchanges of views could have been only "debates, even
among our allies, and not true negotiations."2
B. Political and Propaganda Uses of the Disarmament Issue
Manifest Soviet arms control policy has of course two inti-
mately connected aspects. One is the position taken in the diploma-
tic or negotiations form. The other is the propaganda line that
accompanies and supports Soviet disarmament diplomacy. Thus
simultaneously with the shift in the Soviet negotiating posture in
1955-1956 a change took place in Moscow's manipulation of the dis-
armament issue outside the negotiating forum. The change became
most noticeable in the May 10 proposals and in their treatment in
Soviet propaganda media and continued to be evident throughout
most of 1956. Soviet propaganda machinery seemed to move away from~
the heavy-handed efforts of the Stalin era to "expose" imperialist
hypocracy in the negotiations. Instead of "struggle" from below
to set the masses against the capitalist elites, Soviet communica-
tions media aimed now at dividing the elites themselves--trying to
1Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1961), pp. 313 and 326.
2rbid., p. 325
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isolate the "aggressive circles" while appealing to "sober"
forces in Western leadership circles. Thus, instead of simplis-
tic slogans of "ban the bomb" addressed to the "broad masses,"
Moscow adopted a more sophisticated tack that was designed essen-
tially to obscure East-West antagonisms and to encourage the
development of moderate opinion in and around the Western govern-
ments. The Soviet aim was to neutralize and undermine the basis
for an uncompromising American foreign policy toward the Soviet
Union and thus secure relaxation of Western pressures against the
Communist bloc. The rationale for this particular version of
"divide and conquer" was formulated by Lenin in 1922, and 1it appears
to correspond closely to Soviet policy in the 1955 round.
This new subtler line in Soviet propaganda developed spasmodi-
cally and with some difficulty in 1954 and 1955. First, the peace
fronts had difficulty expressing in a popular way the more compli-
cated and gradualist disarmament programs that Moscow adopted.
Second, poor material for slogans was provided by the Soviets' May
1)55 recognition that political distrust and clandestine weapons
production presented real obstacles to disarmament. Third, Commu-
nist propaganda, by trying to "expose" Western foot dragging in
the negotiations, would tend to alienate the very moderate forces
the new proposals sought to win over.
But a problem central to both policy and propaganda was the
German question. For the period of initiative in Soviet arms
control policy from September 1954 to May 1955 events were pro-
ceeding that involved the signing and then the ratification of
arrangements providing for the rearmament of West Germany. With-
out attempting here to evaluate the relative weight of the
pressures on Soviet policy stemming from the arms race and the
fear of German rearmament, one can crudely reconstruct the sort
of dilemma Soviet tacticians faced in pursuing a soft line on
armaments while seeking stratagems that might halt German rearma-
ment as, for example, the European Defense Community had been
halted.
lThe details of Lenin's instructions to the Soviet delega-
tion to the 1922 Genoa Conference have been published in waves
by scholarly and popular Soviet media since 1959, culminating in
two documents published in Pravda in April 1964. See Walter C.
Clemens, Jr. "Lenin on Disarmament," Slavic Review, September 19 6 4j
and Franklyn Griffiths, "Origin of Peaceful Coexistence: A
Historical Note," Survey, January 1964.
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Alongside the external factors, Soviet propaganda, like Soviet
foreign policy in general, also had to adjust to changes in the
internal party struggles, specifically the shifts in the fortunes
of Malenkov (still ascendant in September 1954), Molotov (still
quite powerful in January and February 1955), and Khrushchev, who
evidently gained effective control over foreign policy between
March and July 1955.
Perhaps because of conflicting pressures of the sort just
referred to, Soviet mass communications did little toward the end
of 1954 and during the first months of 1955 to reinforce the con-
ciliatory impression made by Vyshinsky on September 30 at the United
Nations in his statement of agreement to negotiate on the basis of
the Anglo-French disarmament memorandum. Rather, Soviet propaganda
adhered to a rather hard line primarily directed against the London-
Paris accords to rearm West Germany and the December decision of
the NATO Council to equip NATO forces with tactical nuclear weapons.
A characteristic Soviet comment ran: "He who wants disarmament
cannot rearm West German militarism. "i
Stalinist patterns in Soviet policy were again evident in
January 1955 when the World Peace Council launched its Vienna
Appeal signature campaign against "the preparation for nuclear
war" -- a move that prefigured the stance Soviet negotiators would
take at the DCSC from February 25 until March 8, 1955. The month
of January also saw Moscow charge the United States before the U.N.
Security Council with "aggression" in the Formosan crisis.
From mid-March 1955, however, as Soviet diplomacy took a
noticeably softer course in dealing, for example, with Yugoslavia
and Austria as well as with disarmament, the line of Soviet propa-
ganda organs modulated accordingly. A World Peace Council meeting
scheduled for May was postponed until June, apparently to permit
the formulation of a position more in accord with the May 10 pro-
posals and the Soviet campaign for detente. For Moscow's new grad-
ualist approach to controlled prohibition of nuclear weapons based
on progress in conventional reductions was quite out of keeping
with the World Peace Council's tradition, reiterated in the Vienna
Appeal, of demanding outright prohibition of all weapons of mass
destruction. Certainly the May 10 recognition of the problem of
clandestine production and storing of nuclear weapons was entirely
counterproductive for agitation on the need to "ban" nuclear weapons.
Editorial, "Atomic Weapons Must Be Destroyed," International
Affairs. No. 3, 1955.
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But as indicated at the outset the relative complexity of
the May 10 proposals did not translate readily into attractive
and self-evident propaganda propositions on which to build mass
peace fronts. What these changes in the Soviet negotiating posi-
tion did do was to allow the World Peace Council to advance a
somewhat more "reasonable" and "sober-minded" approach to the dis-
armament issue and thereby enhance its influence among more "respect-
able" peace-oriented and liberal sentiment in Western Europe and
Britain. They were thus consistent with the developing general
line reflecting a new strategy toward the Western elites. Accordingly
in the months immediately following the May 10 negotiating conces-
sions, the peace fronts emphasized that the positions of East and
West had drawn so close that agreement was now "only a matter of
good will."
The interplay was quite clear between the manifest Soviet
policies toward arms control and the evolving general line of
Soviet policy, a policy aimed at substanti'ally improving East-West
relations and securing an atmosphere of detente. For if any
Western move could have been expected to be mercilessly exploited
by Soviet diplomacy and propaganda, it was the West's reluctance
to back its positions after May 10, 1955. But while Soviet diplomats
hit hard in the DCSC (and later at the Foreign Ministers conference)
at signs of this reluctance, Soviet public declarations failed to
take advantage of this singular opportunity for "exposure." A
Soviet magazine reported that at the Helsinki World Peace Council
assembly in June "many speakers expressed regret that the new
Soviet proposals were still not sufficiently widely known in the
West." The United States "reservation" on its pre-Geneva positions
was hardly noted in the official organ of the Cominform--and then 2
only toward the end of the year, on November 25 and December 30, 1955.
Soviet restraint in not "exposing" the reservation on United
States negotiating positions may have been based on the reasoning
that a hostile propaganda of exposure would have had the effect
of neutralizing any tendency of the United States leadership to
seek out a less antagonistic relationship with Moscow. On balance,
instead of playing up the West's apparent embarrassment over the
disarmament issue, Soviet media stressed the positive prospects
for detente and the desirability, if not the immediate possibility,
of disarmament.
'New Times, July 1, 1955.
For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy, November 25
and December 30, 1955.
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The orchestration of Soviet propaganda across the board, with
detente the dominant theme, was simultaneously illustrated by Soviet
propaganda on the related matter of West German rearmament. It
worked hard to prevent final ratification of the Paris Accords,
which took place in May 1955, but from that point on Soviet mass
media seemed to run out of steam, possibly because a continued
hard line would be at cross purposes with the new emphasis on
better East-West relations.
Apparently undeterred by the cool response to Moscow's new
line among Western governments, the Khrushchev-Bulganin team continued
its peace offensive, incidentally illustrating another of its facets
as they toured Asia later in 1955. Bulganin meanwhile kept up his
correspondence with Eisenhower. Visits were arranged for "K and B"
to London and Paris. The Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956
at least gave unequivocal doctrinal sanction to the peaceful path
of revolutionary development and the noninevitability of war.
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Chapter II
FROM SPUTNIK TO CUBA: 1957-1962
A. The Negotiations: Style and Substance
1. An Overview. Prior to analyzing the various measures put
forward by Moscow from 1957 until 1962 it may be useful to outline
the major subjects of negotiation during those years and the forum
in which the negotiations took place.
The U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee (DCSC) was the
main avenue of negotiations in 1957, when, from March to August, its
final session was held. While Moscow initially put forward some
comprehensive proposals, the major focus of the negotiations was on a
series of partial measures that could be implemented without great
delay. The State Department has termed this round of negotiations
"the intensified effort," reflecting in part the fact that the
United States had finished in November 1956 the basic policy review
it had begun in March 1955.
The U.N. General Assembly in 1957 showed such interest in
disarmament that it was dubbed the "Disarmament Assembly." How-
ever, we shall not focus very intensively on the Assembly.
Every year it hears reports on the progress of the disarmament
negotiations during the year, holds a debate, and usually adopts
a resolution that sets the terms of reference for the next year's
negotiations.
The year 1958 was notable because it marked the first uni-
lateral test suspension by any country and because this was
followed later in the year by a de facto three-power moratorium
on nuclear testing that persisted until 1961. 1958 also
witnessed the first East-West conferences of experts, meeting
on the subjects of a nuclear test ban and the prevention of surprise
attack, issues the West hoped could be dealt with as technical
rather than political aspects of arms control and disarmament.
The first of these meetings produced one of the first East-West
agreements of the postwar era in the form of a statement defining
the kind of system needed to control a test ban.
Technical and political talks on the test ban problem
continued in 1959, during which period Moscow also made a rash of
proposals for nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world.
Of great political importance, Chairman Khrushchev laid
before the United Nations General Assembly a plan for general
and complete disarmament (GCD). Although he followed it by
alternative proposals for partial measures, the propaganda im-
pact of his speech was such that both sides have since felt compelled
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to keep on the table detailed GCD packages while discussing also
more manageable topics.
The year 1960 saw both sides discuss GCD in a Ten Nation
Disarmament Committee, while negotiations continued among the
three nuclear powers on the test ban issue, and France began
the tests that would bring her into the nuclear club. Both
sets of negotiations faithfully reflected the deterioration in
East-West relations following the U-2 incident and the abortive
Paris Summit Conference.
Test ban negotiations continued in 1961, but the Soviets
became increasingly intransigent, a portent that they would
soon break the moratorium that had existed since 1958. But even
while Moscow prepared to test a 50-megaton bomb, however,
Ambassadors McCloy and Zorin on September 21, 1961 reached a
joint U.S.-Soviet agreement on the principles to guide future
disarmament talks.
The General Assembly late in 1961 endorsed a proposal of
the three nuclear powers that an Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Committee meet in Geneva early in 1962, composed of eight neutral
states in addition to the five Communist and five Western states
that made up the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee in 1960.
The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament
(ENDC) convened in Geneva in March 1962 without France, which
refused to take part. Earlier in the year the Geneva conference
on the cessation of nuclear testing, which had had well over
300 meetings since 1958, met for the last time. Its members
then gathered as a subcommittee of the ENDC, where the nuclear
powers continued their deliberations on a test ban.
The zigs and zags in Soviet policy toward comprehensive and
partial disarmament measures from 1957 to 1962 will now be outlined
in more detail.
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Table 11.1
DATES OF SESSIONS OF THE EIGHTEEN NATION COMMITTEE ON
DISARMAMENT AND ITS SUBSIDIARY ORGANSI
MARCH 14, 1962 TO APRIL 28, 1964
a. Plenary Sessions
1. Meetings 1- 56 March 14-June 14, 1962
2. Meetings 57- 82 July 16 -September 7, 1962
3. Meetings 83- 95 November 26 -December 20, 1962
4. Meetings 96-147 February 12-June 21, 1963
5. Meetings 148-156 July 30-August 29, 1963
6. Meetings 157-187 January 21-April 28, 1964
7. Meetings 188-217 June 9-September 17, 1964
b. Three-Power Subcommittee
Meetings 1- 50 March 21-December 18, 1962
2. Comprehensive Disarmament. The term "comprehensive" is
used to distinguish those proposals that involve a large number of
measures to be carried out over a certain period of time, usually
in stages. Thus it will be recalled that Moscow's proposal of
May 10, 1955 offered a comprehensive package covering nuclear and
conventional forces although it dealt only with the first two
stages of disarmament, leaving a third-stage transition to complete
disarmament to be specified later. The March 27, 1956 Soviet pro-
posal was comprehensive only in its application to conventional
forces; however, it was accompanied by several partial measures
dealing with nuclear weapons.
In the period from 1957 until 1962 Moscow brought forward four
different versions of comprehensive disarmament, all of which pur-
ported to deal with both nuclear and conventional weapons, and all
of which spelled out the steps to be taken through a third and
final stage of complete disarmament down to the level of police
forces needed for internal security and fulfillment of U.N. Charter
obligations. Moscow supported one set of comprehensive disarmament
measures from late 1956 until August 1957; another from September
1959 until April 1960; a third from June 7 to 27, 1960; and a four
March 15, 1962 (similar to the June 1960 stand but with substantial
alterations, most notably in September 1962).
A tentative judgment on the feasibility of these GCD proposals
indicates that they all suffered from an overload of one-sided measures
that if accepted would be crippling to Western security. The reader
will note that the nature of these one-sided measures varied somewhat
from one plan to another, but in each plan it is doubtful that a basis
existed for East-West agreement. It will also be observed, however,
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that the modifications of the Soviet stand late in 1961 and again
late in 1962 went some distance toward narrowing East-West differences.
a. From Suez to Sputnik: 1956-1957. The basis for
Moscow's comprehensive proposals in 1957 was laid in a declaration
from Premier Bulganin to President Eisenhower on November 117, 1956
dealing with disarmament as well as with the Suez crisis. Bul-
ganin proposed that within two years the United States, the
Soviet Union, and China reduce their armed forces to 2.5 million
men in one year and to 1 to 1.5 million men the second year;
France and the United Kingdom to 750,000 men the first year and
650,000 men the second year; and other states to 150,000 to
200,000 men.
The communication also called for an immediate ban on test-
ing, production, and use of nuclear weapons and for destruction
of nuclear stockpiles and elimination of nuclear weapons from all
armaments. The Soviet declaration also advocated the reduction
of military forces in Germany, NATO, and the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries; the liquidation in two years of all foreign bases; and
the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact countries.
Effective international control was also espoused, but only
two concrete proposals were made: static control posts to guard
against surprise attack; and aerial photography in Europe to a
depth of 800 kilometers east and west of the line dividing NATO
and Warsaw Pact forces. In this limited way Moscow seemed to
accept for the first time a truncated version of Eisenhower's
1955 "Open Skies" plan. Bulganin also suggested that, following
the implementation of these measures, national forces be reduced
to the militia (police) levels required "for assuring internal
security and the security of frontiers."
Qualified acceptance of aerial inspection constituted the
only new note in Bulganin's letter. The suggested force levels
and the time for their implementation were virtually identical
with the Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955, at the Summit Confer-
ence, and of March 27, 1956. They differed from the first only
in specifying that other states be kept to a level far smaller
than that planned by West Germany for its new Bundeswehr.
Perhaps the most notable shift in the November 1956 Soviet
1
U.S. Department of State, Documents on Disarmament, 194p-
1959 (2 vols.; Washington: 1960), Vol. I, pp. 726-727.
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position was the return to attempts to limit nuclear weapons,
which the March 1956 Soviet proposals had bypassed ostensibly on
the ground that less comprehensive disarmament might be more
feasible. Finally, the November 1956 statement was much less
specific about inspection procedures than the Soviet proposals
of 1955 and March 1956.
The main points of Bulganin's November 1956 letter became the
basis for the Soviet negotiating position when the U.N. Disarmament
Commission Subcommittee reconvened in London in March 1957. How-
ever, the Soviet delegation at the DCSC singled out the European
area for special emphasis under two separate headings: The
suggested "effective international control organ" was to have as
its primary task the establishment of and control over aerial
inspection in the 800-kilometer zone; and a "zone of limitation
and inspection of armaments in Europe" was urged as an "important
step toward the solution of the disarmament problem," thus reit-
erating almost verbatim the language of Moscow's March 27, 1956
proposals. Although the Soviet government had proposed an imme-
diate suspension of nuclear tests in a draft resolution introduced
in the United Nations on January 14, 1957,1 no reference to this
measure was made in the March 18, 1957 paper.
2
The atmosphere of the 1957 negotiations was much improved
over 1956. "Item by item" rather than "plan by plan" discussions
were the customary procedure. Soviet and Western diplomats mixed
informally much more than in 1956 and 1955. But the improved
atmosphere did not mean that there were no longer profound differ-
ences between the Soviet and Western plans. The major gap resulted
from the fact that Moscow's opening stand at the 1957 DCSC empha-
sized comprehensive measures while the West now stressed partial
measures. After the Easter recess, however, Soviet representative
Zorin announced:
Taking into account that the Western Powers are not at
present prepared to conclude an agreement on a, comprehen-
sive disarmament programme, and desiring to release the
disarmament issue from its present deadlock...,The Soviet
Government proposes that the Governments represented [on the
DCSC] should reach an agreement on partial disarmament measures.
1Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 736-737.
2Ibid., pp. 752-757.
3April 30, 1957; ibid., p- 779-780.
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Zorin went on to discuss possible partial measures, most of
which, however, could also be seen as part of a comprehensive
program:
Force Levels: Moscow reaffirmed its acceptance of the
force levels proposed for Stage I in the Soviet proposals of
November 1956 and March 1957, which were agreeable to the
West. But Zorin implied that no reduction to these levels
could be made unless the West agreed in advance to the Stage
II reductions advocated by Moscow.
Armaments and Military Expenditures: The Soviet Union
affirmed its March 1956 proposal for a 15 per cent cut in con-
ventional armaments and military budgets, contrasted with the
10 per cent reduction advanced by the U.S. representative.
However, no reference was made to U.S. proposals for beginning
with major armaments or for storage of some armaments in dis-
armament depots during the first stage.
Control: For a first-stage agreement Moscow proposed
more limited controls than it had already accepted in prin-
ciple for a more comprehensive program in 1955-1956. The
proposed control organ for this stage would be established
within the framework of the Security Council. Its functions
would include receiving and examining the information pro-
vided by states on their implementation of partial measures.
There was no reference to control posts at airfields, to
objects of control, to unimpeded access to objects of control,
or to the principle of inspection adequate to assure com-
pliance with agreed measures in the first stage, even though
all of these principles had been approved by Moscow in 1955 and
1956. The question of ground control posts at airfields was
now postponed until the second stage and tied to the achieve-
ment of a 1.5 million force level and the complete prohibition
and elimination from national armaments of atomic and hydrogen
weapons. Although Moscow had implied earlier that control
posts would be established throughout the United States and
the Soviet Union, the April 30, 1957 proposal provided for such
posts only in the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, the
eastern United States, and western border regions of the
Soviet Union.
Prohibition of the Use of Atomic Weapons: Moscow contin-
ued to demand prohibition of the use of atomic weapons but
without reference to U.S. proposals regarding longe-range
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missiles and the cessation of the production of fissionable mater-
ials for military purposes.
Nuclear Testing: The April 1957 proposal called for
separating the test ban issue from other matters of nuclear
disarmament and solving it "without delay." The West, in
contrast, insisted that a test ban be linked with a cutoff of
production of nuclear material for weapons.
Bases: Instead of the complete liquidation of foreign
bases Moscow proposed agreement in the first instance "as
to which of those bases can be liquidated during a period of
one or two years."
Force Reductions in Germany and Elsewhere in Europe:
The April 1957 document referred to Bulganin's proposal of
November 17, 1956 for a one third reduction of foreign troops
stationed in Germany. Such a move, Zorin argued, would
lessen international tensions.
Aerial Inspection: The Soviet Union was ready to apply
aerial inspection within a sector of Europe and the Far East
as proposed by Washington but "with a modification." The
modification would have included huge areas of Western bases
but relatively little Soviet territory. Soviet diplomats
indicated informally, however, that the exact limits of the
zones were subject to negotiation.1
The DCSC negotiations from April through August 1957 saw
a significant narrowing of the gap between the Western and
Soviet positions on separable measures, the details of which
will be discussed below in considering various partial
measures. 2 If, however, one looks at the total package
'U.S. Department of State, Disarmament: The Intensified
Effort, 1955-1958 (Washington, 1960), p. 39.
2
Secretary of State Dulles perhaps overstated the success
of the 1957 negotiations when he told the press on September 10:
"more progress toward disarmament has been made at these talks
than has been made before in the long history of efforts toward
disarmament"; and also that the "real meeting of minds" which
is precedent to any meaningful agreement was also achieved--
and could be achieved again--by methodical cultivation of
private consultations over a sustained period. (Ibid., p. 32.)
proposed by Moscow in March and then modified in April 1957,
the over-all impression is that it was much less negotiable than
its 1955 and March 1956 predecessors if only because of less
satisfactory provisions for control and inspection. Further
there is a distinct impression that Moscow's comprehensive
package of March 1957 was but an opening card meant to be
discarded after exacting some propaganda gain. Its promulga-
tion cane in the backwash of Soviet embarrassment over Hungary
and with Kremlin warnings regarding Western machinations for
war.
The Soviet delegate over the summer of 1957, however, had
shown growing displeasure with the slowness of the proceedings,
especially with the insistence of the Western four that they
could not and would not negotiate on an inspection zone in
Europe without consulting the nations concerned. On August 27,
1957 Mr. Zorin made an unexpected and violent 90-minute attack
on the "aggressive North Atlantic bloc," the "fruitless disarma-
ment talks," and the "ruling circles'. . . double game," accusing
the United States of designing its inspection proposals "to con-
tribute to the preparation of aggressive war." 1 The Soviet
government subsequently refused to participate any longer in the DCSC.
The reasons for the Soviet move to discontinue using the
DCSC as the basic negotiating forum have been aptly summarized
by Bechhoefer: 2 (1) Because the Western four had to obtain NATO
clearance for measures concerning European security, the DCSC
had become cumbersome and ineffective. (2) Harold Stassen's
denigration over the summer of 1957 meant that negotiations with
him were fruitless, reinforcing the Kremlin's belief that the
only useful forum for negotiations was a summit meeting.
(3) Western proposals, including those presented informally on
August 27, 1957 (and formally on August 29), required acceptance
of the entire package of measures before any one of them, such
as a test ban, could be implemented. This all-or-nothing
approach virtually precluded any immediate agreements. (4) The
breakup of the disarmament negotiations would serve as an
ominous event by which Moscow may have hoped to influence the
forthcoming West German elections.
A fifth possible consideration was Moscow's testing of an
ICBM on August 26 and the imminent launching of the first earth
satellite on October 2, 1957. The weight of this consideration
is dismissed by Bechhoefer on the ground that Moscow showed a
'Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, pp. 849-868.
2B ernard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1961), pp. 412-413.
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serious interest the following year in test ban and surprise-
attack negotiations and because the first four factors seem suffi-
cient to explain the Soviet move. Sixth, there is no indication
that the power struggle in the Kremlin and resultant ousting of
the "antiparty group" in July 1957 had a perceptible impact on
the DCSC negotiations. Finally, a strong gesture to impress
Peking may have been wanted. Whatever the Soviet motives, Zorin's
violent speech could not have been calculated to win over moderates
in the West.
b. Khrushchev in New York and Paris: September 1959-
May 1960. The DCSC had held its last meeting in August 1957.
The years 1958 and 1959 saw technical and political negotiations
over a test ban and surprise attack. On August 5, 1959 the
Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and the Soviet Union agreed to establish a new forum
in which five states from the Communist bloc and five from the
West wou d take part, with the first meeting to be held early
in 1960.
The agenda for this proposed Ten Nation Committee on
Disarmament was determined in large part by the fact that
general and complete disarmament was strongly endorsed by the
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union at the U.N. General
Assembly that convened in New York in September 1959. British
Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd outlined a three-stage plan
for GCD to the Assembly on September 17, but his presentation
was overshadowed by Premier Khrushchev's famous address of
September 18, 1959.2 On September 19 the Soviet government
submitted a declaration that provided a programmatic statement
of the disarmament proposals in the Premier's speech.3
Already in 1958 the Soviet bloc achieved "parity" in the
negotiating forum when the Soviet delegations to- the two "experts"
conferences in Geneva were joined by three Eastern European dele-
gations, making four delegations each from the East and West.
2Texts of both addresses are in Documents on Disarmament,
1945-1959, Vol. II, pp. 1447-1460.
3Ibid., pp. 1460-1474.
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Khrushchev's address and the accompanying declaration
served as the basis for the Soviet negotiating posture at the
Ten Nation Disarmament Conference during its first session,
March 15-April 29, 1960. The new Soviet stand was reminiscent
of Litvinov's diplomacy at the League of Nations negotiations
1927-1934., when Moscow put forward sweeping plans for general
disarmament but, in case the "capitalist" governments were not
ready for radical solutions, went on to submit more limited
proposals. Moscow's 1959 program was the first Soviet proposal
of the postwar era to spell out the provisions of all three
stages of GCD and to advocate completion of the entire program
in four years.1 The Soviet plans of 1955, 1956, and 1957, in
contrast, had made provision only for the first two stages of
disarmament, to be implemented in two or two-and-one-half
years, while only raising the question of eventual complete
disarmament.
Analysis of Moscow's 1959 stand reveals that it not
only detailed the nature of Stage III disarmament but also
focused entirely on the end results of GCD. In Stage III,
armies, navies, and air forces would cease to exist; general
staffs and war ministries would be abolished; people would
return to constructive work; all military bases would be
eliminated; states would "retain only limited police (militia)
contingents--of a strength agreed upon for each country--
equipped with light firearms and intended solely for the
maintenance of internal order and the protection of the
citizens' personal safety." International control was to
be established, but its functions and powers would "corres-
pond to the nature of the disarmament measures being
implemented.' Upon completion of the entire disarmament
process the international control organ would have "free
access to all objects of control." It could institute a
general system of aerial observation.
In a departure from the inner logic displayed in Moscow's
comprehensive proposals of 1955-1957 the 1959 declaration called
for the complete disbanding of armed forces in Stage II but
1Khrushchev's speech specified a four-year timetable but
did not break it down into stages as did the accompanying decla-
ration. The British proposal of September 17, 1959 constituted
the most detailed Western statement to that time concerning the
nature of a third and final stage of disarmament. It was
characteristically more cautious and less grandiose than
Khrushchev's statement of September 18. (Ibid., pp. 1450-1451.)
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deferred the destruction of nuclear weapons, missiles, and air
force equipment until Stage III.1 The retention of nuclear
weapons until that time may have afforded a kind of nuclear
umbrella, but without any personnel to support it after
Stage II.
As in 1927, 1932, and 1955-1957, the 1959 proposal for
sweeping disarmament was immediately followed by suggestions for
limited measures in case the West was not ready to embark upon
GCD. Khrushchev's address and the accompanying declaration
singled out the following partial measures for immediate consider-
ation:
(a) Establishment of a control and inspection zone
and reduction of foreign troops in the territories of
the Western European countries concerned;
(b) Establishment of an atom-free zone in Central
Europe;
(c) Withdrawal of all foreign troops from the
territories of European states and abolition of
military bases in the territories of foreign states;
(d) Conclusion of a non-aggression pact between
the member states of NATO and the member states of the
Warsaw Treaty;
(e) Conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of
surprise attack by one state upon another.
To add to the confusion, both the Khrushchev speech and the
Soviet declaration added that "The Soviet Government considers it
appropriate to recall its disarmament proposals of 10 May 1955,
which outlined a specific scheme for partial measures in the
field of disarmament. It is convinced that these proposals
constitute a sound basis for agreement on this vitally important
issue." Finally, Moscow again expressed itself in favor of an
immediate cessation of nuclear testing for all time. 2
'Formally speaking, the 1959 Soviet proposal differed from
others that preceded and followed it in that it did not require the
abolition of any foreign bases until Stage II.
2Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, esp. pp. 1457-
1460 and 1471-1474.
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No state could now ignore the issue of GCD. The General
Assembly on November 20, 1959, in its Resolution 1378 (XIV),
called upon governments to make every effort to achieve a
constructive solution to the problem of GCD. It recommended
that the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee consider the British,
Soviet, and other relevant proposals so 'that measures leading
towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under
effective international control will be worked out in detail
and agreed upon in the shortest possible time."
c. The Ten Nation Talks: March 15-April 29, 1960. The
Ten Nation Disarmament Committee met in Geneva from March 15 to
April 29, when it recessed in anticipation of the Paris Summit
Meeting, and it met again from June 7 to June 27, 1960.2
Unlike the negotiations over comprehensive disarmament when
the DCSC met in London in 1957, the 1960 talks were rasher
vitriolic even before the U-2 and summit difficulties.
Three main issues were debated prior to the April 29
recess. The first problem arose from Moscow's insistence that
only the Soviet proposal be discussed since it alone met the
mandate of the General Assembly to work toward GCD. The
Communist bloc program was the same as that contained in the
Soviet declaration of September 18, 1949. The West's
proposal, submitted on March 16, 1960, was an elaboration
1Ibid., p. 1545
2
The five Western countries represented were the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Italy; the five
Communist states were the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Poland, Rumania,
and Czechoslovakia.
33 Joseph L. Nogee, "Propaganda and Negotiation: The Case of
the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee," Journal of Conflict
Resolution. Vol. VII, No. 3 (December 1962), pp. 510-521; see
also Franklyn Griffiths, "Proposals of Total Disarmament in
baJ Soviet Foreign Policy, 1927-1932 and 1959-1960," Certificate
Essay, Russian Institute, Columbia University, 1962, pp. 128-150.
4 Great Britain, Verbatim Records of the Meetings of the
Ten-Power Disarmament Committee (Cmd. 1152 London: H. M.
Stationery Office, 1962]), pp. 921-923. (Hereafter cited as
Verbatin Recorcds.)
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of previous Western proposals, including the British proposal
to the General Assembly in September 1959. By comparison with
later Western proposals, the position advocated in 1960
resembled more a collection of partial measures, to be imple-
mented in stages, than an integrated program. The nature of
the third stage was, perhaps realistically, rather tentative.
The Communist negotiators announced themselves ready to
discuss these partial measures but on the condition that the
West admittel it did not wish to negotiate on comprehensive
disarmament.
The second issue was inspection and control. The
Communist delegations objected that the West sought control
first and disarmament later. The West complained that the
Soviet program would permit inspection only after disarmament
had taken place. Moscow refused verification of the announced
base figures from which reductions were pledged. Aerial
inspection would be allowed over all Soviet territory only
after GCD had been accomplished, although Zorin stated that
his government would consider such observation over part of
the Soviet Union to verify partial measures--an apparent
allusion to possible measures in East and Central Europe
and in the Arctic.
The third problem was one of timing. Both East and West
talked of three stages, but the Communist program insisted on
an automatic transition from one stage to another, the whole
process to be completed in four years. The Western position
was that the situation would have to.be evaluated after each
stage to determine how and when the next would commence.
Both sides submitted additional papers, ostensibly to
break the deadlock--Moscow on April 11, the West on April 26.
The conference recessed on April 29 with the Communist states
pledging their determination to work for GCD and the test
insisting that progress be made on specific measures.
1
Griffiths, oM. cit.
2
Official Report of the United States Delegation to the
Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (Washington:
Department of State Press Release, August 5, 1960) (hereafter
cited as Official Report of the U.S. Delegation), p. 5;
Verbatim Records, pp. 923-925.
d. Nuclear Disarmament First, June 7-27, 1960. In May
the U-2 plane was shot down over Sverdlovsk, and the Paris
Summit Conference quickly ended, dimming still more the prospects
for fruitful negotiations when the Ten Nation Committee recon-
vened on June 7, 1960. Five days before the committee resumed
its negotiations Moscow circulated a revision of its September
1959 disarmament program to 80 countries;1 this revised program
was the basis for the Soviet bloc's position during the remainder
of the Ten Nation talks. The West for its part sought to elicit
discussion of its own March 16, 1960 proposals and to obtain
clarification of the revised Communist position.
Moscow's new stand purported to meet several Western
criticisms of its previous proposals. The Soviet proposals of
September 1959 and March-April 1960 had deferred nuclear dis-
armament until the third stage, to accord with Western desires
to proceed initially with reductions of the conventional forces
in which the Soviet Union held an advantage. France, however, had
expressed the view that disarmament should begin with the
destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles. Therefore the revised
Soviet proposal put this measure in the first rather than the
third stage, and it provided for the destruction of nuclear
weapons in the second stage. Moscow implied that the quid pro
guo for this Soviet "concession" (considering the Soviet lead
in ballistic missiles) was that foreign bases would have to
be eliminated in the first instead of the second stage. 2 For
the United States and the United Kingdom, of course, the de-
struction of nuclear delivery vehicles and overseas bases in
Stage I would end their prime means of deterrence, making these
aspects of Moscow's revised proposals absolutely unacceptable.
Another ostensible concession was an indication in the
negotiations that Moscow might forgo a four-year timetable.
But Moscow continued to insist on the principle that some
fixed schedule had to be agreed on before disarmament could
begin. Further, Moscow rejected suggestions that joint
research be carried out to determine the problems or even
feasibility of implementing each measure.
The United States delegation nevertheless conceded that
"some elements of the June 2 paper . . . appeared to represent
some slight move ent toward a more rational approach to dis-
armament. . . ." One of these elements was Soviet recognition,
1 Ibid., pp. 925-932.
2 Ibid., pp. 926-927.
3Official Report of the U.S. Delegation, p. 6.
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apparently for the first time in the postwar negotiations, of
the need for "measures for preserving peace and security in
accordance with the U.N. Charter." The revised Soviet proposal
provided that states would undertake in Stage III, "where
necessary, to place at the disposal of the Security Council
units from the contingents of the police (militia) remaining
at their disposal. " States would allow international inspection
to ensure that the size and location of these militia units
accorded with the agreed quota. However, the introduction to
the revised Soviet proposal specified that the militia detach-
ments could be used "solely for the purpose of maintaining
peace among nations, not for the suppression of peoples who
are struggling for their independence and social progress, and
not for interference in the internal affairs of states."
The control council was apparently to be structured on
troika principles, although it was not clear whether Communist,
Western, and neutralist states were to have the same representa-
tion. If they had an equal voice, the two thirds majority rule
meant that a united Communist faction could block all action
if joined by just one neutralist vote. The international
inspectorate in any event would not be able to determine if
clandestine installations existed in excess of agreed amounts
but would be limited "merely to counting those particular
installations or forces that a government declared it was
eliminating."1 However, the powers of the controllers would
expand in "conformity with the scope and nature of the dis-
armament measures involved."
A final problem with the new Soviet text, which again
helped to emphasize its propagandistic iurposes, was its
stipulation that all details of GCD should be worked out in
a single treaty at the Ten Nation Conference and then be sub-
mitted to a world conference. This approach, in the opinion of
the U.S. delegation, would impede even the first measures toward
halting the arms race.2
U.S. representative Frederick Eaton returned to Washington
for consultations during the week of June 19. Modifications and
amplifications of the U.S. position were worked out during this
time, and Soviet representative Zorin was informed before the
June 27 meeting that these changes would be presented in a few
Ibid.
2 Ibid.
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days after consultation with the other Western delegations. In
the light of these events the subsequent behavior of the Soviet
and other Eastern European delegations during the meeting of
June 27 was particularly outrageous. The Polish chairman
refused to permit Western representatives to speak, recognizing
only Communist speakers. He then declared the Ten Nation
Conference ended. The Communist delegations walked out, never
to return, but the United States put its new position on the
record.1 An invitation to the Communist states to reconsider
their withdrawal was turned down. The whole episode was
reminiscent of the violence with which Mr. Zorin displayed in the
DCSC in August 1957 and the shoe pounding of Mr. Khrushchev later
in 1960 at the General Assembly.2
A letter from Premier Khrushchev to Prime Minister
Macmillan on June 27, 1960 explained that the Soviet Union
felt compelled to break off the talks because the West showed
no interest in disarmament but only in controls to provide
espionage data for NATO, which was intensifying the arms race.
The Soviet Premier was particularly incensed that the British
Defense Minister Watkinson had recently visited Washington in
order to supply Britain with the latest rocket weapons and that
U.S. and British planes would soon fly around the clock with
nuclear weapons. 3
e. Closer East-West Agreement in Principle, September 1961.
Following the collapse of the Ten Nation talks in 1960 the next
major East-West negotiations concerning GCD took place from June
to September 1961 in private talks between the Soviet Union and
the United States that culminated in an important agreement
announced on September 20, 1961--the "Joint Statement on Agreed
1 Verbatim Records, pp. 933-936.
However the new U.S. programs did not represent a particularly
hopeful basis for renewed negotiations. Bechhoefer has commented that
the U.S. proposals' "illogical linking of measures of limitation and
reduction with control systems unsuitable for these measures seems
to testify to hasty preparation and liberal use of paste and scissors."
Bechhoefer, o. cit., p. 553; for point-by-point comparisons of the
two Soviet plans and the two plans endorsed by the United States at
the Ten Nation talks, see U.S. Department of State, Disarmament at
a Glance (Washington, n.d.).
3Ibid., p. 938.
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Principles for Disarmament Negotiations."i This statement came
during a period of deep international tension marked by renewed
East-West confrontations in Berlin and the resumption by Moscow
on September 1 of atmospheric nuclear testing and of underground
testing on September 15 by the United States. On September 25,
to round out the picture, President Kennedy presented to the
General Assembly the most detailed blueprint for GCD until then
proposed by the United States, 2 and on September 26 he signed the
bill creating the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
The joint U.S.-Soviet statement was negotiated by Ambassadors
McCloy and Zorin. It announced agreement on eight principles to
guide future negotiations. The main change in U.S. policy was that
Washington made a sharp commitment to work for GCD, including the
"elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruc-
tion" and "the discontinuance of military expenditures." The
United States also agreed that time limits should be specified
for each stage until the disarmament process was completed.
Soviet policy seemed in turn to move closer to Western
positions on inspection and control. Moscow ended its earlier
insistence on "automatic transition" by agreeing that the transi-
tion from one stage of disarmament to another
should take place upon a review of the implementation
of measures included in the preceding stage and upon
a decision that all such measures have been implemented
and verified and that any additional verification
arrangements required for measures in the next stage are,
when appropriate, ready to operate.
The Kremlin also agreed then with the Western view "that progress
in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen
institutions for maintaining peace. . . ." Moscow went beyond
its 1960 position by affirming that states should
place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed
manpower necessary for an international peace force to
be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrange-
ments for the use of this force should ensure that the
United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any
threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and
principles of the United Nations.
1U.N. Document A/4879; Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 439.
2Ibid., pp. 475 ff.
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Qualifications were entered about national liberation or social
change.
The apparent concessions of each side were highly qualified
in other ways, and the prime issue that had long divided East
and West still remained: Moscow explicitly refused to agree to
what it termed "inspection over armaments." Zorin refused to
accept a statement that international verification should ensure
that not only "agreed limitations or reductions take place but
also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed
agreed levels at any stage."i
f. The Eighteen Nation Committee: Modifications in Moscow's
Position, March-September 1962. The wide anxiety resulting from
East-West tension in 1961 increased public concern that disarm-
ament negotiations should continue. The successor to both the
Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960) and the Geneva Confer-
ence on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests (1958-January
1962) was the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC),
agreed upon by the U.S. and Soviet delegations at the United
Nations in late 1961 and approved by the General Assembly on
December 20 of that year. The ENDC in effect added eight neutral
states to the Ten Nation Committee of 1960. (After that forum
had proved unacceptable to Moscow the Soviet Union had proposed
enlarging it by five uncommitted nations, but this was unaccept-
able to the West because of its similarity to the troika. The
final compromise was to add eight states--Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia,
India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic--
thus forming the ENDC.) Whatever similarity to the troika
principle remained in the ENDC structure was partially vitiated
by the rule of unanimity in voting. France's refusal to
participate in the ENDC left it with seventeen active members.
The ENDC convened in Geneva on March 14, 1962 and was the
primary locus of disarmament negotiations in 1962, holding three
plenary sessions throughout the year: March 14 to June 14; July 16
to September 7; and November 26 to December 20. It was agreed
early in the conference that plenary meetings would be devoted
to discussions of GCD, and that two subsidiary organs would be
established to permit concurrent consideration of other matters.
The Committee of the Whole would examine partial measures that
might facilitate GCD and lessen international tension. A sub-
committee of the three nuclear powers would negotiate a nuclear
test ban. (In 1963 these two subsidiary organs ceased to meet,
lSee the McCloy-Zorin correspondence immediately following
the agreement, U.N. Document A/4880, in ibid., p. 442.
21n practice however the ENDC plenary sessions also devoted
much time to the test ban, in 1962 as well as later.
-38-
and the ENDC divided its sessions between discussions of GCD,
collateral measures, and a test ban.) A harbinger of future
difficulties was Premier Khrushchev's effort to convert the
opening meeting of the ENDC into a summit conference.
Reluctantly he acquiesced to an Anglo-American counter
proposal that the foreign ministers attend the opening sessions
and that the heads of government intervene when appropriate.1
The ENDC had before it a Soviet and a U.S. plan for GCD.
Moscow's proposal, tabled on March 15, 1962, was entitled "Draft
Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under Strict Inter-
national Control." The U.S. plan, a detailed elaboration of
President Kennedy's proposal to the General Assembly in 1961,
was introduced as an "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty
on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" on
April 18, 1962.2 During the course of the negotiations both
nations modified certain elements of their programs, which
will be discussed later in this section.
The Soviet draft treaty was essentially the same as that
endorsed by Moscow during the second session of the Ten Nation
talks in 1960, but parts of it had been modified in keeping with
the principles agreed on in September 1961 by Ambassadors Zorin
and McCloy.
The major structural flaws from the Western standpoint
were those that had persisted since 1961:
1. Elimination in Stage I of all nuclear delivery vehicles--
rockets, airplanes, surface ships and submarines, and artillery.
Destruction in Stage II of all nuclear, chemical, biological, and
radiological weapons.
2. Liquidation of all overseas bases in Stage I.
3. "Control over disarmament" but no "control over armaments"
that were not yet scheduled for elimination. Only after GCD was
carried out would the international inspectorate "have the right
of access at any time to any point within the territory of each
state party to the treaty." Only then would aerial inspection
and photography be instituted. The new U.S. proposal for "zonal
11
Documents on Disarmament, 1962. See documents in Vol. I,
pp. 26, 32, 36, 48, 49, 61, 64, and 75.
2Texts in ibid., pp. 103-126, 351-381.
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inspection" was also rejected by Moscow as beinT "inspection
prior to disarmament" and hence as "espionage."
4. A fixed timetable for the implementation of GCD in four
to five years.
5. A troika structure in the International Disarmament
Organization and its inspectorate, with decisions by a two thirds
vote.
6. U.N. peacekeeping to be subject to the Security Council
and thus to a potential veto by a permanent member; to by-pass the
Security Counci would violate national sovereignty by creating
a "superstate."
Perhaps the two major advances of the 1962 Soviet proposal
over 1960 were reaffirmation of the principles jointly agreed to
by Washington and Moscow in September 1961. Article I of the new
Soviet draft provided that the transition from one stage to
another would "take place after adoption by the International
Disarmament Organization of a decision confirming that all
disarmament measures of the preceding stage have been carried
out and verified and that any additional verification measures
recognized to be necessary for the next stage have been prepared
and can be put into operation when appropriate." (How this
provision could be squared with the necessity of adhering to a
set timetable was not reconciled.)
Second, the draft treaty provided for strengthening U.N.
peacekeeping capabilities with each stage of disarmament. States
were to implement Article 43 of the Charter making available to
the United Nations armed forces, assistance, and rights of
passage. After reduction to police (militia) levels, certain
police units would be specially earmarked for use by the Security
Council. The command of these units, however, would be bi the
troika principle and, apparently, by unanimous agreement.
Furthermore the negotiations showed that Moscow did not want
disarmament to impede revolution.. When the United States urged
that the phrase "in a peaceful world" be added to a "draft
preamble of a treaty on general and complete disarmament,"
Zorin objected. He stated that
'Cited from the provisional verbatim records of the Conference
of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, April 16, 1962, p. 31;
references to these documents cited hereafter as ENDC/PV.
2ENDC/PV.26, April 24, 1962, p. 29.
3See Article 37.2 of the Soviet draft treaty.
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the political purpose of such external regulation of
the whole varied process of the historical development
of individual nations and countries can only be to
delay the progressive development of society and to
impede the national liberation movement and the far-
reaching social and economic changes which are in
progress and which must inevitabl come about in the
different countries of the world.
During the summer and fall of 1962 Moscow took a number of Isteps that came closer to the Western position on certain topics:2
1. On July 16 Moscow accepted the U.S. proposal for an
approximate 30 per cent reduction in conventional arms in Stage
I and 35 per cent (from the original) in the succeeding two
stages. Initially the Soviet Union had advocated the reduction
of these armaments "in direct proportion" to cuts in the armed
forces. Howeier, the U.S. plan provided for first-stage cuts
only of those major armaments whose destruction would be
relatively easy to verify, while the Soviet amendment would
cut all arms by 30 per cent in the first stage--thus producing
a staggering problem for verification of light and easily
concealed weapons.
2. On the same day Moscow endorsed a group of measures
to reduce the risk of war, all of them adaptations of proposals
previously introduced by the United States, for example, exchange
of military missions and the establishment of rapid communica-
tions between heads of governments and the U.N. Secretary-
General. (On the other hand the Soviet amendments also included
one that would have prohibited major joint military maneuvers
between two or more states, thus precluding joint NATO exercises.)
3. On July 24 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko suggested
that the SovieL Union would be willing to consider a 5-year time
limit instead of its initial 4 -year limit for completion of GCD.
4. Gromyko also expressed his government's willingness to
reach a compromise force level of 1.9 million men (midway between
the 2.1 and 1.7 figures proposed by the United States and Soviet
Union respectively) at the end of Stage I.
1ENDC/PV.17, April 10, 1962, p. 21.
2 The following modifications in the Soviet stand are discussed
in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Second Annual Report to
Congress, January 1, 1962-December 31, 1962 (Washington, 1963), p. 14.
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5. Following the end of the second session of the ENDC in
early September disarmament was discussed at the U.N. General
Assembly. There on September 21 Gromyko endorsed the "nuclear
umbrella" principle that had been expounded by American scientists
at the Pugwash Conference in Moscow two years earlier. The Soviet
Foreign Minister expressed his government's willingness to have
the United States and the Soviet Union retain in their own territories
until the end of Stage II "an agreed, strictly limited number
of ICBM's, antimissile missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles in
the ground-to-air category.1 However, all attempts by Western
diplomats to explore the specifics of the Soviet proposal were
rebuffed when the ENDC met again late in 1962. Semyon Tsarapkin
demanded that the West first agree in principle to the nuclear
umbrella concept before discussions began on its details. 2
g. Summary. To summarize, none of the comprehensive pro-
posals advocated by Moscow from late 1956 until late 1962 seemed
to offer a promising basis for East-West agreement. The problems
common to all of them were:
Inadequate inspection procedures, especially in the
refusal to allow verification of existing armaments.
An inflexible and probably unrealistic timetable of
four to five years.
Provision for the elimination of overseas bases in
the first of the second stage of disarmament.
United Nations peacekeeping forces subject to great
power veto.
The Soviet proposals between late 1956 and August 1957
were particularly striking for the manner in which they backed
off from the inspection procedures Moscow had endorsed in 1955
and early 1956. The subsequent Soviet proposals of 1959-1962
had in common the structural defect that they would radically
alter the balance of nuclear and conventional weapons one way or
the other. Khrushchev's proposals to the United Nations in 1959
put off nuclear disarmament until Stage III. The Soviet
proposals of June 1960 and March 1962, however, would have
reversed this priority and destroyed all nuclear delivery
systems in Stage I and all nuclear weapons in Stage II.
lA revised version of the Soviet draft treaty that incorporated
this and most of the Soviet proposals since March was circulated by
the U.N. Secretariat on September 24, 1962. as U.N. Document A/C.1/867.
2 ENDC/PV.83, November 26, 1962, p. 22.
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Some narrowing of the differences between the East and West
resulted from shifts in Soviet policy in 1960-1962, and there has
been some movement toward accommodation with the Western position
on the need for U.N. peacekeeping forces, although Moscow
has insisted on their being subject to the Security Council.
Moscow has shown some awareness of the need for an international
inspectorate to affirm that conditions are ready for the transition
from one stage to another. Most important, perhaps, Moscow recog-
nized in September 1962 the desirability for the nuclear powers to
retain a limited number of nuclear contingents after the first
stage of disarmament.
It is difficult to compare the comprehensive proposals Moscow
endorsed from 1955 through 1962 because each set was different in
important respects. Judged in terms of over-all feasibility,
however, two orders of magnitude may be suggested: the proposals
of 1955 and early 1956 seem more feasible than any that Moscow
espoused from late 1956 until perhaps late 1962. The 1955, early
1956, and late 1962 proposals were much closer to the Western
position and suffered fewer structural flaws than those of late
1956 and early 1962. An interesting corollary of this evaluation
is that Moscow seems not to have expected or sought serious nego-
tiations of its 1957-1962 proposals, which were tabled mainly
for propaganda purposes while more serious talks went on concern-
ing various partial measures. The 1955 and early 1956 comprehensive
proposals, in contrast, seemed to be treated relatively seriously
by Soviet negotiators even while they began to work out a partial
measures approacn.
Finally, we should note that during the 1962 negotiations
the Soviet stand was that ENDC discussion of partial or collateral
measures that might ease tension and strengthen confidence among
states "should not divert the attention of members of the Committee
from the execution of their principal task, which is to draw up
and negotiate a treaty on general and complete disarmament.'
A Soviet memorandum of March 19, 1962 reaffirmed support for
eight partial measures that Moscow had urged upon the General
Assembly in Sepgember 1961 but did not even bother to enumerate
them once more.
lDisarmament Commission, Official Records: Supplement for
January 1961 to December 1962, pp. 139-149.
2 Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 496-504.
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3. Partial Measures. One of the most significant changes
in Soviet policy on arms control during 1955 -1956, it now appears,
was Moscow's new interest in negotiating on partial disarmament
measures. In retrospect we can see that 1955 marked a turning
point from which a major trend can be dated--a trend toward a more
sophisticated propagation of partial measures, many of them
relatively negotiable in terms of military-balance agreements
acceptable to both sides. Indeed Khrushchev's address to the
General Assembly in 1959--after proposing GCD--advocated five
partial measures and went on to reaffirm the May 10, 1955 proposals
that he said "outlined a specific scheme for partial measures in
the field of disarmament." The Soviet government was still con-
vinced, the Premier added, that the May 10 proposals "constitute
a sound basis for agreement on this vitally important issue."i
As we have seen, negotiations on GCD often touched on partial
measures that could be separated out of the package and considered
individually. Thus, for example, a reduction of ground forces,
the elimination of overseas bases, even the destruction of nuclear
weapons and delivery vehicles--at least theoretically--could be
negotiated separately. Indeed Jules Moch succeeded to some
extent in having "item by item" debate. But usually agreement on
one item was contingent on ultimate consensus on a whole package.
This approach therefore must be distinguished from negotiation on
"collateral" issues, as they were termed in 1962, that could be
agreed on individually and would, it was hoped, enhance the chances
for more comprehensive disarmament agreements.
A wide range of partial measures was espoused by Moscow from
1956 to 1962. Khrushchev's 1959 address to the United Nations
mentioned five such measures that the Kremlin frequently endorsed
in this period:
1. The establishment of a control and inspection zone,
and the reduction of foreign troops in the territories of
the Western European countries concerned;
2. The establishment of an 'atom-free' zone in Central
Europe;
3. The withdrawal of all foreign troops from the
territories of European States and the abolition of
military bases on the territories of foreign States;
4. The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the
member States of NATO and the member States of the Warsaw
Treaty;
1Aoggggt __ isarmament, 1945-1959i Vol. II, pp. 1459-1460.
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5. The conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of
surprise attack by one State upon another.'
Here we shall single out two sorts of partial measures for
special emphasis: regional arms controls and a nuclear test ban.
These were the partial measures backed most consistently and with
the most apparent interest by Moscow; by focusing on them we shall
also be able to provide a framework for discussion of related
matters--nuclear-free zones, a nuclear production cutoff, and
surprise-attack measures such as control posts.
a. Regional Arms Controls and Surprise Attack. While
the Bolshevik government did not espouse disarmament propaganda
until 1922, it recognized from the beginning of its existence
the value of pursuing what might now be termed regional arms con-
trol or disengagement along its eastern and western frontiers to
guard against foreign intervention.2
From 1947 to 1954 the Soviet government brought forward a
number of proposals to deal with the German problem. Each solution
had three common elements: first, withdrawal of foreign troops;
second, political neutralization of Germany; third, as the reward,
reunification of Germany. (The Soviet draft peace treaty of 1952,
reintroduced at Berlin in 1954, permitted Germany to have military forces.
As noted in Chapter I, Moscow responded warmly in 1954 and
1955 to the Eden Plan and brought forward on March 27, 1956 a
Soviet plan for the creation in Europe of a zone of limitation
and inspection of armaments. A more radical formulation of these
ideas was circulated in Soviet notes to the Western governments
As quoted in ibid., p. 1459.
2A survey of Soviet Russia's peace treaties signed in the
first years of the Bolshevik regime and culminating in the very
detailed provisions of the Russo-Finnish Treaty of June 1, 1922
indicates that the following principles were incorporated, to
varying degrees, in many of the treaties between the Soviet
government and the Central Powers, Japan, the "succession states,"
and Russia's neighbors such as Rumania and Poland: establishment
of neutral zones along territorial and water frontiers, within
which the number of soldiers and the quantity and quality of
equipment would be limited; evacuation and demobilization in
certain areas, including the surrender of property and equipment
to one side or the other; pledges to support international
agreements to neutralize Estonia, the Gulf of Finland, the Baltic
Sea, Holland, and Lake Ladoga, if such agreements were worked
out. Leonard Shapiro, ed., Soviet Treaty Series (Washington:
The Georgetown University Press, 1950), Vol. I, passim; see his
bibliography for original sources.
-4 5..
on November 17, 1956--at the height of the Hungarian uprising.
Contrary to Western preferences, it specified that all foreign
bases would be eliminated in two years and called for a
nonaggression pact between the two alliances. Of more appeal
to the West, it reintroduced the concept of control posts to
guard against surprise attack and accepted the idea of aerial
inspection in Europe. On the next day, November 18, at a
Kremlin reception, Khrushchev called for the reciprocal with-
drawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and of NATO forces
from Western Germany together with the abolition of all foreign
bases.
Variations of the March and November 1956 Soviet proposals
were reintroduced by Soviet diplomats at the DCSC and in notes
to Western governments in the first half of 1957. Frequent
reference was made to "Sir Anthony Eden's proposal" of 1955.
Bonn was warned that arming the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons
would preclude German reunification.1
An expansion of the territory involved was suggested by
Khrushchev in a program televised in Moscow on June 2, 1957 for
American audiences. He suggested that foreign troops be with-
drawn from both Germanies, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and from
Italy, Turkey, and other countries. (But he affirmed that
Communist regimes would remain, based "upon the will of peoples"
in the socialist bloc countries.) 2
Various East European governments began also to make dis-
engagement proposals, with the effect of reinforcing Soviet
positions. The motives of the East European regimes and Moscow
may have been quite diverse. But it appears that the Soviet
government not only tolerated such initiatives but encouraged
and endorsed them. The most conciliatory version of the famed
Rapacki Plan, as we shall see, was adumbrated almost a year
before in a number of Soviet proposals.
A "Balkan zone of peace" without atomic weapons and joined
in a mutual security pact was proposed by Rumanian Prime Minister
Chivu Stoica in September 1957. It was to include Romania,
Bulgaria, Albania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. Mr. Stoica's
overtures, accepted with some reservations by Yugoslavia, were
'The following analysis of Soviet bloc and Western proposals
and commentary is based largely on documentation in Eugene Hinterhoff,
Disengagement (London: Stevens and Sons, 1959). For a convenient
summary and chronology of disengagement proposals, see his Appendix
10, pp. 414-442.
2 Ibid., pp. 204-205.
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turned down by Turkey and Greece,1 but the Soviet Union, as we
shall see, revived the idea of a Balkan zone of peace in May 1959.
The Rumanian initiative of September 1957 was followed by
a similar Polish move. Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki proposed
his plan for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe in a speech
to the General Assembly on October 2, 1957; the proposal was
reiterated in notes circulated by Warsaw in February 1958. This
first version of the Rapacki Plan suggested the creation of a
nuclear-free zone to include Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the
two Germanies. Nuclear weapons would be neither manufactured nor
stockpiled in this zone; the use of nuclear weapons against
the territory of this zone would be prohibited. The four great
powers would guarantee these provisions by a "broad and effective
control" comprising ground and aerial inspection. The plan did
not propose merging NATO and the Warsaw Pact but argued that the
"system of control established for the denuclearized zone could
provide useful experience for the realization of a broader
disarmament agreement." In contrast to a second variant of the
plan in November 1958, no provision was made for a reduction of
troops in the zone.
The basic ideas of the Rapacki Plan were endorsed in
letters from Bulganin from December 10 to 14, 1957 to all U.N.
members, all NATO countries, plus Spain and Switzerland. Explicit
reference was made to Rapacki's U.N. address; in addition, however,
Bulganin proposed a withdrawal of troops from the zone, a European
security pact, and a moratorium on nuclear testing anywhere as
of January 1, 1958. Much of Bulganin's program was outlined in a
seven-point "peace plan" adopted by the Supreme Soviet on
December 21, 1957. A letter from Bulganin on January 8, 1958 to
Messrs. Macmillan and Eisenhower again endorsed the Rapacki
Plan and also called for a summit meeting. Official Soviet and
Warsaw Pact statements throughout 1958 reiterated the proposal
for a nuclear-free zone or the withdrawal of foreign troops from
Central Europe or both.
President Eisenhower on January 12, 1958 indicated the
response of the Western governments to the Rapacki Plan. In
replying to Bulganin's letter of December 10 he did not explicitly
reject the idea of the nuclear-free zone but raised two objections:
that it did not deal with the main problem--nuclear production by
the Soviet Union and the United States; and "there cannot be great
significance in de-nuclearizing a small area when (as the Bulganin
Ibid., p. 214.
letter stated] 'the range of modern types of weapons does not
know of any geographical limit.' . . ."1 Similar objections
were raised in a committee report to the Consultative Assembly
of the Western European Union on April 14, 1958.2
The United States rejected the Rapacki Plan in a statement
from Ambassador Beam to the Polish government on May 3, 1958.
Beam mentioned most of the objections cited in the Eisenhower
letter of January 12 and added that the effectiveness of the
plan would depend upon the "good intentions of the
outside the area." Further:
The [Polish] proposals overlook the central problems of
European security because they provide no method for
balanced and equitable limitations of military capabilities
and would perpetuate the basic cause of tension in Europe
by accepting the continuation of the division of Germany.3
A second version of the Rapacki Plan was brought forward
by the Polish Foreign Minister at a press conference in Warsaw
on November 4, 1958. Rapacki indicated that the revised plan
was intended to meet the Western objections to his initial pro-
posals. A two-stage plan was now suggested: first, a freeze on
existing nuclear weapons in the zone; second, a reduction of
conventional forces and, simultaneously, complete de-nuclearization
of the zone. Both steps would be strictly controlled.
The novelty of this revised Rapacki Plan has been exag-
gerated by some analysts, for, as we have seen, numerous Soviet
statements backing the Rapacki Plan in late 1957 and earlier in
1958 had already advocated not only de-nuclearization but also
withdrawal of foreign troops from the zone.
Immediately following the presentation of the revised
Rapacki Plan on November 4, 1958, two events offered an insight
into the role that disengagement was to play in Soviet bloc
military and political strategy. The first was the opening of
the "Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures
Which Might Be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack," which met
in Geneva from November 10 to December 18. The Soviet proposals
there were essentially an expansion of the Rapacki Plan and of
1Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, p. 936.
2
Hinterhoff, op. cit., p. 229.
Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, pp. 1023-1025.
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Bulganin 's November 17, 1956 proposals for aerial and ground
inspection within a zone in Central Europe and added an aerial
photography zone in eastern Siberia and the western half of the
United States. The November 1958 Soviet proposals to the
Surprise Attack Conference broadened the aerial photography zone
to cover Iran, Japan, and Okinawa.
The Soviet proposals to the Surprise Attack Conference
described for the first time the nature of the control posts that
Moscow had been advocating in more general terms since 1955 and
1956. There would be 28 control posts on Warsaw Pact territory
(including 6 in the Soviet Union) and 54 posts in NATO and CENTO
territory (including 6 in United States territory). The posts
would be situated at railway junctions, major ports, and on
main roads. They would be staffed by 3 to 4 officers from each
side, serviced by nationals of the country inspected, and the
chief of the post would also be from that country.
Moscow made clear that these posts would be to little avail
if not linked with other steps to reduce concentrations of forces
in Central Europe. The Soviet government therefore proposed
(a) a reduction in the foreign armies on the territories of
European states and (b) not keeping modern types of weapons of
mass destruction in either part of Germany.1
The Soviet proposals appeared to be aimed more at avoiding
the outbreak of local war that might escalate than at protection
against surprise nuclear attack. However, it should be noted
that Soviet military strategy posited that a nuclear surprise
attack would have to be accompanied by a massive follow-up by
more conventional forces. Therefore the efficacy of the control
posts might have been greater in Soviet than in Western eyes.
In any event, the Soviets turned down the Western proposals
to the Surprise Attack Conference, which concentrated on various
ways of inspecting nuclear delivery systems to ensure they were
not being mobilized for attack. Significantly the Soviet bloc
delegates to these technical talks apparently included no
scientists 2but consisted entirely of foreign office and military
personnel.
1 U.N.Document A/4078, S/4145, Annex 8, November 28, 1958,
pp. 3-7.
2Bechhoefer, oL. cit., p. 470.
In Bechhoefer's words the Soviet proposals to the Surprise
Attack Conference "again showed the Soviet concern lest Germany
receive nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union was willing to pay a
price, though not a high one, in terms of penetration of the iron
curtain for some assurance that Germany would not become a
nuclear power." 1
The second event illustrating the probable objectives of
the revised Rapacki Plan came on November 10, 1958 (the day the
Surprise Attack Conference opened), when Khrushchev announced
that an end must be made to the occupation of Germany and that
West Berlin must be converted to a free city. The Soviet note
of November 27 was then delivered, proposing that Berlin should
be made a free demilitarized town with no armed forces in it.
If the West did not agree to a German peace treaty Moscow would
sign one with East Germany, and if there were an attack on
East G rmany, it would be viewed as an attack on the Soviet
Union.
In this way, Soviet bloc diplomacy utilized disengagement
proposals as part of an orchestrated campaign to persuade the
West to accept the East European status quo, withdraw from
Berlin, forgo the rearmament of West Germany, keep nuclear
weapons off German territory, and withdraw NA.TO forces from
German soil, obviously ranging along a spectrum from the
barely possible to the utopian.
The reaction of the West to the Khrushchev stick and
Rapacki carrot was negative; the Soviet response was to present
still other proposals and to lift, temporarily at least, any sem-
blance of an ultimatum. From December 1958 to September 1959,
variations on the Rapacki and free city plans were put forward
in talks by Khrushchev with Philip Noel-Baker, Carlo Schmid,
Field Marshal Montgomery, and Hugh Gaitskell; in Mikoyan's
press conferences in the United States; in addresses to the
Twenty-First Party Congress; and finally in the Soviet GCD
proposal at the United Nations in September 1959.
But even before the May 1960 summit, statements by
Washington, Bonn, and Paris made clear that the West was not
willing to negotiate a settlement of the German problem on terms
even close to those advocated by Moscow. As a consequence, while
Moscow, Warsaw, and other East European governments continued
1Ibid., p. 481.
2
Pravda, November 27, 1958.
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to affirm their support of disengagement, these affirmations
lost much of their plausibility after 1960. Their proposals
came at moments when they could have some propaganda potential
although their immediate negotiating value was questionable.
Thus while Moscow was preparing to test a 50-megaton bomb in a
show of strength over Berlin, it asked the General Assembly (on
September 26, 1961) to consider a variety of collateral measures
including nuclear-free zones initially in Central Europe, then in
the Far East and Africa.
For the "people's democracies," advocacy of disengagement
was still a way to obtain some diplomatic prominence. Poland
introduced a slightly revised version of the 1958 Rapacki Plan
into the ENDC Committee of the Whole in March 1962, but the
proposal was not given formal consideration due to procedural
wrangling. Nevertheless Rapacki himself published articles on
his plan in Communist, Western, and neutralist country journals.
China had deferred comment on the original Rapacki Plan
until December 19, 1957, when Peking announced its support of
the Soviet Union's recent peace proposals including a nuclear-
free zone in Central Europe.1 In addition the Chinese welcomed
the TASS proposal of January 21, 1958 that the Middle East be
turned into an area free of nuclear and rocket bases. Through-
out 1958 there were conflicting indicators regarding Peking's
view toward a nuclear-free zone in Asia. The president of
the Chinese Academy of Sciences stated that he would welcome
a conference to (a) establish de-atomized zones; (b) stop
flights with nuclear bomb loads; (c) stop nuclear testing; and
(d) ban the manufacture, stockpiling, and use of such weapons.
This fourth condition of course almost negated any semblance of
Chinese desire to acquiesce in a de-nuclearized Far East. At
other moments in 1958 China approved a nuclear-free zone for
Asia and Africa but showed no anxiety over the nth-country
problem; rather, there were hints that China planned to become
a nuclear power.
Alice L. Hsieh speculated in 1961 that Moscow might have
persuaded Peking in 1958 to accept a nonnuclear status, provided
1This summary of Chinese views is based on Alice L. Hsieh,
Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Age (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 103-108, 154 -166.
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American strategic forces were removed from the Far East.1
The latter condition must have appeared rather hypothetical
at the time. In any case we now have Chinese documents charg-
ing that Moscow first pledged to give Peking assistance to
develop nuclear weapons in October 1957 and then broke this
pledge in June 1959. But even from the way Peking downgraded
the nuclear-free zone concept in 1958 and exploited it as pro-
paganda Mrs. Hsieh rightly surmised that the Chinese government
"very early discarded the notion in favor of another strategy."2
A sign of the growing Soviet concern about relations
with China may have come on January 27, 1959, when Khrushchev
addressed the Twenty-First Congress. He gave only perfunctory
approval to the Rapacki Plan but asserted emphatically that a
"zone of peace, above all, an atom-free zone, can and must be
created in the Far East and the entire Pacific basin area. "3
From January to mid-April 1959 Chinese spokesmen either ignored,
distorted, or gave qualified support to Soviet advocacy of a
nuclear-free Far East. Even this qualified support may have been
partially spurred by pressure from the Japanese and Korean
Communist parties and by a common anxiety about increased
deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in the Far East. The most
restricted Chinese endorsement of the denuclearized zone concept
came on April 18 when Chou En-lai advocated an area of peace and
free of atomic weapons "throughout the whole of East Asia and the
Pacific regions"--an implication that only part of China would be
included,4 and hardly Sinkiang--where nuclear energy facilities
are known to be located.
The timing and site of Soviet advocacy of a nuclear-free zone
of peace in the Balkans may also have been related to the emerging
Sino-Soviet rift. 5 Khrushchev supported such a zone in a May 26,
lIbid., p. 103.
2 Ibid., p. 109.
3Pravda, January 28, 1959.
4Hsieh, op. cit., pp. 159-160.
5Rumania had made a similar proposal in 1957
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1959 speech in Tirana--two days before Chinese Defense Minister
P'eng Teh-huai arrived there. Khrushchev warned that the Soviet
Union might establish missile bases in Albania if the West set up
bases in Italy and Greece. Mrs. Hsieh speculated that this could
have been a hint that Moscow would do no more for Peking than to
establish Soviet bases to defend China in case U.S. rockets were
emplaced, for example, in Japan. A speech by P'eng on May 31
approved Khrushchev's idea of a peace zone in the Balkans but
suggested that a Western attack on Albania would provoke a world
war.3
To round out this picture we should note that in Riga on
June 11, 1959 Khrushchev proposed a nuclear and missile-free zone
in the Scandinavian peninsula and Baltic area. Either as a result
of or despite Khrushchev's suggestion the governments of Norway
and Denmark opted against installing U.S. missile bases on their
territories.
In the one contemporary example of formally agreed
demilitarization of a significant territory the Soviet Union, United
States, and ten other countries with interest in Antarctica on
December 1, 1959 signed an agreement to use that territory "for
peaceful purposes only." The parties obligated themselves not to
build military bases there, carry out maneuvers, test weapons, or
carry out nuclear explosions .2 One might add finally that French
testing in the Sahara in 1960 prompted additional Soviet proposals
for an atom-free zone in Africa, to which some African statesmen
responded positively.
b. Nuclear Test Ban. If disengagement may be character-
ized as an arms control problem that is predominantly political,
the problem of halting nuclear testing is one that has been
complicated by intricate technological factors. But its political
ramifications were global in scope both because of their relation
to the nth-country problem and because they reflected pressure from
world public opinion.
lHsieh; op. cit., pp. .162-163. The U.S. State Department turned down
the nuclear-free Balkans proposal on essentially the same grounds
that it had repudiated the Rapacki Plan in 1958: "It is obvious
that the range of weapons at the disposal of the USSR makes
the concept of an atom-free Balkan zone meaningless as far as the
security of the free nations in that area is concerned. .
Statement of July 11, 1959, in Documents on Disarmament , 1945-1959,
Vol. II, p. 14353
2Ibid., pp. 1550-1556.
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We shall seek in brief compass to review the main trends of
the negotiations to determine the nature of the Soviet interest in
a cessation or banning of nuclear testing.1 In the previous
chapter we saw that Moscow was the first great power to propose a
nuclear test ban "as one of the first measures" in a comprehensive
disarmament program. This statement of May 10, 1955 was reaffirmed
by Bulganin at the Summit in July.
Soviet proposals early in 1956 seemed to envision a ban on
thermonuclear weapons tests but were silent on nuclear tests.
2 A
ban only on thermonuclear testing was proposed by Khrushchev at
the Twentieth Party Congress on February 14 and by the Soviet
Delegation to the DCSC on May 27, 1956. The ban on thermonuclear
tests was one of three partial measures which Moscow told the DCSC
should be agreed on independently of progress on other areas of
disarmament. In contrast to the May 10, 1955 proposal, the ban on
thermonuclear testing proposed by Moscow on March 27, 1956 was
specified as a measure separable from other disarmament moves.
Further, the March 1956 proposal continued the position which
Moscow took late in 1955 that international controls were not
needed to verify a test ban.
However, a test ban on both nuclear and thermonuclear tests
was proposed to the DCSC on July 12, 1956 by Andrei Gromyko and on
September 11, 1956 in a letter from Bulganin to Eisenhower. Both
Soviet statements denied the need for inspection.
At the opening of the DCSC session on March 18, 1957 Soviet
delegate Zorin proposed as a separable measure a ban on testing,
reaffirming Moscow's refusal to accept international controls. By
this time the potential importance of the distinction between
nuclear and thermonuclear weapons testing seems to have become
blurred. But the importance of inspection had not. Khrushchev
announced in Helsinki in June 1957 that Moscow would agree to
international inspection even though it was not scientifically
necessary. Affirming this point at the DCSC on June 14, 1957,
Zorin nonetheless insisted that the West first agree in principle
1Much of the following analysis is based upon documentation
in Ciro Elliot Zoppo, "The Test Ban: A Study in Arms Control Negoti
ation," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1963.
For a convenient chronology of developments in the test ban negoti-
ations, see his Appendix A, pp. 421-483.
2However a joint Soviet-Indian statement of December 13, 1955
called for an unconditional prohibition on the manufacture and use
of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.
to a two- or three-year moratorium on atomic and hydrogen weapons
testing; the details of an inspection system could then be worked
out. From the beginning to the end of this session of the DCSC,
however, the West insisted that progress on a test ban be linked
with other measures, ranging from a nuclear production cutoff to
a rather comprehensive package.
The next major Soviet move in the test ban negotiations came
on March 31, 1958, when--soon after completion of a major Soviet
test series--Moscow officially announced its decision to suspend
nuclear tests unilaterally.1 The Soviet government "sincerely"
hoped its initiative would be followed by other states, but if
other states tested, the Soviet government would feel free to
resume testing in the interests of its security. No inspection
scheme was suggested in the March 31 announcement or in a follow-
up letter from Khrushchev to President Eisenhower on April 4.
However on May 5--a few days after the United States resumed test-
ing in the Pacific--Moscow again endorsed its June 1957 willingness
to establish international control. Agreement on the details of
a controlled test ban could easily be reached at a summit confer-
ence, the Soviet statement declared, but only after the United States
and the United Kingdom halted their tests.
Another significant Soviet move came on May 9, 1958, when
the Soviet Union agreed to President Eisenhower's proposal for
a conference of experts to examine the technical problems of con-
trolling a nuclear test ban. The Conference of Experts to Study
the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on
Suspension of Nuclear Tests met in Geneva from July 1 to August 22,
1958. The recommendations of this meeting were to facilitate the
political decisions taken by a subsequent East-West forum--the
Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests.2
The Conference of Experts reached agreement on the technical
feasibility of monitoring an agreement for the suspension of nuclear
lSome Soviet tests took place between September 30 and
November 3, 1958 but were apparently suspended until September 1,
1961.
2For background, see Bechhoefer, op. cit., pp. 488 ff. For
further discussion of technical aspects, see the many RAND Corpora-
tion studies on the subject and Walter C. Clemens, Jr. "Automated
Inspection of Underground Nuclear Testing" (Santa Barbara, California:
General Electric Defense Programs Operation, 1962).
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weapons testing by means of a network of from 160 to 170 (manned)
land-based posts and ten ship-based posts to monitor the ban,
supplemented by regular flights of air-sampling aircraft and by
special flights to investigate suspicious events. This system
would probably detect and identify explosions down to a yield of
about one kiloton taking place on the earth's surface, in the
open ocean, and at altitudes up to ten kilometers. It would prob-
ably detect explosions of this yield at higher altitudes but would
not always distinguish them from natural phenomena.
The major problem arose in connection with underground ex-
plosions. The suggested system would probably record seismic
signals from subterranean blasts of a one-kiloton yield but might
not identify whether the signals arose from explosions or earth-
quakes. Each year from 20 to 100 underground events of a five-
kiloton yield could not be distinguished as to their origin--man-
made or natural.1
The United States and the Soviet Union accepted the report
of the experts and on August 22, 1958, the day after its submission,
President Eisenhower suggested a meeting of the three nuclear powers
to negotiate an agreement to suspend nuclear testing and to estab-
lish an international control system on the basis of the experts'
report. At the same time the President expressed the willingness
of the United States to suspend testing on the basis of reciprocity
on a year-by-year basis, provided that: (a) the agreed inspection
system were installed and working effectively, and (b) progress
were being made on the arms control measures long sought by the
United States.
The tripartite conference of the United States, Britain, and
the Soviet Union commenced in Geneva on October 31, 1958, and on
that date the first two announced their adherence to a moratorium
on testing. Except for occasional recesses, the conference remained
in session until January 1962, after which time its work was carried
on in a subcommittee of the ENDC.
At the start procedural matters such as debate on
the agenda obstructed progress of the test ban negotiations.
But more formidable problems arose at the first meeting of the
conference in January 1959 after its Christmas 1958 recess. Data
from underground explosions carried out in Nevada in the fall of
1958 disclosed that the method of distinguishing earthquakes from
underground explosions recommended in the experts' report was
much less effective than had been estimated. The new "Hardtack
II" data indicated "that seismic signals produced by explosions
1Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. II, pp. 1090-1111.
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are smaller than had been anticipated and that there are con-
sequently about twice as many natural earthquakes equivalent to
an underground explosion of a given yield as had been estimated
by the Geneva Conference of Experts." For these reasons, either
a greater number of on-site inspections or a greater number of
inspection posts (or both) would be necessary for an effective
inspection system.1 The U. S. government therefore called for
more study of the technical problems of a test ban. It stated
that American scientists were studying modifications of the
system recommended at Geneva in order to restore its originally
estimated capability of detecting underground experiments.2
The U. S. Scientific Panel on Seismic Improvement reported
on March 16, 1959, suggesting how the 180-station Geneva network
could be strengthened. The Hardtack tests, the panel declared,
demonstrated that the Geneva system would have about the same
capability to identify seismic events above the equivalent of
20 kilotons as was originally estimated for seismic events above
5 kilotons. However, by improving the equipment (using 100 instead
of 10 seismometers per station) and techniques (analysis of long-
period surface waves) recommended at Geneva the network of 180
posts could have the capability to identify a disturbance of 10 kilo-
tons that had been expected for events of 5 kilotons.
A still greater refinement of detection capacity was offered.
The panel suggested that the Geneva network be augmented with an
auxiliary system of unmanned seismic stations. If they were spaced
at 170 kilometer intervals in and adjacent to the seismic areas of
the world, about 98 per cent of the .events as small as one kiloton
equivalent located within the network would be identified. 3 The
panel spelled out its recommendations on March 31, 1959. It called
for the development of "unattended telemetering seismic detectors"- -
an antecedent to the "black box" proposals of 19 6 2--to use in a net-
work of auxiliary stations around selected manned stations .4
As might have been expected, the initial Soviet response to
the Hardtack report was to question its motivation and to refuse
lIbid., Document 337. See also, Bechhoefer, op. cit., pp. 509 ff.
2Ibid., p. 1335. 1
3Ibid., Document 347.
4Ibid., Document 349.
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renewed consideration of a problem already settled.' In December
1959, however, Soviet experts finally agreed to analyze the Hard-
tack data and take part in a Technical Working Group established
by the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons
Tests. The Soviet experts' review of the Hardtack report led them
to charge on December 18, 1959 that the Nevada tests were carried
out unscientifically with instruments inferior to those assumed
by the Geneva experts in 1958; that the U. S. scientists had
apparently misrepresented their findings; that, rather than weaken-
ing the capacity of the Geneva network to identify low-yield seismic
disturbances, the Hardtack tests demonstrated a greater capacity
than had been expected. 2
Table 11.2
ESTIMATED ANNUAL NUMBER OF UNIDENTIFIED
WORLD-WIDE CONTINENTAL EARTHQUAKES
5 Kilotons 10 Kilotons 20 Kilotons
and and and
Greater Greater Greater
Geneva Conference of
Experts, August 1958 20-100
Geneva network and
equipment on basis 1500 40 60
of Hardtack data of
January 1959
Geneva network with
improvements within
the present state of 300 40 15
technology on basis of
"Hardtack" data, April
1959
Despite these differences, the Technical Working Group of
Soviet, U. S., and British scientists agreed with a number of the
basic reccommendations of the U. S. Scientific Panel for Seismic
Improvement regarding the instruments and techniques to be employed
by the detection station network. However, nothing was said
1lIbid., Document 340.
2Ibid., Document 400, Annex II.
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regarding many of the panel's specific proposals such as the
development of unmanned seismic detectors. 1
Another step toward resolution of the technical problems
of a test ban came when Moscow agreed to a Western proposal for
another experts' meeting, this one to examine the problems of
detecting nuclear tests in outer space. Scientists from the three
powers reported on July 10, 1959 that three alternative systems
of satellites could be used to police outer space against illegal
nuclear explosions; whichever system was adopted could be incor-
porated into the network of 180 fixed ground control posts recom-
mended by the Geneva experts in 1958. The recommendations of the
1959 experts' meeting were officially adopted by the Soviet Union
on August 10, 1959.2
On September 30, 1958 the Soviet Union resumed testing,
announcing that it was forced to do so because the United States
had tested after the Soviet Union's unilateral suspension. One
month later--on October 30--the Soviet government emphatically re-
jected the U. S.-U. K. proposal for a one-year suspension of tests,
proposing instead a permanent test ban. Nevertheless, Moscow
ended its test series on November 3, 1958, and Soviet leaders re-
peatedly stated that their government would not resume testing
unless another power broke the moratorium. The Soviet Union was
the first country to break the moratorium--on September 1, 1961.
The political conference on test suspension, which had been
planned to follow the experts' meeting in Geneva, opened on October
31, 1958. Between 1958 and 1962 it adopted a number of articles
for a proposed test ban treaty, the- first of which, agreed to on
December 6, 1958, committed the signatories to prohibit tests and
not to give assistance to fourth countries.3  Previously the Soviets
had favored an agreement limited to the three nuclear powers.
Moscow on January 12, 1959 agreed to a provision that any country
could accede to the treaty but insisted that the operation of the
treaty with respect to the three origina parties was not to be
linked to the accession of other states. Even after this date,
however, Moscow showed great reluctance to include provisions that
might obligate any other power--except France.
lIbid., Document 400, Annex I.
2Zoppo, op. cit., p. 441.
3Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests,
Verbatim Records, December 6, 1958. (Mimeographed; available from
U. S. Department of State, Washington, D. C.)
Ibid., January 12, 1959.
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On January 19, 1959, shortly after presenting the Hardtack
II findings, the two Western powers made a major concession by
abandoning the demand that the duration of the proposed test ban
treaty be linked to progress in other areas of arms control.
Another conciliatory move by the West came on April 13, 1959 when
the United States, supported by Britain, proposed a "phased" test
ban. The proposal called for an internationally controlled ban
on tests in the atmosphere and under water as a first stage; under-
ground and high-altitude explosions would be included later. Mean-
while a joint research program would study the problem of detect-
ing underground explosions. The notion of a "phased" test ban was
rejected by Khrushchev on April 25, 1959, and he endorsed instead
a suggestion by Harold Macmillan calling for a predetermined
number of annual inspections. In presenting this proposal in
Geneva on April 27 the Soviet delegate stated that his government
would not insist on a veto if agreement were reached on limiting
inspections to a predetermined number (which, however, he did not
specify).
The United States announced on August 26, 1959 that it would
continue the suspension of tests to the end of 1959. Two days
later the Soviet Union said that it would refrain from nuclear
testing so long as the West continued its test suspension. Moscow
made this point again on December 30, one day after President
Eisenhower announced that the United States reserved the right to
resume nuclear weapons testing after December 31, 1959. There
was no immediate indication, however, that Washington planned to
resume tests in 1960.
Both East and West showed increased interest in some form
of limited test ban in 1960. On February 11 the United States
tabled at Geneva a proposal that would ban all tests above ground
up to heights where both parties agreed that effective control
could be established, all tests in the oceans, and all tests above
the present "threshold of detection and identification"--a seismic
magnitude reading of 4.75 or more. The Soviet counterproposal
came on March 19: a ban on testing in the atmosphere, outer space,
the oceans and on underground tests above the 4.75 threshold. On
underground tests below that threshold there would be a 4- to 5-
year moratorium. While this proposal did not correspond precisely
with the U. S. position, it resembled the solution Britain had
advocated as a way of bridging the difference's of each side. 1 A
less important Soviet concession on February 16 had been an agree-
ment on a small number--as yet undetermined--of on-site inspections
lNew York Times, March 21, 1960.
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each year without, as previously insisted, seismic readings that
would have excluded many suspicious earth tremors.I
Progress toward a limited treaty continued on March 29, 1960
when Eisenhower and Macmillan issued a joint statement accepting
in principle a moratorium on nuclear tests below the 4.75 thres-
hold. The statement called for acceleration of negotiations on the
problems that remained to be resolved--control post staffing, com-
position of the control commission, number of on-site inspections
allowed each year, and voting matters. But both Washington and
London said that as soon as a test ban treaty had been signed and
arrangements made for a coordinated research program for improving
underground test detection, they "would be ready to institute a
voluntary moratorium of agreed duration on nuclear weapons tests
below that threshold. . . ." Moscow was invited to join at once
in plans for this joint research.
On April 4 all the major Democratic candidates for President
(Senators Symington, Johnson, Kennedy, and Humphrey) agreed that
if elected they would continue any test moratorium President
Eisenhower might undertake with Britain and the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union on May 3 accepted Western proposals for
joint underground nuclear testing to improve methods for detect-
ing such tests, Tsarapkin repeating Soviet demands for a four- to
five-year moratorium on other nuclear tests while the research
program was under way. However, Moscow objected to the Western
position that joint research be done on a national basis with three-
power observation. The Soviet position was that the test research
should be done jointly by Soviet and Western scientists. (On
several occasions later in 1960 the Soviet Union protested U.S. plans
to explode nuclear devices as part of Project Vela to improve the
capability to detect and identify nuclear explosions.)
Despite the political effects of the Paris summit debacle
in May 1960, test ban negotiations in July and August saw increased
East-West agreement. On July 5 Soviet delegate Tsarapkin accepted
a British plan for East-West parity in the staffing of leading
posts in the international control commission. U.S. delegate
Wadsworth agreed to the same proposal the next day. The West re-
iterated on July 13 its acceptance (first stated on February 11, 1960)
of the Soviet-sponsored principle of a fixed number of annual on-
site inspections. 2 Moscow responded on July 26 by specifying for the
first time the actual number of such inspections--three. More than
1U.S. Department of State, Geneva Conference on the Discontinu-
ance of Nuclear Weapons Tests: History and Analysis of the Negotia-
tions (Washington: 1961), pp. 82-89.
2 See ibid., p. 418.
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that, Tsarapkin stated, would be unnecessary and would jeopardize
Soviet security. He termed the quota proposed by the West--twenty--
as "unrealistic" and unacceptable.1
On July 27 the three powers agreed that all underground tests
of greater intensity than 4.75 and all tests in the atmosphere,
the oceans, and space should be banned by the draft treaty. On
August 11 all three delegations agreed that the inspection and con-
trol system should be operational within six years of the signing
of the projected draft treaty. The major differences that remained
when the talks recessed late in August were: (a) the number of
permitted on-site inspections--three or twenty; (b) the number and
political composition of the international control commission; and
(c) Moscow's insistence on the right to inspect any atomic devices
used in U.S. seismic research.
When talks resumed on September 27, 1960, Washington proposed
a 27-month moratorium on underground tests that was rejected by
Moscow on October 5, the Soviet delegate continuing to insist on a
moratorium of four to five years.
Beginning in August 1960 the United States began to warn that
time was running out and that progress would have to be made if
testing were not to be resumed. As France continued her test pro-
gram begun in 1960, exploding four small-yield nuclear bombs by
April 25, 1961, the Soviet Union registered perfunctory protests.
In April 1961 the United States and Britain introduced in
Geneva a number of proposals that represented concessions to pre-
vious Soviet demands. These included provisions to (a) reduce
the number of control posts on Soviet territory from 21 to 19;
(b) extend from 27 months to 3 years the proposed moratorium on
small underground tests; (c) institute a satellite system to detect
all nuclear weapons tests in space; (d) ask Congress for legis-
lative authority to permit Soviet internal inspection of the
nuclear devices used in seismic research and peaceful engineering
programs in the United States; (e) accept a.veto over the total
annual budget of the control commission; and (f) organize the
policy-making control commission so as to give the Soviet Union
and its allies parity with the Western powers.
The spring and summer of 1961 saw a general hardening of the
Soviet position in the negotiations. Karushchev's interview with
Walter Lippmann was particularly ominous. He declared (April 17,
1961) that first, the Western powers were not ready to conclude a
test ban agreement; second, the Soviet Union had never tested
1Cited in Zoppo, op. cit., p. 453.
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underground because if war came, she would use the biggest wea-
pons; third, an agreement was unlikely because of French deter-
mination to continue testing; and, fourth, the Soviet Union
would never agree to a single neutral administrator because
"there are no neutral men." On March 21, 1961 Moscow withdrew
its previous agreement to a single administrator to oversee the
daily administrative tasks of the control organ and proposed
instead a troika of three men, each with veto power.
At the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna on June 3 and
4, 1961 Khrushchev made it clear that a neutral administrator
for the test ban control organization would be unacceptable and
that enforcement measures had to be subject to Soviet veto power.
More important, the Soviet government suggested that in the absence
of general disarmament, international inspection of a test ban
would constitute espionage. Therefore Moscow suggested that the
two countries should "take up the main, cardinal question--the
question of general and complete disarmament." Following this
line the Soviet delegation at the Geneva talks gave the West an
ultimatum on June 12: either accept the Soviet terms for a test
ban or merge the negotiations in broader talks on GCD.
On June 21 Khrushchev vowed to renew nuclear testing
immediately if the West resumed such explosions. On July 7 Moscow
charged that the United States was seeking to justify test resump-
tion. And on August 30 TASS declared that the pressures created
by imperialist countries had forced the Soviet Union to resume
testing, which then commenced two days later. The United States
resumed underground testing on September 15, but negotiations
continued.
On September 3, 1961 the West proposed a treaty similar
to that signed in August 1963. It would have banned atmospheric
testing, relying only on national inspection systems. It was
turned down by Moscow on September 9 because it permitted under-
ground tests to continue.
Moscow's "breaking the moratorium,," as it was interpreted
in the West, produced an important change in Western policy;
whereas before the United States and Britain had observed a
voluntary moratorium of a specified duration on underground
nuclear tests, they now refused to consider any such measure that
Moscow could again break at will.
This position was a natural reaction on Washington's part,
but it narrowed considerably the alternatives by which the inter-
ests of both sides might be met in a compromise agreement.
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On November 28, 1961 Moscow proposed a three-environment ban
with a moratorium on underground tests, pending broader agreement on
an international control system over an envisioned program of GCD.
A similar Soviet proposal was made on September 3 and 5, 1962 but
without specifying any relations between the proposed ban and GCD.
Both proposals ran counter to the new U.S. principle that rejected
voluntary moratoriums that could be violated at will.
The alternatives open for a compromise were narrowed still
more by the Soviet position from 1961 to late 1962, which withdrew
Moscow's 1960 agreement to an annual quota of three on-site inspec-
tions.
Moscow paid lip service to a neutralist compromise proposal
made at the ENDC in March 1962, placing responsibility for the polic-
ing of a comprehensive test ban in the hands of an international
scientific body outside the countries to be inspected but with
powers to carry out on-site inspection of suspected disturbances upon
the invitation of the nation concerned. While Washington read the
notion of invitational inspections broadly to mean virtually oblig-
atory inspection, Moscow interpreted it narrowly, as virtually void
of obligatory character.
After the Soviet Union failed to accept a U.S.-proposed com-
prehensive test ban with on-site inspection, the United States
resumed atmospheric testing from April to November 4, 1962.
On August 1, 1962 President Kennedy announced that data from
the Project Vela program would permit the West to reduce the number
of on-site inspections needed to police a test ban. On August 9 the
United States offered extensive concessions to the Soviet position:
a reduction in the number of on-site inspections per year and in the
number of control posts on Soviet territory (from 180 to 80) and
staffing of the posts by nationals of the host country but with inter-
national supervision. The Soviet response, however, was negative
because of continued U.S. insistence on on-site inspections.
On August 27, 1962 the United States and Britain offered the
Soviet Union a choice of two treaties: a limited treaty like that
of September 3, 1961 (and August 5, 1963) or a comprehensive treaty
with international inspection. Both choices were rejected by Moscow.
The first Soviet counterproposal, on August 29, 1962, called for an
uninspected but "definitive" ban on nuclear tests in the atmosphere,
outer space, and under water, but with what amounted to a moratorium
on underground testing "until it was replaced by a permanent solution,"
the basis of which could be the neutralist proposal of March 1962.1
'Documents on Disarmament, 1962, Vol. II, p. 828.
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This Soviet proposal for a three-environment ban linked with a
moratorium of indefinite duration on underground testing was re-
peated on September 3 and 5, 1962. The extent to which this pro-
posal marked a Soviet effort to break the deadlock over underground
testing will be discussed at greater length in Chapter III. But,
Chinese sources in August 1963 claimed that Moscow had informed
Peking on August 25, 1962 of its readiness to sign a nonproliferation
agreement with the United States, which, if true, corroborates the
possible significance of the Soviet proposal of August 29-September 3.
To summarize the complicated story of the test ban nego-
tiations, we can focus on the major alternatives assayed to deal
with the U.S. interest in effective controls and the Soviet
requirements for secrecy and military security: (1) a compre-
hensive test ban; (2) a partial ban with a moratorium on
underground tests; (3) a partial ban with no restriction on
underground tests. The progress and obstacles to each approach
will now be summarized.
First, the Western version of a comprehensive treaty was
unacceptable to Moscow because of the extensive control measures
proposed. The Soviet version was turned down by the West because
it offered too little control. Familiar behavior patterns
intruded: The West wanted security before disarmament; it
wanted scientific reliability while Moscow sought political
and military effects. Its insistence on technical reliability
was interpreted in Moscow as stalling or as a desire for espionage;
in effect the West was proposing inspection over armaments instead
of actual disarmament. Soviet resistance to intrusion raised
fears in the West that Moscow might cheat.
The second hope for a compromise agreement seemed to lie
in a limited test ban accompanied by a moratorium on underground
testing, during which control systems were expected to be improved
so that seismic disturbances could be detected and identified
with minimal or no intrusion. A number of obstacles prevented
such a compromise. Before listing them, however, we must
reiterate that other problems remained to be solved even if
East-West differences were reconciled on the moratorium. As
Eisenhower and Macmillan made clear in March 29, 1960, their
agreement to a moratorium was conditional on progress in the
negotiations concerning the composition of the international
control organ, its voting procedures, and so forth. With this
caveat in mind we can enumerate the obstacles that frustrated
agreement on the specific issue of a moratorium on underground
testing. First, the Soviet Union in 1956 and 1957 treated a
test ban as a separable measure but the West did not. Therefore
the West turned down the Soviet proposal of June 1957 for a two-
or three-year moratorium on all nuclear testing with international
control posts on U.S., U.K., and Soviet territory. Second, after
the West accepted the idea of a separate test ban in 1958 and a
phased (that is, limited) test ban in 1959, the West tended to
advocate a much shorter moratorium than was acceptable to Moscow.
The Eisenhower-Macmillan statement of March 1960 stated that the
moratorium had to be of agreed duration. Moscow on May 3, 1960
proposed a limited ban with a four- or five-year moratorium, but
the West on September 27, 1960 advocated a moratorium of 27 months
and on March 21, 1960 a moratorium of three years. Third, after
Moscow resumed nuclear testing in 1961, the West turned down the
very concept of a moratorium not formalized by treaty. Therefore
the Soviet proposals of November 28, 1961 and August 29-September 3,
1962 for a limited test ban with moratoriums of indefinite length
were summarily rejected. Fourth, when some momentum toward East-
West agreement existed in the spring and summer of 1960, it was
interrupted by political and military developments extraneous to
the negotiations. Fifth, measures that one side would have found
acceptable at one moment were proposed prematurely or too late.
Thus the two- or three-year moratorium proposed by Moscow in 1957
corresponded with a position acceptable to the West only in 1960
and early 1961. And the four- to five-year moratorium advocated by
Moscow in late 1961 and 1962 was not much longer than the three-
year measure proposed by the West prior to the resumption of Soviet
testing in 1961.
The third alternative was a limited test ban without any
limitation on underground testing. This was offered to Moscow on
April 13, 1959, on February 17, 1960, on September 3, 1961, and
on August 27, 1962, but it was not accepted until July 25, 1963.
B. Communications: The Propaganda and Ideology of Disarmament
Manifest Soviet arms control policy was part of a world-wide
communications network designed to create a response favorable to
Soviet objectives. For purposes of analysis we shall look first at
the communications directed to the anti-Communist West and then at
the messages aimed at those who opposed Western "capitalism" or
"imperialism." The first audience consisted broadly not only of
the "ruling circles" but also of the middle classes and even the
working classes in the West, especially where, because of
"embourgeoisement" or nationalism, the old appeal to class struggle
had little meaning. The second audience consisted of Communist
party members everywhere, "anti-imperialist" elites in the emerging
nations, and perhaps the disgruntled "masses" still ripe for
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agitation in some Western countries.
The purposes of these communications will not be discussed
here in detail, but their content and style immediately imply much
about Moscow's objectives without considerable reading between the
lines or familiarity with other data. Generally speaking we can
state that the communications to the West aimed at winning support
for policies of accommodation with the Soviet Union, while the pro-
paganda to the anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist elements aimed
at rationalizing Moscow's steps toward accommodation with the West.
Needless to say, this accommodation had to be on terms acceptable
to the Soviet Union and might be achieved by threat of coercion as
well as by persuasion.
1. The Appeal to the West. We shall distinguish broadly
two kinds of communication connected with Soviet disarmament
policy: first, the statements of Soviet diplomats and statesmen,
whether in the negotiating forum or in more public arenas, which
we shall call "disarmament diplomacy;" second, the communications
transmitted by the mass media--especially the radio and the press.
In some cases, however, we shall join observations on these two
levels of communication and consider the reinforcement of one by
the other.
On the whole, as we shall see, there was continuity of
patterns that emerged in 1955-- "reasonableness" in proposals
and "restraint" in criticism. But by contrast with this restraint
a new element was also introduced in 1959: an attempt literally to
"sell" disarmament by appeal to the.profit motive.
a. Disarmament Diplomacy. Soviet disarmament diplomacy
generally continued the appearance of realism and conciliation
that it began to acquire in 1954-1956. This appearance would be
essential not only to East-West arms control agreements but also
to the relaxation of East-West tensions.
The proposals most likely to strike the West as reasonable
and negotiable were partial measures on matters of joint East-
West concern: surprise attack, nuclear testing, tensions and
armaments in Central Europe (of special concern in London and
Paris if not in Washington). Precisely because these matters
affected Soviet security, it was in Moscow's interest to pose as
a supporter of a reasonable compromise to deal with these common
dangers. While Soviet proposals for GCD did not appear particular-
ly feasible to Western elites, they conditioned the political
climate so that partial measures seemed less improbable and prob-
ably served to strengthen the propaganda image of the Soviet Union.
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Soviet diplomacy sought maximum publicity for its proposals.
The propaganda importance Moscow attached to its disarmament
campaign is seen from the large number of changes in the Soviet
line that were announced not in the negotiating chamber but in
more public arenas. Some examples may illustrate the point.
Thus Moscow's qualified acceptance of the "Open Skies" plan
came in a Bulganin letter to President Eisenhower in 1956.
Soviet acceptance in 1957 of the principle of inspection over
a nuclear test ban was first stated by Khrushchev in Finland
before Zorin could reverse the Soviet stand in the SC. The
Rapacki Plan was announced in the General Assembly in 1957
and modified in a press conference in 1958. Also in 1958
Moscow's proposal for a moratorium on nuclear testing and agree-
ment to technical talks on the test ban took place in correspond-
ence between the Kremlin and the White House. Moscow's proposals
for nuclear-free zones in 1959 were generally expounded far from
any negotiating chamber. Khrushchev's GCD proposal was made to
the General Assembly in 1959. The Supreme Soviet announcement
in 1960 of a unilateral reduction in Soviet armed forces was
communicated to all the parliaments of the world and to the
Inter-Parliamentary Union, ostensibly to obtain reciprocal action
in other states. The General Assembly was the forum for Gromyko's
announcement in 1962 and 1963 that Moscow then endorsed a "nuclear
umbrella" principle. Other such instances could be cited, the
most salient however coming in 1963.
The conciliatory style of Soviet diplomacy in 1955 kept
up through much of the 1956-1962 period but with some sharp
deviations. The 1957 negotiations in the DCSC were noteworthy
for the unprecedented social mixing and informal discussions
that took place between Soviet and Western delegates. The
Soviet agreement in 1958 to the principle of technical talks
(on the test ban and surprise attack) was also without precedent,
although the Soviet scientists turned out to be much more politi-
cally active than their Western counterparts. Bilateral negotia-
tions in private produced the U.S.-Soviet agreement on the
principles of a disarmament treaty in 1961.
However in 1956-1962, as in 1955, Soviet diplomats showed
less restraint than the Soviet mass media, especially those directed
to Western readers. 1 In August 1957, as noted before, Zorin signaled
the imminent end of Soviet participation in the DCSC by making a
'For a dour picture of "Eastern" diplomacy, see Nathan Leites,
Styles in Negotiation: East and West on Arms Control, 1958-1961,
RAND Memorandum, RM-2838-ARPA (Santa Monica, California: November
1961).
-68-
bitter denunciation of the West. Moscow refused in September
to resume negotiations in that forum. Western motives were
impugned by Moscow in 1959 when U.S. scientists presented the
"Hardtack" data to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance
of Nuclear Weapons Tests. The crudest Soviet diplomacy in the
1956-1962 period took place in 1960 in connection with the Ten
Nation Disarmament Committee. The Communist bloc delegations
took a belligerent stand throughout the Ten Nation talks, even
before the Paris Summit Conference, and finally walked out of
the conference never to return. Khrushchev himself on several
occasions in 19 6 1--at the Paris summit and later at the General
Assembly--exceeded somewhat the customary diplomatic norms. 1
Again in 1961, as Moscow seemed to move toward resumption
of nuclear testing, Soviet disarmament diplomacy, like Soviet
foreign policy generally, took on a stern demeanor, a possible
exception being the McCloy-Zorin private negotiations. Soviet
behavior in 1962 at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee
was fairly restrained--by the presence of neutrals if for no
other reason--except for Zorin's vitriolic rejection of a
Soviet-sponsored ban on war propaganda, after Moscow overruled
him on the terms of a compromise declaration he had accepted.
b. The Printed Word. Soviet diplomacy was explained
for audiences around the world in radio broadcasts and periodical
publications of many kinds and in many languages. Our analysis
will focus mainly on the line argued in two journals that more
than any other media, purport to explain Soviet foreign policy
to the non-Communist reader in the West--International Affairs
and New Times. The former is published monthly and contains
slightly more sophisticated and longer articles than the latter,
which is a weekly. Both are available in Russian for Soviet
audiences as well as in many foreign languages.
As with foreign radio broadcasts to the West, especially
to the United States, one may wonder what kind of audience is
actually reached by International Affairs and New Times, and what
the Soviet government believes their impact can be and on whom.
In any event, these two journals provide an indication of the
major themes and trends in Soviet propaganda to the West.
1His behavior at the Bucharest Party Congress in June
1960 also was quite boisterous.
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Both journals seem generally to have continued the propa-
ganda emphases inaugurated in 1955. From 1956 to 1962 the
tendency was to play up the possibility and desirability of
disarmament and East-West detente, the need for reasonable com-
promise on East-West differences, and the benefits to all interests
from a reduction of international tension and military expendi-
ture.
"Restraint" rather than "exposure" was the usual way of
dealing with Western disarmament positions. Moscow often claimed
that Western intransigence was the main reason why disarmament
negotiations had failed. But when compared with Soviet propa-
ganda of the Stalin period or even with the treatment of other
themes during the 1956-1962 period (such as Western policy toward
the underdeveloped nations or Western military strategy),
International Affairs' criticism of Western arms control policy
was relatively restrained and mild. The main purpose of these
Soviet discussions of disarmament evidently was not primarily
to attack the West but to project to Western and third-world
public opinion the image of the Soviet Union as a peace-loving
country with which productive negotiations could be conducted.
This general picture must be modified, however, to take
account of a certain hardening in Soviet disarmament propaganda
at many moments from 1956 to 1962--usually in connection with
some new manifestation of East-West tension. Such was the case
in late 1956 and early 1957 (Hungary and Suez); in mid-1958
(Lebanon and Quemoy); mid-1960 (the U-2 and the Paris summit);
and 1961 (Berlin and related events). At these moments even
International Affairs, not to speak of the World Marxist Review
and the internal Soviet press took on a much tougher line
toward the West. This harsher tone in a journal like International
Affairs, it may be assumed, was meant less to rally the "masses"
against "capitalist" governments than to "sober" the middle
classes.
Further, while Soviet propaganda generally manifested
considerable restraint in dealing with Western policies, it
also registered its concept of the "good" by reference to "evil."
Thus, depending on the exigencies of time and place, certain
Western leaders were singled out for personal attack, for example,
John Foster Dulles, Konrad Adenauer, Charles de Gaulle; along with
strategists such as Henry Kissinger, Herman Kahn, and Maxwell Taylor were
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severely criticized.
With this broad-brush treatment in mind, we shall now
trace briefly the manner in which Soviet media presented the
disarmament issue to the West. By 1959 some radically new
elements had entered the Kremlin's "soft-sell" approach.
In early 1956 International Affairs painted disarmament
in optimistic tones but stated that Moscow had done its part;
progress now depended on the West. Agreement on disarmament
would end the arms race and facilitate the settlement of other
problems. 1 It would allow a transfer of funds to the developing
countries. 2 Steps already taken by the Soviet Union were
"practical proof" of its striving for disarmament. 3 Only the
future would "show whether the Western powers will switch from
talking about disarmament to real cooperation in solving this
problem, the most urgent and vital of our time."14
Following the Hungarian and Suez crises late in 1956, the
tone of Soviet pronouncements changed significantly.5 In keep-
ing with the new belligerent "anti-imperialist" tone of all Soviet
lY. Viktorov, "The Soviet Union and Disarmament," Interna-
tional Affairs, No. 6, 1956, p. 43; G. Andreyev, "Who Is Stalling
on Disarmament?", ibid., No. 10, 1956, p. 23.
2A. Vosnesensky, "Arms Reduction and the Underdeveloped
Countries," New Times, No. 22, 1956, pp. 14-15; I. Yevgenyev and
P. Fyodorov, "The Way to Solve the Disarmament Problem," Interna-
tional Affairs, No. 7, 1956, p. 20; Commentator, "The Most Urgent
Problem," ibid. , No. 8, 1956, p. 33.
3Y. Viktorov, "The Soviet Union and Disarmament," loc. cit.
p. 48 .
4G. Andreyev, "Who Is Stalling on Disarmament?", loc. cit., p. 26.
5N. Arkadyev and I. Matveyev, "Disarmament--Problem No. 1,"
New Times, No. 5, 1957, p. 5; I. Orlov, "Report from the General
Assembly," ibid., No. 11, 1957, pp. 7-9; Commentator, "World
Problem Number One," International Affairs, No. 2, 1957, pp. 55-59;
Editorial, "Outlaw Atomic Weapons," ibid., No. 5, 1957, pp. 5-10;
Y. Viktorov, "Towards a Relaxation of World Tension," ibid. , No. 7, 1957,
p. 8 0 .
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propaganda, statements on disarmament also became harsher. Where-
as in 1956 the West was occasionally criticized for using dis-
armament talks as a screen to hide a continuing arms race, in
1957 the preparation of nuclear war was said to be the West's
aim: "Is it not evident that the U. S. rulers are forcing the
world to the brink of an atom war?" 1 "Preparations for an
atomic war are continuing at a mounting pace." 2
In keeping with this belligerent tone the Western powers,
and especially the United States, were explicitly warned of the
Soviet Union's ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons:
"The aggressor will not be able to find refuge anywhere, neither
on the banks of the Hudson or the Potomac. And the more
adventuristic minds across the Atlantic might do well to assimi-
late this ruthless truth. "3
But even while the West was accused early in 1957 of pre-
paring atomic aggression, New Times and International Affairs
stressed the possibilities for East-West agreement.4 New Times,
for example, in an article on the DCSC quoted James Reston to the
effect that there is now "a serious basis for limited agreement
with the Kremlin in the disarmament field."5 The article then
went on to say: "None would deny that talks on this subject are
lCommentator, "World Problem Number One," ibid.,
pp. 58-59.
2Editorial, "Outlaw Atomic Weapons," ibid., p. 9.
3Editorial, "Marking Time," New Times, No. 15, 1957, p. 2,
see also editorial, "Outlaw Atomic Weapons," loc. cit.
I. Orlov, "Report from the General Assembly," New Times,
No. 4, 1957, pp. 7-9; "International Notes," ibid., No. 12,
1957, p. 19; Major General E. Boltin, "Progress towards Disarma-
ment--Or Still Bigger Armaments," ibid., No. 24, 1957, pp. 7-9.
5
"International Notes," ibid., No. 12, 1957, p. 19.
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beset with not a few difficulties, but, given good will and the
readiness to work for mutually acceptable decisions, they can
be overcome."1
International Affairs echoed the same thought: "To be
sure, there are still many outstanding issues in international
relations. But they can be settled if the countries concerned show
readiness to settle them and make extensive use of the tried and
tested method of negotiation."2 An article in the February
1957 issue commended a U. N. resolution on disarmament as a
"positive step" offering further evidence of the value of nego-
tiations as the only way to reach agreements that are in the
interests of all countries concerned. The following month an
editorial reiterated that "the Soviet Union takes into account
the stand of the Western powers on disarmament and other questions
and has expressed readiness to examine any proposals likely to
promote confidence between states and bring about a detente."3
It is not quite clear why the Soviet leadership chose to em-
phasize the theme of Western war preparations in early 1957.
Perhaps this was done to facilitate the unification of the
Soviet Union's shaky East European empire; perhaps the Soviet
Union hoped to draw the attention of world public opinion away
from its actions in Hungary. It is even possible that this new
line was a product of the temporary weakening of Khrushchev's
power position that evidently took place during this period.h
lIbid.
2M. Marinin, "Some Conclusions," International Affairs,
No. 1, 1957, p. 118.
3Editorial, "The Bedrock of Soviet Foreign Policy," ibid.,
No. 3, 1957, p. 9.
4H. S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union (rev. ed.;
New York: Frederick A. Praegr, 1962), pp. 147-163.
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In any case, impending events soon brought this phase to a close.
Following Khrushchev's triumph over the "antiparty group"
in June 1957, Soviet propaganda immediately took on a more mellow
tone and the theme of war preparations was muted. This occurred
not because foreign policy was necessarily a major issue between
Khrushchev and his opponents but because once Khrushchev emerged
victorious, he chose to identify himself with the peace aspira-
tions of the Soviet people by portraying the "antiparty group"
as opponents of peaceful coexistence. Although there were cer-
tainly foreign policy differences between Khrushchev and the
defeated opposition (especially between Khrushchev and Molotov),
foreign policy had been only one element in the complex struggle
for power. Once Khrushchev's former colleagues had been defeated
(and were thus unable to reply to his charges) he attempted to
discredit them as enemies of serious negotiation and reasonable
compromise.1
The July 1957 issue of International Affairs began with a
strong editorial endorsing peaceful coexistence and proclaiming
the necessity of personal contacts between statesmen of the
socialist and capitalist camps.2 The editorial called for "nego-
tiation on the basis of mutual advantage taking into consideration
the interests of both parties." The August issue condemned the
"antiparty group" for opposing efforts to lessen tension and for
advocating a policy of "tightening all screws" and called for
1
"This group attempted, in effect, to oppose the Leninist
course toward peaceful coexistence among states with differing
social systems, to oppose the relaxation of international tension
and the establishment of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R.
and all the peoples of the world. . . . [Molotov] denied the ad-
visability of establishing personal contacts between leaders of
the U.S.S.R. and the statesmen of other countries, which is
essential in the interests of achieving mutual understanding and
improving international relations." "Resolution of the Plenary
Session of the Party Central Committee--On the Anti-Party Group
of G. M. Malenkov, L. M. Kaganovich and V. M. Molotov," Current
Digest of the Soviet Press, 1957, No. 23, p. 6. This publication
will be referred to hereafter as CDSP.
2Editorial, "For a Leninist Peace Policy," International
Affairs, No. 7, 1957, pp. 5-10.
"patient negotiations, regard for the interests of the countries
concerned, [and] the desire to find a business-like solution to
controversial questions."i
Following the ouster of the "antiparty group," Soviet pro-
paganda again turned to the theme it had emphasized earlier in
the year and that Moscow had championed at the DCSC--the issue of
a nuclear test ban. Here was an issue suitable for agitation
of the "masses" as well as for manipulation of middle-class senti-
ments. New Times cited scientists from the Soviet Union and
abroad on the hazards of radioactive fallout. 2  In April 1957
International Affairs reprinted an article from Look by Adlai
Stevenson urging a ban on hydrogen bomb tests.3 The World Peace
Council came out against nuclear tests in May, and in August the
World Conference Aga nst Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs meeting in
Tokyo followed suit. An editorial in New Times on August 22,
1957 remarked: "There can be no doubt that the Tokyo appeal for
public mobilization will fall on receptive soil." 5
1
"Leninskii kurs na mirnoe sosushchestvovanie--general'naia
liniia vneshnei politika Sovetskogo Soiuza" [The Leninist Course
of Peaceful Coexistence--The General Line of the Foreign Policy
of the Soviet Union], Kommunist, No. 11, -August 1957, pp. 3-11.
Quotation from p. 8.
2
"Scientists Gagged," New Times, No. 18, 1957, p. 21;
"Soviet Oncologists Call for Nuclear Tests Ban," ibid., No. 20,
1957, p. 2; "Ban Nuclear Weapons Tests," ibid., No. 22, 1957, p. 3.
3Adlai E. Stevenson, "Why I Raised the H-Bomb Question,"
International Affairs, No. 4, 1957, pp. 138-142.
4
"Atomic War Must Be Prevented," New Times, No. 19, 1957,
p. 3; "World Peace Council Appeals," ibid., No. 25, 1957, p. 3;
"The Tokyo Declaration," ibid., No. 34, 1957, p. 3.
5Editorial, "Common Aim," ibid., No, 22, 1957, p. 2.
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By the beginning of 1958, Soviet treatment of disarmament
gave the impression of being considerably milder than it had
been during much of the previous year.1 There was a temporary
recurrence of charges of Western war preparations in mid-1958
in connection with the Middle Eastern and Offshore Islands crises, 2
but the rest of the 1958 Soviet discussions of disarmament were
marked by more restrained criticism of the West. 3 Approximately
twice as many articles on disarmament appeared in International
Affairs in 1958 and 1959 as in the 1956-1957 period, a suggestion
at least of greater propaganda interest. The quality of these
articles indicated an increasing familiarity with Western writing
on arms control, although Soviet writers usually distorted
Western views. A trend toward more detailed exposition of Soviet
proposals, for example, on nuclear-free zones, could also be
noted.
An illuminating case study of the way Soviet propaganda
dealt with a Western concession took place in 1958. When Moscow
announced its unilateral test suspension in March, Soviet media
gave this great prominence.4 Western recalcitrance was then cited
as the reason for failure to agree on a test ban.5 But when the
1M. Slavyanov, "Who Is Blocking Disarmament," International
Affairs, No. 1, 1958, pp. 23-30; "A Genuine Peace Programme,"
(ed.), ibid., No. 2, 1958, pp. 3-7.
2G. Andreyev, "Disarmament and the Inspirers of the Cold War,"
ibid., No. 6, 1958, pp. 8-14; I. Yevgenyev, "The Nations Want
Disarmament," ibid., No. 8, 1958, pp. 18-22.
3K. Semyonov, "All Nuclear Tests Must Be Stopped at Once,"
ibid., No. 10, 1958, pp. 14-19.
4 Editorial, "An Historic Act," ibid., No. 5, 1958, pp. 12-18;
A. Lebedinsky, "The Harmful Consequences of Nuclear Weapons
Tests," ibid., No. 6, 1958, pp. 14-15; V. Alexandrov, "Some
Current International Problems," ibid., No. 7, 1958, p. 11;
Commentator, "The Western Powers and Nuclear Tests," ibid.,
No. 11, 1958, pp. 70-74.
5Ibid.
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West agreed in October 1958 to a year-by-year moratorium on test-
ing, Soviet media gave this move little attention.1 The official
Soviet position was that a year-by-year suspension was inade-
quate, but, had Moscow's commitment been firmer to strengthen
moderate elements in the West, this narrowing of the gap might
have been stressed.
In early 1959 the Soviet Union continued to accuse the West
of obstructing agreement. Moscow's propaganda organs and Soviet
diplomats attacked the U. S. "Hardtack" data that had been sub-
mitted in January, 1959 to qualify Washington's position on
underground test controls.2 Despite this complication, Soviet
disarmament propaganda in the first half of 1959 generally main-
tained the tone of restrained criticism that characterized 1958.
The Soviet push toward a summit meeting, which began in
the summer of 1959, brought a warmer tone to International Affairs
in August and September. Editorials proclaimed: "No one has
anything to lose from the ending of the cold war and the achieve-
ment of agreements designed to secure peace: all countries can
but gain from it." 3 Further: "There is every requisite now for
a sharp turn for the better in international relations, for the
complete elimination of the cold war in the interests of all man-
kind." International Affairs asserted: "It may be confidently
In the following articles, although the subject of nuclear
testing is discussed, the one-year moratorium is not even mentioned:
A. Lebedinsky, "New Facts on Radiation Hazards," International
Affairs, No. 7, 1959, pp. 25-27; K. Semyonov, "Obstruction Tactics
Continue," ibid. , No. 8, 1959, pp. 9-13; V. Kirillov, "The
Post War Disarmament Problem," ibid., No. 9, 1959, pp. 13-17.
2V. Kirillov, "The Western Powers Oppose Discontinuation
of Nuclear Tests," ibid., No. 3, 1959, pp. 18-23; K. Semyonov,
"Obstruction Tactics Continue," ibid., No. 8, 1959, pp. 11-12;
Petre Borila, "Peace Is Our Policy," World Marxist Review, No. 6,
1959, p. 7.
3Editorial, "The Soviet Union, the United States and the
Fate of Peace," International Affairs, No. 9, 1959, pp. 4-5.
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said that all the objective conditions for the advent of such an
era have been created."1
The Soviet GCD proposal of September 1959, as Khrushchev
told the General Assembly, did not imply that Moscow was not
desirous of negotiating on partial disarmament measures. This
argument was reiterated in both International Affairs and World
Marxist Review. 2 The first article on GCD to appear in Interna-
tional Affairs asserted:
If the Western Powers for one reason or another are not pre-
pared to agree to universal and complete disarmament, the
Soviet Union, as before, will bend its efforts towards reaching
understanding with other states on the relevant partial steps
and the strengthening of security.3
Similarly, in his foreign policy report to the Supreme Soviet
on October 31, 1959, Khrushchev repeated: "Our proposals state
in writing, in black and white, that if the Western powers are
not prepared to accept GCD, we feel it possible and necessary
to reach an understanding at least on partial measures in the
sphere of disarmament." 4
The propaganda line of the World Marxist Review at this
time emphasized "struggle" rather than "negotiations" for peace.
It could be that Khrushchev's presentation at the General
Assembly was meant as grist both for mass propaganda and for
lEditorial, "The World Breathes More Freely," International
Affairs, No. 10, 1959, p. 6.
2 Editorial, "Disarmament Is Not a Utopia," World Marxist
Review, No. 11, 1959, p. 7; V. Kirillov, "The Peoples Want an
End to Nuclear Tests," International Affairs, No. 12, 1959,
p. 28.
3I. Grigoryev, "An Epoch-Making Programme," International
Affairs, No. 10, 1959, p. 12.
4 N. S. Khrushchev, "On the International Situation and the
Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union," CDSP, No. 44, 1959, p. 10.
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appeals to the moderates. His plea for GCD would serve the first
purpose; his alternative partial disarmament measures the second.
Advocacy of GCD of course might appeal to certain moderate
groups as well as to various radical elements.
The most drastic innovation in Soviet propaganda to the
West from 1956 to 1962 was a reversal of the traditional position
on the economic consequences of disarmament for capitalist society.
Beginning in 1959 the arms race was no longer depicted as a
necessary crutch for a degenerate capitalism. It was portrayed
as an obstacle to the kind of growth that Japan and Germany,
relatively unburdened by defense expenditures, enjoyed. This
argument was adumbrated in a colloquium published in May 1958
by International Affairs, reinforcing the suspicion that this
modification of Communist economics was for foreign audiences.
But a Hungarian economist wrote in the same vein in an Hungarian
journal early in 1959. And the Soviet party magazine Kommunist
presented a limited revision of the old "crisis" theory in
August 1959, suggesting a wish to convince Communists as well
as Westerners that disarmament was possible. The stage was set
for Khrushchev to reassure American businessmen in his Septem-
ber 1959 trip to the United States that they stood to gain from
a redirection from war to civilian industry. Some Western
One of the first U.S. studies of this change in Soviet
writing was by Herbert Ritvo, "Internal Divisions on Disarmament
in the USSR," in Seymour Melman, ed., Disarmament: Its Politics
and Economics (Boston: American Academy of Arts and Sciences,
1962), pp. 222-223. An unpublished manuscript by Michael J.
Lavelle, S.J., "The Economics of American Disarmament: A Soviet
View" (1963) explores the problem at greater length. The major
Soviet work has been I. Glagolev, ed., Ekonomicheskie Problemy
Razoruzheniia (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk, 1961). As Ritvo noted
in his article, however, Glagolev, a short time before this
book, had written a treatise in which he stressed the vested
interests that monopoly capitalists have in the arms industry.
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businessmen agreed with him, so he told the Supreme Soviet on
January 14, 1960 (when he announced that Soviet forces would be
cut):
Some people in the West assert that disarmament threatens
grave consequences for the economy of the capitalist
countries. . . . The least that can be said about such
assertions is that they are completely unsubstantiated.
I have had occasion to talk with representatives of American
business circles, and the most reasonable of them have nowhere
so gloomy a viewpoint and are confident that U.S. industry
is fully able to cope with the tasks of shifting the entire
economy to production of goods for peaceful uses.
He then went on to say that disarmament would benefit Western
economies by allowing a reduction of taxes, increased expendi-
tures for public welfare, an expansion of the domestic market,
and greater international trade.1 An editorial in the February
1960 issue of International Affairs quoted a statement of the
National Planning Association of the United States in support
of this view, and subsequent issues of International Affairs
also discussed this theme.2
1N. S. Khrushchev, speech to the Supreme Soviet, January 14,
1960, in CDSP, No. 2, 1960, p. 9.
2
"Thus, we have a situation when a certain section of the U.S.
ruling class is beginning to lose economic incentives in the arms
drive. . . . The basic trend and character of the arms drive now
conducted by the aggressive circles of the imperialist states
inevitably reduces the economic incentive in war preparations for
larger sections of businessmen in most of the capitalist countries."
0. Andreyev and L. Lvov, "The Arms Drive Strategy Cannot Win,"
International Affairs, No. 11, 1960, p. 66. See also "The
Burning Problem of Today," ibid., No. 2, 1960, p. 5; L. Gromov
and V. Strigachov, "Some Economic Aspects of Disarmament,"
ibid., No. 3, 1960, pp. 26-34; R. Entov, "Military Spending and
Monopoly Profits," ibid., No. 2, 1961, pp. 31-38. In the World
Marxist Review, however, discussions of the economic conse-
quences of disarmament were aimed at allaying the workers' fears
of unemployment and said virtually nothing about the position
of Western businessmen. See, for example, Vladimir Kaigi, "The
Economic Possibility of Disarmament," World Marxist Review, No. 11,
1960, pp. 18-24.
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From mid-1961 until late 1962, however, International
Affairs seems to have stressed the beyefits that workers might
enjoy if the arms burden were lifted.. After the Cuban missile
crisis the advantag s of disarmament for businessmen were em-
phasized once more.
When the Paris Summit Conference collapsed in May 1960,
Soviet disarmament propaganda hardened. Although statements
during the next few months were not nearly so conciliatory as
those in late 1959 and early 1960, neither did they appear so
harsh as the pronouncements of early 1957.3 In breaking up the
conference, Khrushchev was very careful to state that the
Soviet Union was not rejecting all negotiations, and he added
that it would be desirable to hold negotiations in six or eight
months when the international atmosphere had cleared and the
1L. Gromov, "Our Idea of a World Without Arms"
(International Affairs, No. 7, 1963- pp; .54-55)
is aimed solely at Western workers; R. Yevzerov
("Militarism and the Uneven Development of Capitalism," ibid.,
No. 7, 1962, pp. 11-18) discusses the economic consequences of
disarmament but makes no attempt to reassure Western businessmen
as was done during 1960; L. Gromov and V. Strigachev ("Invalid
Economic 'Arguments' about Disarmament," ibid., No. 9, 1962, pp. 32-
39) make some remarks aimed at allaying the fears of Western business-
men, but the article seems to be directed mainly at Western workers.
2 K. Ivanov, M. Kalugin, B. Batsanov, "Economic Programme for
Disarmament," ibid., No. 12, 1962, pp. 8-16. In this article it
is not only said that Western businessmen will not be hurt by
disarmament; even the arms manufacturers are reassured: "The only
losers would be a small handful of arms manufacturers. . . . But
even the arms manufacturers . . . could convert their plants to
produce consumer goods instead of weapons for the destruction of
people."
3 V. Alexandrov, "An Urgent Task," ibid., No. 6, 1960, pp. 46-
48, V. Alexandrov, "Western Zigzags on Disarmament," ibid. , No. 8,
1960, pp. 56-60; N. Arkadyev, "An Artificial Deadlock," ibid., pp. 61-
63; Commentator, "Constructive Contribution to Disarmament," ibid.,
No. 7, 1960, pp. 42-44.
United States had elected a new president.1  In his speech in
East Berlin after leaving Paris Khrushchev said: "If we can't
get a working agreement on the settlement of disputed international
issues with the present leaders of the U. S. A. or with the pres-
ident who takes ov,6r from Eisenhower, we'll wait until the pres-
ident after that. The World Marxist Review and International
Affairs echoed this line)d
Soviet discussions of disarmament in the latter part of 1960
and the first half of 1961 suggest an impression of drift and un-
certainty. This uncertainty changed to intransigence in June 1961,
when Moscow announced that further test ban talks should take place
in the context of GCD negotiations. International Affairs explained:
Taking into account the situation that has arisen at the
Geneva talks on ending nuclear tests, the Soviet Government
has arrived at the conclusion that it is evidently hard to
reach agreement now on this question (control) and that per-
haps it would be better for our countries to begin with the
cardinal question--general and complete disarmament. 5
N. S. Khrushchev, statement, in CDSP, No. 20, 1960, p. 5.
2N. S. Khrushchev, speech, in ibid., No. 21, 1960, p. 4.
3Editorial, "The People Demand: Curb the Aggressor and Ensure
Lasting Peace," World Marxist Review, No. 6, 1960, p. 5; editorial,
"A Policy of Perfidy," International Affairs, No. 6, 1960, pp. 3-4.
4Commentator, "Constructive Contribution to Disarmament,"
ibid., No. 7, 1960, pp. 42-44; V. Alexandrov, "Western Zigzags on
Disarmament," ibid., No. 8, 1960, pp. 56-60; symposium: "Disarma-
ment--Vital Problem of Our Time," ibid., No. 11, 1960, pp. 53-67;
V. Khvostov, "Disarmament Negotiations: History of the Problem,"
ibid., No. 2, 1961, pp. 60-67; G. Andreyev, "Disarmament Talks:
Truth and Fiction," ibid., No. 6, 1961, pp. 3-14.
5Editorial, "The Principal Problems of the Time," ibid.,
No. 7, 1961, p. 8; V. Khvostov (in "The Prospects of Disarmament,"
ibid., No. 11, 1962, p. 49) later observed: "I will not conceal
the fact that after the U-2 spy flight and especially after the
threats of atomic war addressed to us last year over the West Berlin
issue, we, Soviet people, have decided to be even more circumspect
about our country's defences. This is apropos of inspection."
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From mid-1961 up through the Cuban crisis late in 1962 Soviet
disarmament propaganda became less reasonable in appearance, and
the number of articles on disarmament in International Affairs
declined somewhat relative to the 1958-1960 period. Attention
shifted from partial measures to GCD and the We'st's opposition to
the latter.1  The First World Congress for General Disarmament and
Peace convened in the Kremlin in July 1962 and was addressed by
Chairman Khrushchev. It was also addressed by several Americans
such as Dr. Homer Jack, who managed to push through a minority
resolution protesting nuclear testings by Moscow as well as the
West. 2 Finally, as noted above, there were signs that Moscow had
slackened its appeal to Western business interests regarding the
economic benefits of disarmament and was now addressing itself
more to the "workers," a trend that seems to have been reversed
following the Cuban encounter.
2. The Appeal to Anti-Capitalism and Anti-Imperialism.
There was another side to the coin presented to the West. For if
Soviet security interests had to be promoted with the capitalist
foe, Moscow's leading position also had to be preserved and pro-
moted among the Communist and other revolutionary forces opposing
the West. Soviet policy regarding East-West detente and disarmament
had to be rationalized for the benefit of party workers in the
Soviet Union, Communists abroad (especially in China), and the
non-Communist revolutionaries of the emerging nations.
a. The Existence of "Sober" Forces. The rationale for
Khrushchev's policies toward the West emerged in stages, partly as
a result of prodding from Peking and* other strongholds of orthodoxy.
In 1956 Khrushchev denied the fatal inevitability of war and pro-
claimed the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism. In
1957 it was announced that the opponents of peaceful coexistence
lEditorial, "Geneva: Hopes and Prospects," ibid., No. 5,
1962, pp. 8-11; Commentator, "Who is Frustrating Hopes at Geneva,"
ibid., No. 6, 1962, pp. 3-7; N. Arkadyev, "New Words, Old Tune,"
ibid., No. 8, 1962, pp. 5-10; K. Semyonov, "Marking Time," ibid.,
No. 10, 1962, pp. 3-5.
2See Dr. Jack's reports published by the Committee for a
Sane Nuclear Policy; for the Khrushchev speech, see Vseobshchee i
polnoe razoruzhenie--garantiia mira i bezopasnosti vsekh narodov
(Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1962).
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were "antiparty." Later in 1957 it was argued that Sputnik showed
the balance of forces was swinging in favor of the socialist camp.
All the while the economic benefits of disarmament for the devel-
oping countries and for the socialist economies were also reiterated.
As the pressure from the "dogmatists" increased, however,
more elaborate justifications for a revisionist Soviet foreign
policy were worked out. The argument that disarmament was eco-
nomically feasible for capitalism was also addressed to the
readers of Kommunist and to the Supreme Soviet, in case some of
this audience doubted the feasibility of disarmament. As in 1954-
1956, the Kremlin posted the existence of "sober forces" in the
West, even when these forces seemed at times to sink below the
Kremlin's official horizon. As before, the sober forces were said
to know that peace was necessary; now it was added that some of
them recognized that it could also be profitable.
The years 1959-1960 saw the Kremlin go to still greater
lengths to justify both its image of a heterogeneous adversary and
the utility of collaborating with certain elements in the Western
"ruling circles." First, Moscow unveiled certain party archives
to provide scriptural revelation in support of its position. Second,
Soviet ideologists gave new content to the doctrine of peaceful
coexistence to make it an instrument of revolution as well as a
safeguard of peace.
b. The Sanction of Script-ure. Beginning in 1959--the
same year the line changed on the economic consequences of disarm-
ament for capitalism--the Kremlin commenced publication of Lenin's
advice to the Soviet delegation to the Genoa economic conference
in 1922. Harsh words reaffirming Communist doctrine about the
inevitability of war and class struggle, Lenin warned, were super-
fluous and should be avoided. Soviet negotiating behavior, in-
cluding propagation of a "broad pacifist program" by Moscow,
should be "biting" but "nice." By such tactics, said Lenin, "we
will win even if Genoa fails."
Lenin's instructions were not all published at once. But
the first and most revealing set of these materials--a letter
exchange between Chicherin and Lenin in 1922--was passed to the
press on July 27, 1959 and appeared later that year in the obscure
Lenin Miscellany, Volume XXXVI, available only in Russian. Other
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materials appeared at intervals (but none from mid-1960 until
early 1961), culminating in two documents printed in Pravda in
1964. In 1960 and 1962 some of the materials were available for
non-Russian readers of New Times.
With the publication of the first group of Genoa materials
in 1959 a statement by Lenin published long before assumed new
meaning. Speaking soon before the Genoa conference was to take
place, Lenin noted, in words that since 1959 have been paraphrased
time and again by Soviet spokesmen in the international Communist
debate:
Of course when we go to Genoa as merchants, it is
not a matter of indifference to us whether we deal
with those representatives of the bourgeois camp
who are pressing for a military solution to the
problem, or with those representative of the bour-
geois camp who are attracted to pacifism, be it of
the palest hue and one that from the Communist
point of view will not stand up to the slightest
criticism. It would certainly be a poor merchant
who could not master this difference, and, adapt-
ing his tactics to this end, achieve his practical
objectives.1
Whenever the phrase "It is not a matter of indifference to us. . . ..
occurs in current Soviet and international Communist statements,
it may be assumed that a case is being made for collaboration--
informally by means of detente or formally by means of entente or
agreements--with heterogeneous Western elites.
As will be seen, the "It is not a matter of indifference
to us" line was first advanced publicly at high level by Otto I
Kuusinen in his notable Lenin anniversary speech of April 1960,2
1V. I. Lenin, Sochininiia, 2nd ed., Vol. XXVII, pp. 225-226.
20. V. Kuusinen, "Pretvorenie v zhizn' idei Lenina," Pravda,
April 23, 1960. In April 1960 New Times cited the Lenin-Chicherin
correspondence, translating certain passages and giving the docu-
mentary source. In this case, the Genoa proposals were taken
literally as evidence of the Soviet commitment to disarmament and
coexistence without any reference to the exploitation of elite
differences in the West. A. Leonidov, "The Making of a New
Diplomacy," New Times, No. 14, April 1960.
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at a moment when the Chinese ideological onslaught intensified.
Presumably the new Lenin documents were cited and explained orally
at party meetings for those who did not read Lenin Miscellany
or even Pravda.
c. The Enrichment of Doctrine. The second way the Kremlin
sought to rationalize its policies was to add new content to its
peaceful coexistence doctrine. Moscow was now heavily engaged in
a two-front struggle that seemed to require contradictory strategies.
If Moscow sought to placate the Chinese, a more aggressive foreign
policy was called for; if the Kremlin wanted better relations with
the West, a less aggressive policy was needed. A "unity of opposites,"
to use Marxist terminology, was assayed. The new line on peaceful
coexistence called for both struggle and collaboration (i bor'ba
i sotrudnichestvo) in dealing with the West.1 Again the turning
point was in 1959.
A brief review of the evolution of the peaceful coexistence
doctrine is required to appreciate its development in 1959-1960.'
In the period from 1953 through 1958 the discussions of
relations with the West went through two phases. In the first
years after Stalin's death the term peaceful coexistence was little
used; and main emphasis was on such phrases as "the relaxation of
international tension" and the "settlement of disputes by peaceful
means." 2 After the Twentieth Party Congress a second phase began,
and the term peaceful coexistence was used more widely.
Khrushchev's ideological revisions at the Twentieth Party
lSee the "Dialectics of Coexistence" in Robert C. Tucker,
The Soviet Political Mind (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963),
pp. 201 ff.
2See A. Leontrev, "0 mirnon sosushchestvovanii dvukh
sistem" [On Peaceful Coexistence of the Two Systens], Kommunist,
No. 13, 1954, pp. 43-58. The article emphatically rejected the
notion of the export of revolution and said that it was necessary
to expand mutually profitable economic and cultural exchanges.
I
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Congress imparted a new significance to "peaceful coexistence."
It had always been the "Leninist policy," the First Secretary
averred. Its aim, however, was portrayed in relatively passive
terms: to ensure peace and prevent war. In this vein Khrushchev
cited approvingly the five-principles of peaceful coexistence that
had bien endorsed at Bandung in 1955 and by China and India in
1954.
From 1956 until early 1959, Soviet spoKesmen and publicists
often spoke of peaceful coexistence--calling it the "Leninist
policy"--but endorsed it mainly as a way of promoting peace, non-
intervention, and equal respect for the sovereign rights of all
states. In this fashion it was even hailed as the basis f r
relations between the member states of the socialist camp.
Even Prior to the Twenty-First Party Congress in January
1959, an important change occurred, and the emphasis shifted from
peaceful coexistence to competitive coexistence. The nature of
the changes inaugurated at the Twenty-First Party Congress is
clear if we compare the structure of the arguments used before and
after January 1959.
In the period 1953-1958 the argument was addressed mainly
to the West. It was said: At the present time there are only
two possibilities, either war or peaceful coexistence. In order
to avoid war, there is no choice but to live and cooperate together.
Peaceful coexistence is a necessity. At the Twenty-First Congress
this was all changed. It was then declared that a long period of
peaceful coexistence was not just a-necessity, it was also a great
opportunity. The period of peaceful coexistence would enable the
1N. S. Khrushchev, "Report of the Central Committee of the
CPSU to the Twentieth Party Congress," CDSP, Vol. VIII (1956),
No. 4, pp. 9-11.
"Declaration of the Government of the U.S.S.R.--On the
Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship
and Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist
Countries," in National Comunism and Popular Revolt in Eastern
Europe, edited by Paul E. Zinner (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1956), p. 485; the Chinese comment on this declaration uses
similar language; ibid., p. 493.
socialist system to overtake and surpass the capitalist system
and thus pave the way for the world-wide victory of socialism.
Prior to the Twenty-First Congress there had been some
mention of economic competition, but this element played a very
minor role in the discussion. The argument was cast in the form:
Of course there are differences between capitalism and socialism,
but there is no need for these to lead to war. Let us compete
peacefully instead. Once again the argument still centered on
the problem of avoiding war. In 1959 the emphasis shifted; it
was proclaimed that economic competition provided the key to the
world-wide victory of socialism. In the 1953-1958 period it was
said that socialism would eventually triumph because it was a
superior system to capitalism, but it was not said how this
victory would take place. 1
Beginning at the Twenty-First Congress, the nature of the
competition was more clearly spelled out.2 Whereas competition
previously had usually been discussed in vague terms as a con-
test between two social systems and two different sets of ideals,
now it was viewed almost entirely as a production race between
the socialist camp and the capitalist camp. But the Soviet
doctrine went even further. It not only specified the form
of the competition but also offered a timetable to indicate how
it would proceed. The year 1965 was to mark a turning point in
world history. By 1965 the socialist camp was to produce more
than 50 per cent of the world's industrial output. As a result,
according to a typical article: "By 1965, a relatively brief
period, the socialist camp will have become stronger than the
1This approach is exemplified in L. Leont'ev, "Sotsializm
v ekonomicheskom sorevnovanii s kapitalizmom," [Socialism in the
Economic Competition with Capitalism] , Kommunist, No. 15, 1957,
pp. 107-121; "Leninskii kurs na mirnoe sosushchestvovanie-gen-
eralnaia liniia vneshnei politiki Sovetskogo Soyuza" [The Lenin-
ist Course of Peaceful Coexistence--The General Line of the Foreign
Policy of the Soviet Union] , ibid., No. 11, 1957, p. 3; M. Baturin,
"Peace and the Status Quo," International Affairs, No. 1, 1958,
p. 76.
2N. S. Khrushchev, "On the Control Figures for Development
of the U.S.S.R. National Economy in 1959-1965," in CDSP, Vol. XI
(1959), No. 4, pp. 17-20; thereafter cited as "Control Figures."
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imperialist camp not only in some but in all respects. This
will be such a turning poi t in history that its consequences
cannot be foreseen today." Even more important, by approximately
1970 the Soviet Union would overtake the United States in per
capita production, and this would be "a universal-historical
victory of socialism in the peaceful competition with capitalism." 2
Not only would economic competition lead to the economic
victory of the socialist bloc; it would also provide the key to
ensuring peace. At the Twentieth Party Congress it was merely
said that as a result of the appearance of new forces in the world,
one of which was the socialist camp, war was no longer a fatal-
istic inevitability. Now it was explicitly stated that the grow-
ing strength of the socialist camp was the main force preventing
war:
The real possibility of eliminating war from the life of
society develops in proportion to the growth and strength-
ening of the world socialist system. . . . The struggle
for peace in contemporary conditions is first of all a
struggle for the fulfilling and overfulfilling of the
national economic plans of the U.S.S.R. and the other
socialist countries' plans of peace. 3
These doctrinal modifications appeared to represent a still
growing confidence in the Soviet economy. With ostensible assur-
aice Khrushchev declared that the victory of socialism in the Soviet
Union was final and capitalist encirclement no longer existed.
The Soviet leaders seemed to believe that they could actually
challenge the West through economic competition. The emphasis on
domestic prosperity for the Soviet people was also popular internally,
and the ideological refinements could be used to induce greater
efforts to overfulfill the new plan.
1F. Havlicek and L. Gruppi, "The Growing International
Significance of Communist Construction," World Marxist Review,
March 1959, p. 4.
2
"S'ezd stroitelei kommunizma". Congress of the Builders
of Communism] , Kommunist, No. 2, 1959, p. 15.
3
"Iskliuchit' mirovuiu voinu iz zhizni obshchestva"
E To Eliminate War from the Life of Society], Kommunist, No. 9,
1959, pp. 3-5.
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Another motive behind the changing line was Chinese
pressure. It was no accident therefore that following Peking's
broadside in April 1960, "Long Live Leninism," Soviet doctrine
went still farther and heralded peaceful coexistence as the key
to world revolution and the class struggle. Peaceful coexist-
ence was then billed as "a specific form of the class struggle"
and even as "the highest form of the class struggle."
The extent to which the meaning of peaceful coexistence
was changed in mid-1960 can perhaps be best seen when the new
phrases about the class struggle are compared to an article
attacking the "antiparty group," which appeared in the August 1957
issue of Kommunist. In this article the "antiparty group" was
severely criticized for its opposition to peaceful coexistence,
but at no point was it suggested that peaceful coexistence is a
means of fomenting revolution. Peaceful coexistence was defended
solely as a means of promoting peace and lessening tension, and
in support of this point a resolution of the Twentieth Party
Congress was quoted to the effect that the five principles of
peaceful coexistence "constitute the best formula under present
conditions for relations among states with different social
systems. . " .12
After mid-1960 peaceful coexistence was no longer presented
as simply a system of state relations, and the pronouncements on
peaceful coexistence manifested a new militancy. After mid-1960
it was said that the socialist camp had the power "to force the
imperialists to abandon war and to impose on them the policy of
peaceful coexistence.'3
1M. Reimann, "Peaceful Coexistence and the Class Struggle,"
World Marxist Review, October 1960, p. 6; B. Ponomarev, "Peaceful
Coexistence is a Vital Necessity," CDSP, Vol. XII (1960), No. 32,
p. 4.
2
"Leninskii kurs na mirnoe sosushchestvovanie--general'naia
liniia vneshnei politiki Sovetskogo Soiuza" [The Leninist Course
of Peaceful Coexistence--The General Line of the Foreign Policy
of the Soviet Union] , Kommunist, No. 11, 1957, pp. 5 and 11.
3Todor Zhivkov, "Peace: Key Problem of Today," World
Marxist Review, August 1960, p. 12.
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It is important to note that the goal of concrete agree-
ments with the West was still retained, but it was specified
that this goal could be realized through the might of the
socialist camp and not as a consequence of the good will of the
imperialists. This was simply a device to defend a conciliatory
policy in militant terms. Further evidence on this point is
provided by an important article by F. Konstantinov and
Kh. Momdzhyan, two of the editors of Kommurinist, in the July 1960
issue of that journal. They adopted the new militant line and
spoke of imposing peace on the imperialists and forcing them to
accept disarmament, but at the sane time they stated: "The
theory of peaceful coexistence of states with different social
systems presupposes certain agreements, mutual concessions, and
even more compromises.
Khrushchev's visit to the United States, as noted before,
marked the most vigorous Soviet campaign for GCD since the
1930's, as well as renewed Soviet affirmation of the need to
negotiate partial disarmament measures that could be immediately
implemented. The GCD proposal in effect provided propaganda grist
for the more revolutionary aspect of Soviet foreign policy, although
it turned out to be the subject of violent Chinese attacks.
"Peace Does Not Come, It has to be Won," was the title of an
article in the September 1959 issue of the World Marxist Review.
The main theme was that peace must be "imposed" by mass struggle
against the bourgeoisie (as opposed to being negotiated on an
equal basis between the governments of East and West).
Even in the period following the Paris Summit Conference
collapse and the Bucharest Congress in 1960, when the Soviet line
took on a veneer of militancy to meet the Chinese challenge, the
importance of negotiations and compromise was stressed. The party
journal Kommunist declared: "The theory of peaceful coexistence
of states with different social systems presupposes certain agree-
ments, mutual concessions, and even some more compromises." 2 And
the December 1960 statement of the 81 Communist parties meeting in
Moscow declared:
1F. Konstantinov and Kh. Momdzhyan, "Dialektika i sovremen-
nost" [Dialectics and the Present], Kommunist, No. 10, 1960,
p. 
6.Ibid.
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The policy of peaceful coexistence is also favoured by a
definite section of the bourgeoisie of the developed
capitalist countries, which takes a sober view of the
relationshiy of forces and the dire consequences of a
modern war.
In reviewing the work of the 81 party conference Premier
Khrushchev declared, citing the master:
Two trends are observed in the policy of the capitalist
camp vis a vis the socialist countries: a bellicose-
aggressive one and a moderate-sober one. V. I. Lenin
pointed to the necessity of establishing contact with
those bourgeois circles that gravitate toward pacifism,
"be it even of the poorest kind." He said that in the
struggle to preserve peace we must also use sensible
representatives of the bourgeoisie. 2
The new Party Program adopted in October 19613 had nothing
to say on disarmament except to reaffirm the party's policy of
working for "general and complete disarmament under strict inter-
national control" and the abolition of all overseas bases. The
program devoted a great deal of space, however, to further elabora-
tion of the peaceful coexistence line as it began to emerge in 1959.
The "chief aim" of Soviet foreign policy, it declared, was to
"provide peaceful conditions for the building of a communist
society in the U. S. S. R. and developing the world socialist
system, and together with the other peace-loving peoples to deliver
mankind from a world war of extermination." The program underlined
that "to abolish war and establish everlasting peace on earth is a
historic mission of communism"; that this could be done by the
"peoples who can and must force the imperialists into disarmament."
Peaceful coexistence was an "objective necessity," but peaceful
1G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar,
eds., The Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York: Frederick A. Traeger,
1961), p. 189.
2CDSP, No. 4, 1961, p. 11. The World Marxist Review trans-
lation of the speech softened many key phrases; for example, the
last sentence in this quotation was rendered as "we should not
overlook also the saner representatives of the bourgeoisie" (World
Marxist Review, No. 1, 1961.
3For texts of the former 1919 program, the draft and final
versions of the 1961 program, see Jan F. Triska, ed., Soviet
Communism: Programs and Rules (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962).
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coexistence implied not only the absence of interstate violence;
it also "serves as a basis for the peaceful competition between
socialism and capitalism on an international scale and constitutes
a specific form of class struggle between them." Peaceful co-
existence would benefit all mankind except the "big monopoly
magnates and militarists." It would (1) steadily strengthen "the
world socialist system"; (2) aid the struggle of the working class
in the capitalist countries; (3) facilitate the national-liberation
struggle; and (4) accord with the interests of the bourgeoisie who
wish to be spared a thermonuclear war.
The CPSU pledged to work to strengthen "all the organizations
and parties that strive to avert war, the neutralist and pacifist
movements and the bourgeoisie circles that advocate peace and normal
relations between countries. . . ." The party would "expose" the
initiators of war and take all steps to defend the Soviet Union
and "socialist camp as a whole." It would "oppose all wars of con-
quest, including wars between capitalist countries, and local wars
aimed at strangling people's emancipation movements, and...
support . . . anti-imperialist wars of liberation. . . I
These ideas were amplified in Soviet writings in 1961 and
1962, which endeavored to rationalize detente in terms of revolution.
In explaining the need for closer relations between East and West,
an important article in Pravda on January 11, 1962 argued that
there were two compelling reasons for cooperation between states
with different social systems, one political the other economic.
In the political realm all states have an interest in preventing
nuclear war, and for this a certain 'amount of joint action is
necessary. In the economic realm there is a common interest in
mutually profitable trade. 2
In fact international trade was no longer simply portrayed
as being desirable; it was elevated to the status of an objective
economic law. The Diplomatic Dictionary of 1961 stated:
lIbid., pp. 63-67.
2N. Inozemstev, "Mirnoe sosushchestvovanie--vazhneishii
vopros sovremennosti" [Peaceful Coexistence--The Most Important
Question of the Present], Pravda, January 11, 1962, p. 5.
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The necessity of peaceful cooperation is dictated by the
development of the productive forces of society. With
the present level of development of productive forces
no single country can develop normally without economic
and cultural links with other countries. The restoration
of international economic ties is an objective economic
necessity.1
To meet the Chinese challenge, Soviet policy had to be por-
trayed as a manifestation of revolutionary militance. To this
end it was argued that the present historical period, characterized
by the simultaneous existence of two conflicting social systems,
is a period of unprecedented complexity. As a result, relations
between socialist and capitalist states are not characterized just
by cooperation as the revisionists claimed, nor just by conflict
as the dogmatists alleged. Rather there is a dialectical com-
bination of both "struggle and cooperation" (i bor'ba i sotrudni-
chestvo ). As one writer put it in 1961: "Peaceful coexistence
is a dialectical process that organically combines the sharpest
class struggle between socialism and capitalism, and cooperation
of states with different social systems in the name of preserving
peace."2
d. The Obsolescence of Doctrine. Finally, perhaps the
most radical step by which Moscow justified its policies against
Chinese attack was simply to deny the relevance of Lenin's teach-
ings on imperialism to the present era. For Moscow this was
"creative Leninism, and the revelations of Lenin's views in 1922
helped to justify it. Khrushchev candidly told the Bucharest
Congress in June 1960:
The thesis, enunciated at the 20th and 21st Congresses of
our Party, that war is not inevitable in our time has
immediate bearing on the policy of peaceful coexistence.
The tenets on imperialism that Lenin advanced still hold
true; they serve as before, and will go on serving, as a
1Diplomaticheskii slovar' [Diplomatic Dictionary] (2 vols.;
Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1961), Vol. II, p. 299.
2Yu. Krasin, Mirnoe sosushchestvovanie--forma klassovoi bor'by
[Peaceful Coexistence--A form of the class struggle] (Moscow:
Gospolitizdat, 1961), pp. 70-75.
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lodestar for us in our theory and practice. But it
must not be forgotten that Lenin's tenets on im-
perialism were put forward and developed by him
decades ago, when many phenomena that have now
become decisive for the development of the histor-
ical process and for the entire international
situation did not exist.
Khrushchev warned:
Comrades, when it comes to this question we must not
now repeat mechanically what Vladimir Il'ich Lenin
said about imperialism many decades back, and again
and again reiterate that imperialist wars are
inevitable until socialism has won all over the
world.1
A cynic might say that the Kremlin's modifications of
ideology proved it was a fig leaf to cover the expediencies of
power politics. This judgment would ignore the role that per-
ception of a changing reality is bound to exert upon any
systematic and somewhat rational world view. But it would seem
fair to argue that the Kremlin's revision of the line on the
economic consequences of disarmament upon capitalism represented
a crude manipulation of theory for policy purposes without any
basis in a materially changed reality. On the other hand the
thesis that war is no longer inevitable was implicit acknowledg-
ment that atomic weapons had foreclosed policy alternatives still
available in earlier times.
1Pravda, June 22, 1960.
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Chapter III
THE SPIRIT OF MOSCOW: DETENTE AND LIMITED ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
1962-1964
A. The Negotiations: Style and Substance
1. Moves on the Test Ban and GCD. Shortly before the Cuban
missile crisis erupted, Moscow shifted its position on two central
issues. First, on August 29 and September 3, 1962, after rejecting
two alternative test ban proposals put forward by the United States
on August 27, the Soviet delegate to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Conference (ENDC) announced his government's willingness to sign a
three-environment test ban with a moratorium on underground testing
"while continuing negotiations on the final prohibitions of such
explosions." A similar proposal had been made by Moscow on November
28, 1961, but with the provision that inspection over the underground
test moratorium could take place only in the content of a compre-
hensive disarmament agreement. Moscow's August 29-September 3 position
seemed no longer to be contingent upon GCD measures being enacted,
but Soviet representative Kuznestsov clouded the issue on September
5 by reiterating Moscow's support for its stand on November 28, 1961.
In any event the Western delegates rejected the new Soviet overture
on principle because--after Soviet test resumption in 1961--the
West would no longer consent to an unpoliced moratorium. 1
The other shift in Moscow's position prior to Cuba took place
during the general debate of the Seventeenth General Assembly.
Foreign Minister Gromyko announced on September 21, 1962:
Taking account of the stand of the Western Powers the Soviet
Government agrees that in the process of destroying vehicles
for -the delivery of nuclear weapons at the first stage ex-
ception be made for a strictly limited and agreed number of
global intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles, and
anti-aircraft missiles of the ground-to-air type which would
remain at the disposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United States alone. 2
Ostensibly this concession was made to meet the Western demands for
retention of a "nuclear umbrella" during the early stages of the
disarmament program. But during the brief -third session of the
1ENDC/PV.76, August 29, 1962, pp. 14-23; ENDC/PV.79,
September 3, 1962, pp. 72 and 78-80. See also veroatim records of
September 5, 1962.
2United Nations document A/PV.ll27, 21 September 1962,
pp. 38-40.
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ENDC in November and December Soviet spokesmen refused to clarify
the-Gromyko proposal until it was accepted "in principle" by the
West.1
The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 was not followed
by any immediate or dramatic shifts in Soviet positions on the
test ban, GCD, or collateral measures in either the United Nations
General Assembly or the ENDC. At the General Assembly meeting in
New York the Soviet government continued to attack Western pro-
posals for a partial test ban or a comprehensive ban with on-site
inspection. A more positive chord was sounded on December 5, 1962,
when the United States and Soviet Union announced agreement on
certain measures of cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer
space.
The Soviet position on a nuclear test ban was formally
modified for the first time since September when on December 3 and
10, 1962, Moscow publicly espoused the idea of automatic seismic
stations--"two or three" on Soviet territory--to control an under-
ground test ban. 2 Delivery of the sealed apparatus for periodic
replacement in the Soviet Union would have to be carried out by
Soviet personnel in Soviet aircraft, but Moscow would be prepared
to agree to servicing by foreign personnel.
The usual pattern of backing and filling followed. As the
United States and Great Britain in the following days pressed for
lENDO/PV.83, November 26, 1962, p. 22. However, on
March 27, 1963 the Soviet delegate elucidated for the first time
that Moscow would permit inspection of -the missile launch pads.
ENDC/PV.114, March 27, 1963, pp. 39-40.
2 ENDC/PV.90, December 10, 1962, pp. 13-27. The "black
box" idea had been endorsed by U.S. and Soviet scientists at
the Pugwash Conference in September 1962; Soviet diplomats
broached it again privately during the October meeting at the
General Assembly and again in Geneva on November 7; it was
treated favorably by Radio Moscow's Domestic Service on November
10 and in an Izvestiia article of November 11; open discussion took
place in Geneva after November 13, but Moscow did not espouse the
idea publicly at the General Assembly until after it had finished
its test-ban debate.
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a meeting of experts to discuss this proposal, the Soviet represen-
tative alleged that an attempt was being made to sabotage agreement.
But as the third session of the ENDC ended in frustration and
acrimony, Premier Khrushchev in private correspondence with President
Kennedy renewed Soviet agreement on December 19 to "2 to 3" on-site
inspections per year for the control of a comprehensive test ban
treaty,l thereby thus returning to a position first held in 1960.
Significantly, Khrushchev made clear that the concession was being
offered primarily to assist the American President to obtain do-
mestic support for an agreement.2  In his reply, President Kennedy
insisted--cordially--that the minimum number of inspections accept-
able to the United States was between eight and ten. 3 Meanwhile,
informal talks were taking place in New York among Soviet, American,
and British representatives. They lasted from January 14 through
January 31, 1963, when they were broken off by Moscow on the issue
of the number of on-site inspections, on which neither side seemed
ready to budge.
In subsequent negotiations at the ENDC the Western powers
1Documents on Disarmament, 1962, pp. 1239-1242.
2 Communication from Premier Khrushchev -to President Kennedy,
dated December 19, 1962, in United Nations Document DC/207, April 12,
1963 (also ENDC/73, January 31, 1963). Khrushchev repeated that
the USSR would accept three automatic seismic stations. He out-
lined in his letter three zones in which those stations could be
established: Central Asia, Altai, and the Far East. He also spe-
cified the most suitable sites within each zone.
3 Letter dated December 28, 1962 from President Kennedy to
Premier Khrushchev, in ibid. (also ENDC/74, January 31, 1963).
Kennedy found Khrushchev's suggestions for locating unmanned
seismic stations helpful, but inadequate. He felt that there
would be need for a number of stations in the vicinity of the
Kamchatka and Tashkent areas. Khrushchev had no objections to
stations in these areas providing that the number of stations
remained fixed at three. Communication from Khrushchev to
Kennedy, dated January 7, 1963, in ibid.
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on April 1, 1963 reduced their demand from 8-10 to 7 on-site
inspections,l but in the following month the debate degenerated
to the point where the Soviet negotiator declared that it was
"a sheer waste of time." 2
2. Limited Agreements and the SIit of Moscow." While
the test ban negotiations showed little prospect of success the
EIDC discussions on other arms control items in the spring of
1963 appeared equally inauspicious. The five Communist delega-
tions attacked the Nassau agreement of December 1962, plans for
U.S.-Canadian defense cooperation, the Franco-German treaty of
cooperation of January 1963, and U.S. overseas bases--particularly
those serving Polaris submarines. A number of Soviet proposals
were aimed directly against these Western positions--a declaration
"On Renunciation of Use of Foreigr Territories for Stationing
Strategic Means of Delivering Nuclear Weapons, "3 a draft nonaggres-
sion pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact powers,4 and a proposal
for declaring the Mediterranean a nuclear-free zone. 5 On June 21,
just before the ENDC recessed, the Soviet representative rejected
a draft treaty put forward by the Mexican delegate that would
have prohibited the orbiting or stationing in space of nuclear
weapons.
It was against this background of hostile negotiating
behavior in the ENDC that Moscow was negotiating a direct communi-
cations link with Washington as well as a test ban agreement.
Evidence of progress on the hot line was indicated on April 5, when
the Soviet delegate declared that his government agreed to the
United States proposal "imn ediately, without waiting for general
and complete disarmament." On April 26, even as the United States
lENDC/78, April 1, 1963,. in United Nations Document DC/207,
April 12, 1963.
2 ENDC/PV.126, April 29, 1963, p. 24.
3 ENDC/PV.147, June 21, 1963, p. 49.
4 ENDC/77, February 20, 1963, in United Nations Document
DC/207, April 12, 1963.
5ENDC/PV.139, May 31, 1963, pp. 21-22.
6 ENDC/PV.118, April 5, 1963, p. 52.
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delegate made his first reference to the possibility of agreement
on this question, the Soviet representative made a blistering
attack on the Western powers.1 The Soviet government signed the
direct communications link agreement with the United States on
June 20, 1963, shortly before an otherwise apparently fruitless
ENDC session ended---a striking illustration of the counterpoint
in the East-West debate.
Meanwhile private talks on a test ban treaty were proceeding
among unofficial representatives of the United States, the Soviet
Union, and Britain. In March 1963 a small number of scientists
from the three countries met in London to erplore possible com-
pramises; although the meeting was a private one, it was evidently
under the auspices of the respective governments. No formula for
an agreement was reached, but each side apparently did succeed in
impressing the other with its interest in agreement. On April 24
and May 31 the effort was pursued further in personal messages
from President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan to Premier
Khrushchev. Following the Soviet Premier's second reply the Western
representatives were able -to announce on June 10 the scheduling
of a "high-level" conference of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in Moscow on July 15.2 Appropriately,
in the United States notice of this meeting was given by President
Kennedy in his widely remarked American University address of
June 10, 1963.
Speaking in Berlin on July 2, 1963, Ehrushchev announced
that in the forthcoming three-power talks in Moscow the Soviet
government was interested in concluding a partial test ban agreement.
Modifying the Soviet negotiating position previously revealed on
September 3, 1962, Khrushchev dropped the qualification of an
(uninspected moratorium) on underground testing while a total ban
was being negotiated but now called for the simultaneous signing
of an East-West nonaggression pact. At the same time he reiterated
the Soviet view that international control over a comprehensive
treaty was unnecessary, equating such control with legalized
espionage. 3
While circumstantial evidence suggests that Khrushchev had
lENDC/PV.125, April 26, 1963, p. 23.
2 Great Britain, Further Documents Relating to the Conference
of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament (London, 1963), p. 7
(Cmd. paper 1284).
3ENDC/112, August 22, 1963, in United Nations Document DC/208,
September 5, 1963
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opted for a test ban agreement even before his July 2 statement,
and may have recognized that a Yartial ban held the greatest pros-
pects of success on both sides, it was not yet entirely clear
that the nonaggression pact issue might not be used by the Kremlin
to scuttle agreement at the last minute. Sino-Soviet negotiations
were simultaneously in progress in Moscow, and some members of the
Soviet leadership may have been opposed to a test ban agreement
either at that time or more generally. At any rate; on July 19,
Khrushchev publicly confined himself to the "hope" that a nonaggres-
sion pact would emerge from the test ban negotiations. 2 The three-
power negotiations began in Moscow on July 15 as scheduled, and
after the first day Moscow let the nonaggression pact issue drop
to the background, although it was clear that the final communique
would have to make some mention of it. The negotiations thereafter
were friendly and businesslike.
The main problems were the withdrawal clause and -the question
of depositories for the treaty. These were solved with relatively
little difficulty, strong Soviet resistance to the former being
overcome by a circumlocution. On July 25 the treaty was initialed
and on August 5, 1963 it was signed. As for the nonaggression
pact, the Soviet government was content to accept an accompanying
statement to the effect that the three governments would consult
with their respective allies for the purpose of achieving an
agreement satisfactory to all. 3
1 Moscow ceased jamming the Voice of America
broadcasts in May and June 1963 and,' as indicated, the hot line
agreement was signed on June 20, 1963. Khrushchev publicly
commended President Kennedy's American University speech of
June 10 in Pravda of June 15, 1963; further, in June 1963, the
Soviet publication New Times singled out the fact that Secretary
of State Rusk on May 29, 1963 had supported the proposal of a
group of United States Senators for a partial ban as being in the
interest of both countries. New Times, No. 23, 1963, p. 32 (Russian
edition, June 7, 1963).
2 ENDC/113, August 23, 1963, in United Nations Document
DC/208, September 5, 1963.
3 ENDC/l00/Rev. 1, July 30, 1963, in United Nations Document
DC/208, September 5, 1963.
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The impression of de'tente generated by the limited test ban
treaty pervaded the brief fifth session of the ENDC, which met
through the month of August. But there were no basic changes of
position on the part of either the Soviet Union or the West.
The nuclear powers were still unable to agree on an agenda for
collateral measures, and the debate remained general. Moscow
continued to plead the case for a nonaggression pact even though
bluntly informed by the United States representative that the
ENDC was not the place for that matter. While urging that the
momentum gained by the test ban be used to settle the problem of
GCD, Soviet negotiators also advanced the various collateral
measures proposed by Khrushchev in his speech of July 19, 1963,
including a cut in military budgets, a reduction of forces in
both Germanies, and measures to prevent surprise attack. On
this last question, which was known to hold some interest for the
United States, Mr. Tsarapkin made clear that an agreement would
have to be combined "with certain partial disarmament measures."1
The ENDC adjourned soon thereafter and did not reconvene until
January 21, 1964.
New Soviet moves were, however, taken at the Eighteenth
General Assembly meeting in New York in the fall of 1963. On
September 19 Mr. Gromyko further modified the Soviet position on
a "nuclear umbrella," conceding that a limited number of nuclear
missiles might be retained through the end of the disarmament
process.
At the same time the Soviet government reversed the position
it had taken on June 20, 1963 in the ENDC and assented to a joint
Soviet-American agreement not to orbit nuclear weapons in space.2
President Kennedy on the following day agreed to talks on the
latter proposal, and on October 3 the Soviet Foreign Minister
joined his American and English colleagues in an agreement in
principle. 3 Accordingly on October 17, 1963 the United Nations
General Assembly by acclamation adopted Resolution 1884 (XVIII),
which endorsed the Soviet-American "understanding" on this issue
and called upon all states to refrain from orbiting nuclear
1 ENDC/PV.152, August 16, 1963, p. 33.
2Pravda, September 20, 1963.
3New Times, No. 41, 1963, p. 32.
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weapons in space.
Other sigris of limited movement in Soviet positions on arms
control in this period were evident as the year 1963 drew to a
close. At the International Atomic Energy Agency Conference in
Vienna the Soviet Union accepted some safeguards to ensure that
fissionable fuel and reactors were not used for military purposes
by aid recipients,2 and at the United Nations the Soviet Union
joined the United States in an agreement on certain legal prin-
ciples governing the exploration and use of outer space. In fact
the latter agreement, which was approved by the U.N. Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on November 22, failed to contain
several Soviet principles--such as the prohibition of nongovern-
mental activit es in space--which had been objectionable to the
United States. On December 13 Mr. Khrushchev announced a unilateral
reduction in the Soviet military budget and the possibility of a
cutback in Soviet armed forces. . And on December 31, 1963 he addressed
a letter to all heads of state urging an agreement on the peaceful
settlement of territorial disputes--a proposal 4 of questionable value
but obviously aimed at least in part at China.
Another East-West agreement came on April 20, 1964, when--
after an unpublicized plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in Feb-
ruary--private negotiations among Washington, London, and Moscow
led to simultaneous pledges by the three governments to cut back
production of fissionable materials.
3. Hardening of the Line in the ENDC. In the ENDC session
that commenced on January 21, 1964,. however, Soviet negotiators
vigorously rejected the new United States proposals for a freeze
on stragetic delivery vehicles and for a reduction of Soviet and
American strategic bomber forces. Instead Moscow laid major em-
phasis on GCD (including its concession of September 1963 on the
lUnited Nations, General Assembly Official Records, Eighteenth
Session Annexes, Agenda Item 26.
2Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs: 1963
(New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper
and Row, 1964), p. 287.
3Ibid., p. 292.
4ravda, January 4, 1964.
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"nuclear umbrella"), the destruction of all bombers, reciprocal
budgetary reductions, and a nonaggression pact. Moscow argued
that the United States proposal on the nondissemination of nuclear
weapons could not be taken seriously until the NATO Multilateral
Force (MLF) project was abandoned; the Kremlin also refused to
dissociate from other partial measures the proposal of ground
control posts against surprise attack. By March 1, 1964 Mr.
Gromyko was publicly charging the West with responsibility for the
lack of progress at the ENDC, and an undertone of recrimination
continued to be evident in Soviet statements until the end of the
session on April 28.
We might sum up the period from September 1962 to mid-1964
as one of extraordinary movement toward agreements on the fringes
of the disarmament problem. However, the Soviet approach to
East-West agreements for arms control and disarmament reflected a
notable duality between public and private negotiating posture.
Publicly Soviet representatives continued in the negotiations to
pursue lines of conduct that often seemed to undermine the possibil-
ity of agreement, while privately Moscow proceeded toward specific
understandings with the United States.
B. The Propaganda and Ideology of Disarmament
Soviet propaganda treatment of the arms control and disarma-
ment issue, in common with Soviet negotiating behavior in the ENDC,
seems generally to have been antagonistic to the West even when
private talks between Moscow and Washington were proceeding favor-
ably. The outstanding exceptions to this rule arose in connection
with the test ban and the understanding not to orbit nuclear
weapons in space, when Moscow exhibited definite propaganda re-
straint.
1. War Danger and Antagonism Toward the West. Soviet
propaganda from the spring of 1962 until after the Cuban crisis
of October laid great emphasis on the Soviet GCD program and the
benefits its realization would bring to the underdeveloped and
developed nations alike. However, as some of the substantive
differences about policy began to become clear, Moscow turned to
criticizing the West, particularly the United States, for its lack
of a constructive approach. This was particularly evident with
the test ban issue, when Western insistence on on-site inspection
was depicted time and again as an intelligence scheme. Parallel
lIzvestiia, March 2, 1964.
-104-
to this line on disarmament (and at a time when the Soviet
leadership was probably deciding on the Cuban missile adventure),
Soviet propaganda increasingly emphasized the danger of war and
United States preparations for a new Cuban invasion. But even
while Moscow was broadcasting to Western populations a highly
critical view of Western negotiating conduct, it did so in a
relatively calm and even reasonable tone, with little or no
invective and no emphasis on mass peace 'action. On a related
point, the Soviet theoretical journal Kommunist went to press on
August 24, 1962 with an article by Khrushchev on problems of
economic integration in which he made strong claims that the
capitalist states had accepted the Soviet economic challenge
and were in fact already engaged in peaceful economic competition.
The limited shift in Soviet policy on the test ban issue
on August 29-September 3, 1962, at the ENDC was described by
Pravda on the following day as ",opening the way to agreement."
New Times on September 8, 1962 described the move in similar
terms. The Soviet willingness to agree to a limited test ban cum
moratgrium was affirmed by Khrushchev in a speech on October 1,I
1962. The possible significance of the Soviet move of August 29-
September 3 is suggested also by a subsequent Chinese charge that
the Soviet Union notified Peking on August 25, 1962, that it had
agreed to a U.S. proposal to refrain from transferring nuclear
weapons and technical information concerning their manufacture
to non-nuclear powers and that non-nuclear powers should refrain
from seeking to buy or produce atomic weapons. 2 As the Cuban
missile crisis approached, Soviet comment continued to focus on
the test ban issue, stressing alleged Western obstruction tactics
and Moscow's willingness to negotiate on the basis of its own pro-
posals or the neutralist "compromise" memorandum of April 1962.
2. After Cuba. In the aftermath of the Cuban episode Soviet
propaganda stressed the opportunities for U.S.-Soviet agreement on
the test ban and other arms control measures as a result of Soviet
1Pravda, October 2, 1962.
2 See Peking Review, No. 33, August 16, 1963.CDI
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concessions. Indeed the same day that Khrushchev announced that
Russia's missiles were being withdrawn from Cuba Moscow stated
the U.S. and Soviet positions on a test ban were "close." Sub-
sequently, although the United States and Britain continued to be
attacked in Soviet media for continued obstruction of the test ban
talks, Moscow emphasized that conditions were more favorable for
agreement and that in fact the work of the Three-Power Subcoimittee
was "gradually advancing."2 Nonetheless, following the British
announcement of November 12 that it planned to conduct a nuclear
test in Nevada with United States cooperation, the Soviets stepped
up their accusations of Western obstruction' and maneuvering which
they alleged aimed to avoid agreement.
As the ENDC resumed its deliberations in November 1962, the
Soviet concession on the "nuclear umbrella" that had been announced to
the U. N. General Assembly by Andrei Gromyko was stressed as a
manifestation of Soviet good will that required Western concessions
in turn. Soon, however, the Soviet negotiator was reportedly
engaged in "exposing" Western moves to accelerate the arms race
with its plans for a NA.TO nuclear force while posing in favor of
disarmament. 3 Soviet propaganda also criticized the United States
and Britain for their negative reaction to Moscow's proposal of
December 10 to use automatic seismic stations ("black boxes") to
police underground testing in a comprehensive ban and for their
efforts to evade compliance with the recent General Assembly reso-
lution calling for an end to all testing by January 1, 1963.
At the same time, Moscow radio, both foreign and domestic,
carried reports of Soviet-American agreements of December 5 at the
General Assembly on cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space
and on the peaceful uses of resources released by disarmament; also
on December 14 Moscow domestic service carried an interview with
Senator Albert Gore, which emphasized the point that further agree-
ments were possible. This time Khrushchev's highly conciliatory
report of December 12 to the Supreme Soviet on foreign policy was
being translated for distribution in all major languages.
Khrushchevts December 19 letter to President Kennedy conceding
the possibility of two or three on-site inspections was advertised
as a step to meet the West part way. The Soviets emphasized that a
1TASS in English to Europe, October 28, 1962, 1611 GMT.
2Moscow International Service, November 18, 1962, 1000 GMT.
3TASS in English to Europe, December 4, 1962, 1748 GMT.
4 General Assembly Resolution 1762 (XVII) of November 6, 1962.
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rapprochement of Soviet and American positions had taken place
on the test ban. But now Moscow's propaganda increasingly noted
that within the United States government there were opponents of
any compromise. In breaking off the private three-power talks
in New York on January 31, 1963 on the grounds that the West was
not "showing good will," Moscow, citing Edward Teller and Nelson
Rockefeller, emphasized that the United States administration was
under "strong pressure" not to conclude a test ban agreement.1
The American test resumption soon thereafter was assailed as an
attempt to poison the atmosphere at Geneva, and it was implied that
this move was due to pressure from the "right."2 At the same time
Soviet propagandists continued to stress the advantageous economic
consequences of GCD, particularly in connection with economic aid
to the underdeveloped countries.
3. Hardening of the Propaganda Line, March-May 1963. By
March 1963 Soviet media were once again emphasizing the lack of
headway in Geneva and questioning the good faith of the Western
powers. Western moves on the MIF, deployment of Polaris, and
Canadian-American nuclear weapons cooperation were all described
as fostering nuclear proliferation, increasing tension, and thus
impeding progress on GCD. The Soviets gave considerable propa-
ganda coverage t'o their proposal of February 10, 1963 in the ENDC
prohibiting the stationing of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles
on foreign territory. In this proposal the existence of a war
danger was cited, and Western public opinion was urged to insist
that common sense prevail. Similarly the Soviet proposal of a
nonaggression pact was discussed in terms of Western evasion of
agreements to better the international situation, giving parti-
cular attention to the "aggressive designs" of the French and
West German governments.
As the direct Moscow-Washington communications link--the
hot line--was being negotiated, Soviet media continued to accuse
the Western powers of procrastination on all issues at Geneva.
Although Soviet propaganda indicated obliquely that there was
interest in a test ban in the United States government, 3 the move-
ment toward a hot line agreement was minimized; instead Western
lEditorial, "Transferred to Geneva," New Times, No. 6,
February 13, 1963.
2Editorial, "Nevada and Geneva," ibid., No. 7, February 20, 1963.
3Editorial, "Vicious Circle," New Times, No. 15, April 17, 1963.
On this occasion Moscow noted that "influential elements" were
exerting pressure on the Kennedy administration not to sign a test
ban.
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rejection of "constructive" Soviet proposals was emphasized in
Soviet propaganda throughout the remainder of the fourth ENDC session.
Particular attention was given to the negative Western response to
the Soviet proposal of a nuclear-free zone in the Mediterranean,
again with explicit references to Polaris and to possible MLF deploy-
ment. (However, when the hot line agreement was signed, Soviet
media acknowledged it as a "bright spot" in the ENDC's work and a
proof of Soviet good will in seeking agreements with the West.)l
In sum, while the ground was being prepared for the partial
test ban treaty in private talks among the three powers and also
in the Soviet-American agreements of the period,2 the Soviet propa-
ganda line on the ENDC was basically antagonistic. The earlier
tendency, manifested in the period December 1962 to February 1963,
to imply that the Kennedy administration did not have a free hand
in negotiating a test ban was subordinated in the later months to
an antagonistic propaganda attacking "aggressive" Western moves
outside the negotiating forum.
4. Agreements and Propaganda Restraint, June-October 1963.
Khrushchev s favorable comments of June 15, 1963 on President
Kennedyts American University speech of June 10 and Khrushchev's
proposal of a partial test ban at Berlin on July 2, Soviet state-
ments began to play down United States "aggressiveness" and instead
indicated a recognition that the governments with which they were
negotiating were under pressure from "militarist 'ultras' and the
big war monopolies" not to enter into agreements or move toward a
detente.3
With the initialing of the test ban treaty on July 25, 1963
and the subsequent debate on the issue in the United States, Soviet
propaganda emphasized two main themes: The agreement furthered a
relaxation of tensions and created favorable conditions for the
1 Izvestiia, June 22, 1963.
2In addition to the hot line, a Soviet-American agreement on
limited space satellite cooperation was signed on March 20, 1963
in Rome, and on May 21 a memorandum on Soviet-American cooperation
in the peaceful uses of atomic energy was initiated in Moscow.
New Times, No. 13, 1963, p. 32 and No. 22, 1963, p. 32.
3See, for example, "The Test Ban Talks," New Times, No. 29,
July 1963.
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solution of other East-West problems,l and it "exposed" the
"reactionary' groups in the West that were most opposed to agree-
ments and detente.2
Table III.1 characterizes the Soviet propaganda view of the
debate in the West on the test ban in this period. It should be
cautioned that Soviet media laid great emphasis on the various
individuals and groups constituting the "aggressive circles" while
saying relatively little about the majority of "sober-moderate"
individuals and groups that supported the partial test ban. None-
theless Soviet reporting of the struggle over the test ban in the
West was suggestive of Soviet political interests in East-West
security agreements.
The main line of Soviet comment on the test ban agreement
was that the "madmen" were exposed, isolated, and weakened in the
debate that followed the agreement. The treaty was seen as a
means of "tying the hands" of those in the West who were most
vociferous in their opposition to the "socialist" states, 3 while
at the same time the "forces of peace" had been strengthened. In
this connection Soviet commentators emphasized that American politi-
cal leaders were showing an increasing understanding of the need
for policies of coexistence rather than policies of force. This
view complemented the other main Soviet propaganda line to the
effect that a start had been made toward a relaxation of tensions
and the step-by-step negotiation of other outstanding East-West
problems.
Soviet domestic propaganda on the test ban made the point
that the relaxing effect of the test ban on the international
1See, for example, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian,
July 26, 1963, 1400 GMT; TASS in Russian to Europe, July 29, 1963;
0310 GMT, TASS in English to Europe, August 3, 1963, 1900 GMT;
Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 5, 1963, 0600 GMT; and
TASS in English to Europe, August 5, 1963, 1619 GMT.
2 See, for example, TASS in English to Britain, July 31,
1963, 1800 GMT; Moscow in Danish to Denmark, August 2, 1963, 1600
GMT; TASS in English to Europe, August 3, 1963, 1147 and 1900 GMT;
Moscow in English to Britain, August 5, 1963, 1900 GMT; Moscow in
English to Southeast Asia and Australia, August 5, 1963, 1300 GMT;
and Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 6, 1963, 0100 GMT.
3Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, April 18, 1963,
1400 GMT
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Table 111.1
TEST BAN DEBATE IN THE WEST AS DESCRIBED
BY SOVIET PROPAGANDA MEDIA
United States
1 2 3
Cog: Senator Goldwater - Dr. Teller; Mr. Nixon; Senators
Jackson Stennis 5 Dirksen, Symington,7 Thurmond,8 Curtis,9
Mundt,1$ Russell I and Long;12 Congressmen Halleck,1 3 Mi ler,14
and Hosmer;1 5 Generals Power, Walker,1 7 and Wedemeyer unspe-
cified "military circles" including "Pentagon people; "l unnamed
"madmen" representing the military and arms production interests.
2 0
Pro: President Kennedy;21 Secretaries Rusk and McN ara;
2 2
Senators Humphre 2 3 Fulbright,24 Aiken,2 5 Saltonstall,
2b Clark,27
Church, Young, and Mansfield;30 the "majority of the Senate; 3 1
General Maxwell Taylor;32 various United States business interests
not involved in arms production;3 3 Professor Shulman;34 Dr. York.
3 5
Federal Republic of Germany
Con: Stra ss; 36 Adenauer;37 von Brentano;3 8 von Hassel;
3 9
Krome;40 Barzel; 1 "right wing of CDU party;" 142 unspecified "Bonn
militarists."t43
Pro: Schroeder;4 4 "Schroeder group;"
45 Erhard described as
somewhat "flexible. "4b
France
Con: General De Gaulle and unspecified French "extremists."7
'For example, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, July 27,
1963, NBO GMT; Moscow in German to Germany, July 28, 1963, 1030
GMT; TASS in English to Europe, August 3, 1963, 1147 GNT; Moscow
Domestic Service in Russian, August 9, 1963, 1900 GMT; Moscow in
English to eastern North America, September 7, 1963, 0112 GMT.
See, for example, TASS in English to Europe, July 29, 1963,
0948 GMT, and Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 21, 1963,
0300 GMT.
3 Moscow in German to Germany July 28, 1963, 1030 GMT; Mos-
cow in English to Britain, August ., 1963, 1900 GMT.
4TASS in English to Europe, July 29, 1963, 0948 GMT; Moscow
in Danish'to Denmark, August 2, 1963, 1600 GMT.
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5TASS in English to Europe, July 29, 1963, 0948 GMT; and
TASS in English to Europe, August 17, 1963, 1850 GMT.
6TASS in English to Europe, August 3, 1963, 1147 GMT;
editorial, "The Test Ban Talks," New Times, No. 29, July 24, 1963.
TYuri Yudin, "The American Business Community and the
Treaty," New Times, No. 35, September 4, 1963.
8TASS in English to Europe, August 3, 1963, 1147 GMT.
9Yudin, op. cit.
10 Ibid.
1 1Ibid.
12 ITASS in English to Europe, August 29, 1963, 1159 GMT.
3TASS in English to Europe, August 3, 1963, 1147 GMT.
14Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 11, 1963,
1400 GMT.
15TASS in English to Europe, July 29, 1963, 0948 GMT.
16Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 20, 1963, 1800
GMT; and Yudin, op. cit.
1 7TASS in English to Europe, September 6, 1963,1215 GMT.
18Yudin, op. cit.
1 9TASS in English to Europe, July 29, 1963, 1916 GMT; Moscow
in English to Britain, August 9, 1963, 1900 GMT; Moscow Domestic
Service in Russian, August 9, 1963, 1900 GMT.
2 0For example, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, July 27,
1963, 1430 GMT; TASS in English to Europe, August 3, 1963, 1900
GMT; Moscow in English to Southeast Asia and Australia, August 5,
1963, 1300 GMT; Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 18,
1963, 1400 GMT; TASS in English to Europe, September 3, 1963,
0624 GMT.
"For example, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 9,
1963, 1900 GMT; TASS in English to Europe, August 21, 1963, 0922
GMT; Moscow in Italian to Italy, August 21, 1963, 1900 GMT.
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2 2Izvestiia, August 15, 1963; Moscow in Italian to Italy,
August 21, 1963, 1900 GMT.
2 3For example, TASS in English to Europe, August 5, 1963,
1637 GMT; Yudin, op cit.; and TASS in English to Europe, Septem-
ber 7, 1963, 1930 GMT.
24TASS in English to Europe, August 5, 1963, 1637 GMT.
26Ibid.
2 TTASS in English to Europe, August 29, 1963, 1917 GMT; and
Yudin, op. cit.
28Yudin, op. cit.
29Ibd
30TASS in English to Europe, September 4, 1963, 1855 GMT;
Moscow in English to eastern North America, September 7, 1963,
0112 GMT.
3 1lMoscow Domestic Service, August 18, 1963, 1400 GMT.
32Moscow in Italian to Italy, August 21, 1963, 1900 GMT.
3 3Pravda, August 20, 1963; Yudin, op. cit.; Moscow in Italian
to Italy, August 21, 1963, 1900 GMT; TASS in Russian to Europe,
September 26, 1963, 2232 GMT.
34 TASS in Russian to Europe, August 26, 1963, 1920 GNT.
3 5 1bid.
o6M scow in English to Britain, August 9, 1963, 1900 GMT;
Moscow Domestic Service, August 16, 1963, 1800 GMT; Y. Grigoryev,
"Bonn and the Treaty," New Times, No. 36, September 11, 1963.
37Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 11, 1963, 14
GMT; Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 18, 1963, 1400
GMT; and Grigoryev, op. cit.
o8M scow Domestic Service in Russian, August 11, 1963, 1400
GMT; Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 16, 1963, 1800
GMT; and Grigoryev, op. cit.
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39Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 11, 1963, 1400
GMT.
G Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 16, 1963, 1800
4 1Ibid.
4 2Grigoryev, op. cit.
4For example, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, July 27,
1963, 1430 GMT; TASS in English to Europe, August 3, 1963, 1900
GMT; TASS in English to Europe, August 9, 1963, 0616 GMT.
44TASS in English to Europe, July 29, 1963, 0948 GMT; Moscow
Domestic Service in Russian, August 11, 1963, 1400 GMT; Grigoryev,
op. cit.
45Grigoryev, op. cit.
4 6Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 11, 1963, 1400
GMT.I
4
-TASS in English to Europe, July 29, 1963, 0948 GMT; TASS
in English to Europe, August 3, 1963, 1900 GMT; and Moscow
Domestic Service in Russian, August 4, 1963, 1900 GMT.
I I I
situation inhibited the formation of new multilateral NATO or
European nuclear forces. 1 It was also asserted that the Soviet
negotiating proposals that accompanied the test ban2 had provoked
"a tense struggle" among the NATO powers. 3 Noting the line-up of
1Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 12, 1963, 1900
GMT; Krasnaia zvezda, August 16, 1963.
2On July 26 in a Pravda interview Khrushchev proposed that
further efforts be devoted above all to the conclusion of a nonaggres-
sion pact; as additional measures he proposed the freezing or reduc-
tion of military budgets, implementation of measures to prevent
surprise attack, reduction in the numbers of foreign troops in East
and West Germany, and a Soviet-Western exchange of troop represent-
atives between forces stationed in Germany. Moscow Domestic
Service in Russian, July 26, 1963, 1400 GMT.
3Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, September 1, 1963,
1400 GMT.
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the NATO members on the issue of a nonaggression pact, Moscow added
that this struggle was "going on not only inside NATO but in every
Atlantic country."1 The Federal Republic of Germany was consistently
portrayed as the chief obstruction to further East-West agreement
and on occasion as "blackmailing" the United States to this end.2
French opposition to further East-West agreements was also stressed. 3
Perhaps most interesting, however, was the Soviet propaganda
treatment of the resumption of underground testing by the United
States almost immediately after the limited test ban was signed.
To some in the West the United States resumption of testing at
this particular moment might have seemed inappropriate. To some
in Moscow and in the Communist peace fronts it represented a good
opportunity for a propaganda line "exposing" the United States'
lack of good faith in seeking further measures. On September 4
Moscow broadcast a formal statement by J. D. Bernal, president of
the World Peace Council, charging that the United States test resump-
tion was "an affront to humanity" and"a direct blow against the
spirit of the agreement"; Bernal called upon the Communist peace
fronts to condemn the action of the United States.4 It is under-
stood, however, that Soviet news agencies were subsequently directed
not to publish or broadcast the Bernal message. Soviet media
appear to have continued the moratorium on propaganda opposing
the United States underground tests until October 12, 1963, when in
lIbid. The division on a nonaggression pact at the NATO
Council session in Paris late in August 1963 was reported as follows:
the United States, Britain, Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, Denmark,
and Italy for the pact; the Netherlands, Portugal, and Iceland for
it but with reservations; France, West Germany, Greece, and Turkey
opposed to the pact and even to East-West talks about it.
2See, for example, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, Septem-
ber 1, 1963, 1400 GMT.
3See, for example, Moscow in English to eastern North America,
August 12, 1963, 0030 GMT.
4TASS in English to Europe, September 4, 1963, 1901 GMT.
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a broadcast to Italy the tests were criticized by Moscow as
not being in the spirit of the limited test ban treaty.1
In mid-October 1963 another instance of Soviet propaganda
restraint may have occurred in connection with the Soviet-American
informal "agreement" not to orbit nuclear weapons in space. On
October 10 Moscow Domestic Service told the Soviet people that,
following Gromyko's proposal of September 19 to the General Assembly,
an "agreement in principle" had been reached by the American, Soviet,
and British governments not to orbit nuclear weapons.2 On October 10
and 11 Mr. Gromyko had discussions with Secretaxy Rusk and Presi-
dent Kennedy and then proceeded to New York for discussions with
the Soviet delegation. On October 17 Radio Moscow reported that
the General Assembly had unanimously approved the "expression" of
the Soviet and American "intention" not to orbit nuclear weapons. 3
At some point between October 10 and 17 an "agreement" or
"agreement in principle" among the three powers had become a Soviet-
American "expression of intention" endorsed by the General Assembly.
Possibly the Soviet government exaggerated the extent of the prelimin-
ary agreement, although Moscow cited The New York Times as having
greeted it with satisfaction. 5 In any case, not only did Moscow avoid
commenting on the apparent change in the American position, but it
also emphasized the General Assembly resolution as representing "a
new impor ant step toward further relaxation of international
tension." (Soviet propaganda on the resolution also noted that
ioscow in Italian to Italy, October 12, 1963, 1900 GMT.
2 loscow Domestic Service in Russian, October 10, 1963, o600
GMT.
3TASS in English to Europe, October 17, 1963, 1759 GMT.
4On October 8 in a foreign broadcast Moscow referred to "the
New York agreement" as "further proof that the policy of peaceful
coexistence has gained the upper hand" over the Pentagon and un-
named "U.S. politicians." Moscow in French to Africa, October 8,
1963, 1600 GMT.
5Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, October 10, 1963,
o6oo GMT.
TASS in English to Europe, October 19, 1963, 2107 GMT.
See IzvestLia editorial of same date.
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it had been received with "indignation" and "disappointment" by
Senator Goldwater agd "the most aggressive-minded elements of U.S.
military quarters.')
5. Stiffening of the Propaganda Line, October 1963-April
1964. On October 21, 1963, as talks on East-West problems contin-
ued between Washington and Moscow and as Khrushchev continued to
seek to convene a conference of the international Communist move-
ment to excommunicate the Chinese, TASS released the first major
Soviet warning to the West since the test ban was signed. It took
the form of a warning that the NATO talks begun on October 11 to
set up the MLF could obstruct progress toward further East-West
agreements; 2 it emphasized that the Western powers could not ver-
bally oppose the spread of nuclear weapons while in practice seeking
to supply them to the Bundeswehr.
This slight hardening of the Soviet propaganda line was also
reflected in new activity by the Communist peace fronts, which had
been dormant since the "World Congress of Women" in Moscow in June
1963. Thus Khrushchev's October 25 warning against allowing the
detente to lead to the "moral and spiritual demobilization of the
forces of disarmament" 3 was followed by "Peace Week" (November 17-
24) in France and the Warsaw session of the World Peace Council
(November 28-December 1). The latter called for renewed mass
actions, emphasizing a comprehensive test ban, opposition to nuclear
proliferation including the MLF., nuclear-free zones, and the mobili-
zation of "pressure" on the ENDC to progress toward a GCD treaty. 4
The slightly less conciliatory Soviet diplomatic and propa-
ganda-agitational line on the disarmament issue after the under-
standing not to orbit nuclear weapons in space was prolonged by
Khrushchev's continuing inability to cope with the Chinese and by
the improbability of further agreements for some time after the
assassination of President Kennedy. Soviet propaganda became
increasingly preoccupied with comments on Western diplomatic acti-
vity to establish the MLF. Khrushchev's December 13 announcements
1TASS in English to Europe, October 19, 1963, 1433 GMT.
TASS in English to Europe, October 21, 1963, 1213 GMT.
30bserver, "Moscow Programme," New Times, No. 44, November 4,
1963.
4
Mikhail Kotov, "The Widening Peace Front," New Times, No. 50,
December 18, 1963.
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of a cut in the Soviet military budget and a possible unilateral
force reduction were characterized by Soviet media as tension-
reducing moves designed to influence the MLF discussions at the
Paris NATO Ministerial Council session of December 16 and 17.
By the end of the year Khrushchev was speaking in terms of dis-
armament by "mutual example."
As the ENDC resumed in January 1964, Moscow proposed a
series of partial measures that were advertised as facilitating
GCD. By March, as the Soviet Union began again to seek support
for a world Communist conference and as the ENDC settled down to
unproductive discussion, Mr. Gromyko attacked the West for barring
all progress in Geneva while Radio Moscow asserted that the Soviet
draft GCD treaty was "the only plan" that could form the basis of
negotiation.1
On April 20, 1964 the joint declaration of intent to reduceI
production of fissionable materials was announced and characterized
by the Soviets as "a major new step toward easing international
tension." 2 No further agreements, formal or informal, took place
in the arms control area during the remainder of the period before
Khrushchev was deposed, and Soviet propaganda continued to stress
Western obstruction in the ENDC.
It is difficult to avoid the impression that the Soviet Union's
continuous propaganda line, like the general lack of conciliation in
its public negotiating posture, was aimed as much at covering the
Soviet left flank against internal and external criticism from
"orthodox" Communists who objected t-o conciliation and an agree-
ment with "imperialism" as it was to putting political pressure on
the West to take a more reasonable approach to the control of modern
weapons. The Soviet leadership's vulnerability to the charge of
collusion with "imperialism" that could arise from accommodation with
the West suggests that when the Kremlin seeks an agreement on arms
control, it may wish to remove the negotiations from the public forums
and conduct them privately, perhaps while continuing a somewhat hard
propaganda line.
1 Moscow in German to Germany, March 10, 1964, 1245 GMI'.
2Pravda, April 23, 1964.
